{¶ 1} Ohio Valley Associated Builders and Contractors (“OVABC”) appeals from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment against it due to a lack of standing. In a cross-appeal, DeBra-Kuempel (“DeBra”) contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for attorney fees under R.C. 4115.16 and Civ.R. 11.
{¶2} The record reflects that OVABC is an association of builders and contractors. In October 2009, it filed an administrative complaint against DeBra with the Ohio Department of Commerce, alleging that DeBra had violated Ohio’s prevailing-wage law. The complaint involved an HVAC contract that DeBra had been awarded as part of a public-improvement project for Wright State University. The project is identified by the parties as the “Wright State University LAR/Cage Wash/Surgery Project.” After 60 days passed without a final determination by the Ohio Department of Commerce, OVABC filed the present action in the trial court. DeBra later moved for summary judgment, arguing that OVABC lacked standing because (1) none of OVABC’s members had bid against DeBra for the HVAC contract, and (2) neither OVABC nor any of its members had suffered any damages. DeBra also moved for attorney fees.
{¶ 4} In its sole assignment of error, OVABC contends that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked standing as an “interested party” to file a statutory prevailing-wage action against DeBra. The issue presented by OVABC’s appeal is whether it must have a member who had bid directly against DeBra on the same contract to have standing to pursue its prevailing-wage action. OVABC contends that standing exists because two of its members, Ohio Electrical Services and C & N Industrial, bid on other contracts, namely the electrical and lead contracts, within the project, even though they did not bid against DeBra for the HVAC contract. Resolution of this issue turns on R.C. 4115.16 and R.C. 4115.03(F).
{¶ 5} R.C. 4115.16 gives an “interested party” the ability to file an administrative complaint with the Ohio Department of Commerce. If no ruling is made within 60 days, the statute authorizes the interested party to file suit in common pleas court. The phrase “interested party” is defined in R.C. 4115.03(F) as follows:
{¶ 6} “(F) ‘Interested party,’ with respect to a particular public improvement, means:
{¶ 7} “(1) Any person who submits a bid for the purpose of securing the award of a contract for construction of the public improvement;
{¶ 8} “(2) Any person acting as a subcontractor of a person mentioned in division (F)(1) of this section;
{¶ 9} “(3) Any bona fide organization of labor which has as members or is authorized to represent employees of a person mentioned in division (F)(1) or (2) of this section and which exists, in whole or in part, for the purpose of negotiating with employers concerning the wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment of employees;
{¶ 10} “(4) Any association having as members any of the persons mentioned in division (F)(1) or (2) of this section.”
{¶ 12} “ ‘OVABC would have this court allow an association having a member that submits a bid on any aspect of a public construction contract to have standing to challenge any contract awarded to another entity for any other work, even if, as here, that other work is unrelated to what the member bid on. This court cannot countenance that interpretation of R.C. 4115.03(F). Such an interpretation is contrary to basic principles of standing.’ ”
{¶ 13} The trial court then agreed with York that the word “contract” in R.C. 4115.03(F)(1) means “the contract at issue” (i.e., the specific contract awarded to the defendant for HVAC from which the alleged prevailing-wage violation arose). The court in York also read the phrase “public improvement” in R.C. 4115.03(F) as meaning “the specific improvement encompassed by that contract.” York declined to read “public improvement” in “the broadest sense possible, i.e. the entire construction project, especially when doing so would contradict general principles of standing.”
{¶ 14} In its opening appellate brief, OVABC cites several cases that it believes undermine the trial court’s analysis in both York and the present case. In response, DeBra argues that those cases are distinguishable and that York was decided correctly. After the opening round of briefing, however, two Ohio appellate districts filed opinions addressing the precise issue before us.
