104 Ky. 431 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1898
delivered the opinion of the court.
This action was instituted by the plaintiffs, Robt. N. Landin' and Fannie E. Lander, his wife, against John McLeod, receiver of the Ohio Yallev Railway'. It is alleged in the petition that the plaintiffs are husband and wife, and citizens of Hopkinsville, Ivy., and that they are colored people, and citizens of the United States. It is farther alleged that said railway was in the possession and under the control of said McLeod as receiver aforesaid; and that said McLeod, through his agents, etc., has been and is operating it as a common carrier, and said railway extends from the city of Evansville, Inth, through
The defendant filed a demurrer to said petition.
The answer of the defendant is as follows: The defendant for answer to the petition herein denies that while plaintiff, Fannie E. Lander, was seated in one of its passenger cars and waiting for the train to start the conductor in charge of this defendant’s car came to her and, without demanding her ticket, or making any explanation to her of his conduct, required that she should give up her seat and leave said coach, or to occupy a seat in the front coach usually called the smoker, or in a small compartment in the front part thereof, or to get off of the
The defendant, for further answer, says that the plaintiff bought a ticket at Hopkinsville, Ky., to Mayfield, Ky., and started to board one of defendant’s trains at Hopkins-ville, Ivy.; and, when she made an effort to board said train, the brakeman in charge of said train, and under the employment of this defendant, was standing at the steps of the coach, where it was his duty to stand, and there informed the plaintiff before she got into any coach to go into the colored coach, the apartment set apart for colored people, as required by the laws of this State. The plaintiff refused to do this, and went to the white coach. The conductor thereupon went into the white coach, and politely informed the plaintiff of the law of this State providing for separate coaches for colored and white passengers, and politely requested her to obey the law, and to go into the compartment provided for colored people, and took the plaintiff’s basket or baggage and carried it into the colored compartment for her, and requested her to go into said car. The plaintiff, without being forced in any way and without any force being used upon her in any way, consented to go into said coach, and did go into said coach. The conductor did not take hold of the plaintiff," and did not force her from her seat, by any violence whatever, but, after explaining to her about the law and the requirements of the law, the plaintiff voluntarily, in company with her husband, left the white coach, and went into the coach provided for the colored people. No insulting language was used by the conductor or any other employe of the train to the plaintiff, and she was not in any way mistreated or offended by any misconduct
The reply is a traverse of the affirmative matters of the answer, and the affirmative averments of the reply were,, by agreement, controverted of record.
A jury trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $125, and, appellant’s motion for a new-trial having been overruled, the prosecutes this, appeal...
The instruction given by the court is as follows: “The court instructs the jury that, under the law and the evidence in this case, the plaintiff had the right to take a seat where she did in the ladies’ coach, and that any attempt on the part of the defendant, his agents or employes in charge of the train, to make her move into or take a seat in another coach was a violation of law and of her rights; ánd, if she was required by any conductor or any agent or servant of the defendant so to remove, the jury must find for plaintiffs the damages they have sustained; and in so finding they are not confined to actual damages, but may take into consideration the humiliation and injury to the feelings of the plaintiff, and the nature and condition of the compartment which she was required to occupy, and find in any sum not exceeding the amount claimed in the petition.”
The defendant asked the three following instructions, which were refused by the court:
“(1) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff got into the ladies’ coach in defendant’s car at Hopkinsville, Ky., and was invited, in a polite and courteous- wajq by the conductor of said car, to leave the same, and go into the compartment prepared for colored passengers; and they believe from the evidence, further, that said compartment prepared for colored passengers was substantially as comfortable in all of its appointments as the car from which she was invited to leave; and they further believe from the evidence that the conductor was*439 not guilty of any- misconduct towards the plaintiff, and ' used no more force than was necessary to compel a compliance with his request — then the law is for the defendant, and the jury should so find.
“(2) The court instructs the jury that it was the duty of' the defendant to provide separate coaches for colored and white passengers, and it was the duty of the defendant* through its agents, officers, or employes, to compel colored passengers and white passengers to occupy the respective compartments prepared for them and it was the duty of the plaintiff to obey this regulation of the company; and if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant was in good faith at the time enforcing the.regulation, and using no more force than was necessary to compel the plaintiff to conform to this regulation, then the law is for .the defendant, and they should so find.
“(3) The court instructs the jury that, in the event they should find for plaintiff, they can only find compensatory damages; that is, such damages as would* actually compensate her for any injury done to her, including any mental anguish or mortification to her feelings resulting by reason of the conduct of defendant’s agents and employes in compelling her to leave the ladies’ coach and go. into the colored compartment.”
