73 So. 899 | Ala. | 1917
Lead Opinion
(1-4) While the order was written upon the letter head of the West Huntsville Cotton Mill Company and signed by Pratt as president, the order was not signed by said West Huntsville Company, or by Pratt as president of said company, and the only thing to indicate that the order was for said company was the use of its stationery and the fact that Pratt was president of said company, and this was not conclusive that the order was for the said West Huntsville Company. There was proof that there was a New York & Alabama Oil Company of which Pratt was president, that the appellant had previous dealings with this company, and had in fact received notice, prior to the shipment of the articles here involved, that they were ordered by and for the New York & Alabama Oil Company. Therefore it was a question for the jury as to whether or not the order was sent in for the appellee or the New York & Alabama
(5, 6) We think, however, that the trial court erred in the rulings as to the first count, as there was plenty of evidence from which the jury could infer that the appellant made the sale to the appellee, and from which the jury could also infer that Pratt knew that the sale was intended to be made to the appellee, and not the New York & Alabama Company, and if he, as president of both companies, received the goods which he knew were intended for appellee and turned them over to the New York & Alabama Company the appellee would be liable for his act, and upon an account for goods sold, notwithstanding the order, when made by Pratt, was intended for the New York & Alabama Company. Nor do we think that the letter from Pratt of November 13th, signed as president of the New York & Alabama Company, was conclusive of the fact that the order there referred to was for said New York & Alabama Company. Moreover, it was a question for the jury as to whether or not the appellant received it before the shipment of the 15th, or if it had time to cancel the same.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Rehearing
(7) In reversing this case because of so much of the oral charge, which practically eliminated count 1 from the case, the fact was not suggested in brief, and was not noticed by the court, that the record does not affirmatively disclose that the exception to the said oral charge was taken in open court, in the presence of the jury and before the jury retired. Therefore the action of the court in this respect cannot be considered.—Carter v. Tenn. Co., 180 Ala. 367, 61 South. 65, and cases there cited. The rehearing is granted, the judgment of reversal set aside, and the case is affirmed.