{¶ 15} In Ohio Valley Associated Builders & Contrs. v. Indus. Power Sys., Inc.,
{¶ 16} In the second case, Ohio Valley Associated Builders & Contrs. v. Rapier Elec., Inc.,
{¶ 17} Unlike the unanimous Sixth District decision, the Twelfth District’s ruling included a dissent. As the Butler County Common Pleas Court had in York, the dissenting judge “rejected] an interpretation of R.C. 4115.03(F) that grants standing to any association having a member that bid on any part of a public improvement project to challenge an entirely different contract within that project.” The dissenting judge reasoned that “the General Assembly intended to afford ‘interested party’ standing under R.C. 4115.03(F) to a narrower class of litigants, namely, parties that bid on the same contract.”
{¶ 18} Having reviewed the cases cited by the parties, as well as the recent rulings by the Sixth and Twelfth Districts, we hold that OVABC qualifies as an interested party under R.C. 4115.03(F)(4) and, therefore, has standing. We reach this conclusion for at least five reasons. First, on its face, the language of R.C. 4115.03(F) supports it. As set forth above, the statute grants an association standing if it has any members who submit “a bid for the purpose of securing the award of a contract for construction of the public improvement.” (Emphasis added.) The phrase “public improvement” is defined in R.C. 4115.03(C) to include “all buildings, roads, streets, alleys, sewers, ditches, sewage disposal plants, water works, and all other structures or works constructed by a public authority of the state or any political subdivision thereof or by any person who, pursuant to a contract with a public authority, constructs any structure for a public authority of the state or a political subdivision thereof.”
{¶ 19} This definition suggests that “public improvement” encompasses an entire project, whether it be the construction of a building or some other public work. It follows that a particular public improvement might involve separate contracts for its various components. In this context, we believe that the most
{¶ 20} Second, our reading of R.C. 4115.03(F)(1) is consistent with the Sixth and Twelfth Districts’ recognition that “ ‘[c]ourts have construed the definition of an interested party broadly to further the purposes of the prevailing-wage law.’ ” Rapier,
{¶ 21} Third, as both the Sixth and Twelfth Districts recognized, our reading of R.C. 4115.03(F)(1) is consistent with the legislative intent of the prevailing-wage law, which is “ ‘ “to provide a comprehensive, uniform framework for, [inter alia,] worker rights and remedies vis-a-vis private contractors, subcontractors and materialmen engaged in the construction of public improvements” ’ ” and “ ‘ “to support the integrity of the collective bargaining process by preventing the undercutting of employee wages in the private construction sector.” ’ ” Rapier at ¶ 12, quoting Indus. Power Sys.,
{¶ 22} Fourth, we agree with the Sixth and Twelfth Districts that common-law standing requirements, such as establishing a “personal stake” in a case, do not apply when the issue is statutory standing under R.C. 4115.03(F). “ ‘Standing does not flow from the common-law “personal stake” doctrine alone.’ ” Indus. Power Sys. at ¶ 21, quoting Middletown v. Ferguson (1986),
{¶ 23} Fifth, our reading of R.C. 4115.03(F)(1) is consistent with the way the phrase “public improvement” is treated elsewhere in Ohio prevailing-wage law. For example, “[i]n order for prevailing-wage law to apply to a given public improvement the cost of the construction must pass a threshold level[.]” W. Unity ex rel. Beltz v. Merillat, Williams App. No. WM-03-016,
{¶ 24} “(C) A public authority may not subdivide a project into component parts or projects of less than the threshold unless such projects under the threshold are conceptually separate and unrelated to each other, or encompass independent and unrelated needs of the public authority. Phases may be considered as separate projects only where the public authority has proposed construction of the project in separate and distinct phases, the proposal to construct in phases is based upon lack of adequate funding necessary to award the contract as a whole, and a period of six months or longer of construction inactivity will occur between each phase. A single project which exceeds the fifteen-thousand-dollar limit as set forth in this rule shall constitute construction of a public improvement regardless of how many separate contracts are included within the project.” (Emphasis added.)1
{¶ 25} The foregoing language makes clear that each individual contract does not pertain to its own separate “public improvement.” Rather, absent special circumstances, “the public improvement” constitutes the project as a whole even though it may involve separate contracts for its component parts. This further supports our conclusion that OVABC has standing under R.C. 4115.03(F) because two of its members bid on “a contract” for “the public improvement” at Wright State University.