It will be readily conceded that it was the duty of the-appellant to furnish the appellee a seat in a coach as good and comfortable as the others used or set apart for the-accommodation of first-class white passengers, and also-that appellant would not be justifiable in using unnecessary force in requiring plaintiff to occupy the coach set. apart for colored passengers; and, while there is some conflict in the proof in this respect, the chief, if not the-sole, question discussed in the briefs on file is the con
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Britton v. A. C. Airline Railway Co., 88 N. C. 542, used the following language: “Equally well settled does it seem to be, both upon principle and authority, that amongst those reasonable regulations which they have a right to adopt is the one of, classifying their passengers, and assigning them to separate, though not unequal, accommodations. This right, as regards the separation of the white and colored races in public places, has been expressly and fully recognized in many of the courts,, both State and National [quoting West Chester, &c., Railroad Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. St. 205; Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. Rep. 485], In some of the cases it is said to be not barely a right appertaining to the carrier, but a positive duty, whenever its exercise may be necessary in order to prevent contacts or collisions arising from natural or well-known antipathies, such as are likely to lead to disturbances from promiscuous intermingling.”
The Supreme Court of Illinois'in Chicago & N. W. Railway Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill., 187, said: “It is the undoubted right of railroad companies to make all reasonable rules and regulations for the safety and comfort of passengers v traveling on their line of road. It is not only their right, but their duty, to make such rules and regulations. It is alike the interest of the companies and the public that such rules should be established and enforced, and ample
In discussing the question under consideration, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in C. O. & S. W. Railroad Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 615 [4 S. W. 5], said: “We know of no rule that requires railroad companies to yield to the disposition of passengers to arbitrarily determine as to the coach in which they take passage.”
The case of Day v. Owen, reported in 5 Mich. 525, was an action to recover damages against a defendant because of his refusal to allow Day, a colored man, to take cabin passage in defendant’s boat from Detroit to Toledo. One of the defenses interposed was that, by the regulations and established course of the business of the steamboat men, colored persons were not received as cabin passengers, and were not allowed to use the cabin as such passengers, and said regulation and course of business was averred to be reasonable. The court in that case said: “The refusal to allow plaintiff the privilege of the cabin, on his tendering cabin fare, was nothing more or less than denying him certain accommodations while being transported, from which he was excluded by the rules and regulations of the boat. The rules and regulations must be reasonable, and, to be so, they shoulld have for their object the accommodation of the passengers. * * * As the duty of carriers is imposed by law for the convenience of the community at large, and not of individuals, except so far as they are a component part of the community, the law would defeat its own object if it required the carrier, for the accommodation of particular individuals, to incommode the community at large.”
The same principle is announced in West Chester &
In Murphy v. Western A. Railroad Co., 23 Fed. Rep., 637, U. S. Circuit Court, Judge Key in his charge to the jury, said: “Again, I believe that, where the races are numerous, a railroad may set apart certain cars to be occupied by white people, and certain other cars to be occupied by colored people, so as to avoid complaint and friction; but, if the railroad charge the same fare to each race, it must furnish, substantially, like and equal accommodations.” It, however, appears in the case supra that the railroad did' not furnish equal accommodations, and the colored man was allowed to recover.
In the United States District Court of Maryland, in the •case of McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 Fed. Rep. 639, the syllabus of the decision reads as follows: “Plaintiff, an educated colored clergyman, the holder of a first-class ticket on defendant’s steamboat, when the supper bell rang, seated himself at the table; and on the captain requesting him to move to another table because the other passengers had complained of his presence, he refused. The captain then had another table fixed up for the other passengers, and plaintiff was left alone, his supper being furnished him. Held, that there was no discrimination against plaintiff on which to base a libel for damages against the owner of the boat.”
It was said in the case of Houck v. Southern Pac. Railway Co., in the United States Circuit Court for Texas, reported in 38 Fed Rep., 226, in substance, that a railway company, in the management of its complicated interests, may be authorized in law, on showing a proper or sufficient-state of facts, to establish in the opinion of the court the reasonableness of the rule, in setting apart one or more of
It will be seen from the authorities cited that the appellant was authorized to establish a rule requiring white passengers and colored passengers to occupy separate coaches; and whether the law relied on by appellant is constitutional or not, yet if it did adopt the requirements of the law as a rule, and the rule was reasonable, all passengers were legally bound to abide by the rule; and it may be safely assumed that such a rule, in this State, is .a reasonable rule, and is not unjust either to the white or colored people.
The important question presented for decision is whether or not the Kentucky statute requiring separate coaches or compartments for white and colored passengers is in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of this State. The statute in question is embraced in sections 795-801, inclusive, of the Kentucky Statutes. The assumption by some colored persons, and by some of the white race, to the effect that the statute implies or assumes that the colored race is an inferior race, is not well founded. It is well known that a large portion of the white race is opposed to being required to occupy the same seat, or to travel in the same coaches that are occupied by the colored race, and it is wholly immaterial whether the colored race shares the same feeling in that regard towards the white race or not, but the presumption is.