{¶ 26} Finally, we reject DeBra’s argument that OVABC cannot pursue its lawsuit because it does not meet the requirements of Civ.R. 17(A), which requires an action to “be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” The phrase “real party in interest” means “ ‘one who has a real interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and not merely an interest in the action itself, i.e., one who is directly benefitted or injured by the outcome of the case.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Swayne, Greene App. No. 2009 CA 65,
{¶27} Common-law standing, which requires a plaintiff to have a “personal stake” in a lawsuit, is similar to Civ.R. 17(A)’s real-party-in-interest requirement. Indeed, one who has standing by possessing a “personal stake” in a lawsuit undoubtedly also has a “real interest in the subject matter of the litigation.” Thus, courts often conflate common-law standing and Civ.R. 17, treating them as one and the same. See, e.g., State ex rel. Jones v. Suster (1998),
{¶ 28} As set forth above, however, the present case involves statutory standing, not common-law standing. Ohio’s prevailing-wage law expressly authorizes “interested parties” to file an enforcement action in common pleas court. Unlike common-law standing, it does not follow that a party granted statutory standing will be “directly benefited or injured by the outcome of the case,” as required by Civ.R. 17(A). The present case illustrates the distinction. Although OVABC qualifies as an interested party and, thus, has statutory standing, the record does not reflect that OVABC itself, as an association, directly will benefit or suffer from the outcome of the case.
{¶ 29} Despite this fact, Civ.R. 17(A) does not prevent OVABC from pursuing its lawsuit. Notably, Civ.R. 17(A) recognizes that a party granted statutory standing may not meet the definition of a real party in interest. Thus, it creates an exception, providing that “a party authorized by statute” may sue in its name “without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought.” Cf. Celebrezze v. Hughes (1985),
{¶ 30} Based on the reasoning set forth above, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that OVABC lacked interested-party standing under R.C. 4115.03(F).
{¶ 31} DeBra’s cross appeal contends that the trial court erred in denying its request for attorney fees under R.C. 4115.16 and Civ.R. 11. In support of its ruling, the trial court reasoned:
{¶ 32} “The Court does not find Defendant’s argument well-taken that it should be granted attorney’s fees pursuant to O.R.C. 4115.16(D). The Court did not find that no violation of the Prevailing Wage law occurred. Further, the Court cannot say that Plaintiffs filing of the Complaint was unreasonable or without foundation. To this Court’s knowledge, neither the Ohio Supreme Court nor the Second District Court of Appeals has made a ruling as to the exact issue before this Court on standing. Further, the Court did not rule on the merits of Plaintiffs wage violation claim.
{¶ 33} “The Court does not find that Defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees under Ohio Civil Rule 11. The Court does not find that the filing of Plaintiffs Complaint was a willful violation of Civil Rule 11, or that it was frivolous.”
{¶ 34} Our review of DeBra’s appellate brief reveals two possible grounds for awarding attorney fees: (1) OVABC’s standing claim lacks even arguable merit, and (2) OVABC’s allegation of a prevailing-wage violation lacks any factual or evidentiary support. In light of our analysis above, however, DeBra plainly is not entitled to attorney fees based on OVABC’s lack of standing. As for the merits of OVABC’s allegations, the case has not proceeded far enough for us to determine whether they are wholly baseless. As the trial court pointed out, its ruling did not address the merits of OVABC’s allegations. Instead, it dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. Because the merits of OVABC’s allegations have not yet been examined below, we cannot say that the trial court erred in
{¶ 35} The judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is reversed and remanded insofar as it dismissed OVABC’s complaint for lack of standing. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed with respect to the denial of DeBra’s motion for attorney fees.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded.
Notes
. In W. Unity ex rel. Beltz v. Merillat, Williams App. No. WM-03-016,
. DeBra separately argues that no standing exists because neither OVABC nor any of its members suffered any damages. We need not address this issue further because the trial court declined to decide it below. As set forth above, the trial court found the issue moot in light of its determination that OVABC lacked standing under R.C. 4115.03(F).