In the case of Quinn, etc. v. L. & N. Railroad Co., 17 Ky. Law Rep. 811 [32 S. W. 742], the court had under consider-1 ation the claim of appellant, who was a colored lady, for j damages against the appellee, based upon'the allegation j that the appellee permitted a white person to go in and re- \ main in the car assigned to colored passengers, and which was occupied by her, and while such person was permitted to remain there he used obscene and profane language, thus humiliating and injuring appellant. This court held that she had a cause of action, and reversed the judgment •of the lower court on account of error of instructions, the instructions not being sufficiently explicit as to the right of the party to recover. In Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Com., 18 Ky. Law Rep. 491 [37 S. W. 79], the court again recognized the validity of the law; and to the same effect is the case of Bailey v. L. & N. Railroad Co., 19 Ky. Law
The statute of Mississippi of March 2, 1888, required all railroads carrying passengers in that state to provide equal and separate accommodations to the white and colored races. It also provided that all railroad companies that shall refuse or neglect, within sixty days after the approval of the act, to comply with the requirements, should be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction fined not more than $500. The Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. was indicted- and fined in the court of Mississippi for failure to comply with the law in question, and, the judgment of the lower court having been affirmed by the Supremo Court of Mississippi, appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which court affirmed the judgment of the Mississippi court. In discussing the question, the court said, 133 U. S. 587, [10 Sup. Ct. 348]: “So far as the first section is concerned (and it is with that alone we have to do), its provisions are fully complied with when to trains within the State is attached a separate car for colored passengers. This may cause an extra expense to the railroad company; but not more so than State statutes requiring certain accommodations at depots, compelling trains to stop atcrossingof other railroads, and a multitude of other matters confessedly within the power of the State. No question arises, under
It will be seen that the' appellee in the case at bar purchased a ticket from Hopkinsville to Mayfield, the entire trip being within the State of Kentucky; and, moreover, it appears that she would leave the appellant’s road at Princeton, Ky., and there board another train for May-field, her destination. It, therefore, seems clear to us that the decision of the Supreme Court, supra, is conclusive of the constitutionality of the act in question, so far as appellees in this case are concerned. It is true that the appellant railroad extends to Evansville, in the State of Indiana, but that fact can in no wise render the statute in question invalid as to the duty of the railroad to respect and enforce the statute in question.
We have also been referred ■ to the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, May, 1896, reported in 163 U. S. 537, [16 Sup; Ct. 1138.] We quote as follows from the opinion of the court in that case: “This case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana passed in 1890, providing for separate railway carriages for the white and colored races. Acts 1890, No. 111, p. 152.
It seems to us that the foregoing decision conclusively settles that it was the duty of the appellant to assign to the appellee a coach separate from a coach set apart for white persons. It may be true that the railroad under-consideration in the case supra commenced and ended in the State, of Louisiana, but we do not think that the court was at all governed in its conclusion by that fact.
It is insisted for appellee that the act under consideration undertakes to regulate or control as to inter-State passengers, and that that portion of the statute is invalid,, as being in conflict with the inter-State commerce clause of the United States Constitution, and that the act is inseparable, and therefore it must all be held invalid. We do not think that such contention is tenable. It seems to-us that such contention is in conflict with the decision,, hereinbefore referred to, of the Supreme Court of the-United States in the case of Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S., 587, [10 Sup. Ct., 348], and also in-conflict with the well-settled rules of construction. If it were conceded (which is not) that the statute is invalid as. to inter-State passengers, the proper construction to be given it would then be that the Legislature did not so intend it, but only intended it to appty to transportation within the State, and therefore it should be held valid as to such passengers. It seems to us that a passenger taking passage in this State, and railroad companies receiving-passengers in this State, are bound to obey the law in respect to this matter, so long as they remain within the jurisdiction of the State.
It results from the foregoing that the court erred in-giving instruction No. 1, and also erred in refusing the in
Separate opinions concurring in the result were delivered by Burnam and Du Relie, justices, as follows:
delivered a separate opinion as follows:
The validity of the act of the Legislature known as the “Separate Coach Bill” has been approved in a number of decisions rendered by this court; and the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S., 537, [16 Sup. Ct., 1138], in which a majority of that court concurred, seems to finally settle the question as to the constitutional right of the States to pass such laws. If the question were an open •one, I should feel it my duty to dissent in this case, as in my opinion the act in question is an unwarrantable interference with the rights of railroad companies to conduct their business in the interest of the general public, and to promote the safety and comfort of their passengers; is founded upon race prejudice, which tends to engender bad feeling between the white and colored races; and is, in its operation, prejudicial to the public welfare.
delivered a separate opinion as follows:
It appears to be well settled by adjudicated cases that a railroad company may lawfully adopt a rule of conduct for its passengers in the terms of the separate coach law. It seems to me indisputable that whatever a carrier of passengers may do by regulation the government of the State may, in the exercise of its inherent police power, by law require the carrier to do. The policy of such a law, its ultimate purpose, or the reasons which led to its enactment, are not matter for our consid