Ohio v. BrookshireOhio v. Brookshire
Rendered on the 31st day of October, 2014.
FAIN, J.
{¶ 2} We conclude that the mandatory transfer provisions of
{¶ 3} Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Reversed, in part, and Affirmed, in part, and this cause is Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Brookshire Confesses That He Was Involved in Robberies at Burger King and Penn Station Restaurants
{¶ 4} On January 9, 2013, men in masks robbed a Burger King fast-food restaurant. On January 20, 2013, men in masks robbed a Penn Station fast-food restaurant. During the robberies, the masked men held individuals at gunpoint. The police investigation of the Penn
II. Course of the Proceedings
{¶ 5} Delinquency complaints were filed against Brookshire. The complaint in Montgomery County Juvenile Court Case No. 2013-639 alleged that he had committed offenses that if he were an adult would have constituted one count of Aggravated Robbery and five counts of Kidnapping, all with firearm specifications. This case related to Brookshire’s actions in the Burger King robbery. The delinquency complaint in Montgomery County Juvenile Court Case No. 2013-468 alleged that he had committed offenses that if he were an adult would have constituted four counts of Aggravated Robbery and three counts of Kidnapping, all with firearm specifications. This case related to Brookshire’s alleged actions in the Penn Station robbery.
{¶ 6} After the delinquency complaints were filed, the State filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to the General Division of the Common Pleas Court (“adult court”) so that Brookshire could be tried as an adult. The juvenile court held a probable cause hearing in order to determine whether transfer to adult court was appropriate pursuant to
{¶ 7} Following the probable cause hearing, the juvenile court found that Brookshire was 17 years old at the time of the charged offenses, the acts alleged in the complaint would be felonies if committed by an adult, and there was probable cause to believe that Brookshire was responsible for committing Aggravated Robbery and Kidnapping in the two robberies. Based on these findings, the juvenile court relinquished its jurisdiction and transferred the cases to the adult
{¶ 8} In March 2013, a Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted Brookshire on one count of Aggravated Robbery and five counts of Kidnapping for Brookshire’s alleged actions in the Burger King robbery. Each count had a firearm specification attached to it. The Grand Jury also indicted Brookshire on four counts of Aggravated Robbery and three counts of Kidnapping for Brookshire’s alleged actions in the Penn Station robbery. Each count had a firearm specification attached to it.
{¶ 9} Ultimately, Brookshire pled guilty to the following counts: one count of Aggravated Robbery with a firearm specification relating to the Burger King robbery; two counts of Kidnapping relating to the Burger King robbery; two counts of Aggravated Robbery relating to the Penn Station robbery; and one count of Kidnapping relating to the Penn Station robbery. In exchange for his guilty pleas, the remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. The adult court found Brookshire guilty of these six counts. The court sentenced Brookshire to the following: six years on the Aggravated Robbery count in the Burger King robbery and three years on the firearm specification; five years each on the two Kidnapping counts involving the Burger King robbery; six years each on the two Aggravated Robbery counts involving the Penn Station robbery; and five years on the Kidnapping count involving the Penn Station robbery. The adult court ordered that the three-year sentence on the firearm specification would be served consecutively to the six-year sentence on the Aggravated Robbery sentence. The remaining sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other, for a total prison sentence of nine years.
{¶ 10} Brookshire appeals from the adult court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
{¶ 11} Brookshire’s first three assignments of error state:
THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED WHEN IT TRANSFERRED DELAQUAN BROOKSHIRE’S CASE TO ADULT COURT BECAUSE THE MANDATORY-TRANSFER PROVISIONS IN
R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) ANDR.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b) VIOLATE A CHILD’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THEFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ;OHIO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 .THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED WHEN IT TRANSFERRED DELAQUAN BROOKSHIRE’S CASE TO ADULT COURT BECAUSE THE MANDATORY-TRANSFER PROVISIONS IN
R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) ANDR.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b) VIOLATE A CHILD’S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION AS GUARANTEED BY THEFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ;OHIO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 .THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED WHEN IT TRANSFERRED DELAQUAN BROOKSHIRE’S CASE TO ADULT COURT BECAUSE THE MANDATORY-TRANSFER PROVISIONS IN
R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b) ANDR.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(b) VIOLATE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL ANDUNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS AS GUARANTEED BY THE EIGHTH ANDFOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ;OHIO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 .
{¶ 12} In State v. Brookshire, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25853, 2014-Ohio-1971, we addressed identical assignments of error brought by Delaquan’s co-defendant in the Penn Station robbery, LV Lavell Brookshire. For the reasons set forth in that opinion, Delaquan Brookshire’s first three assignments of error also are without merit. Id. at ¶ 26-33. See also State v. Anderson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25689, 2014-Ohio-4245, ¶ 62-81.
{¶ 13} Brookshire’s First, Second, and Third Assignments of Error are overruled.
IV. The Adult Court Committed Plain Error By Failing to Follow The Procedures Set Forth in R.C. 2152.121
{¶ 14} Brookshire’s Fourth Assignment of Error states:
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO SENTENCE DELAQUAN BROOKSHIRE TO PRISON FOR COUNTS 2, 3, 7, 8, AND 10, BECAUSE THE COURT WAS REQUIRED TO IMPOSE A SENTENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
R.C. 2152.121 AND REMAND THE MATTER TO THE JUVENILE COURT AFTER IMPOSING A STAYED SENTENCE.
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16} All of the Aggravated Robbery and Kidnapping charges brought against Brookshire in the juvenile court included firearm specifications, which made Brookshire eligible for mandatory transfer to the adult court.
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18} But the fact that the juvenile court properly transferred the cases to adult court does not end our analysis. Whether all of the charges were properly transferred from the juvenile court to the adult court is a different question than whether the adult court could subsequently impose sentences on all six of the offenses.
{¶ 19}
If a complaint is filed against a child alleging that the child is a delinquent
child, if the case is transferred pursuant to division (A)(1)(a)(i) or (A)(1)(b)(ii) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code, and if the child subsequently is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense in that case, the sentence to be imposed or disposition to be made of the child shall be determined as follows: (1) The court * * * shall determine whether * * * division (A) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code would have required mandatory transfer of the case or division (B) of that section would have allowed discretionary transfer of the case.
(2) If the court in which the child is convicted of or pleads guilty to the offense determines under division (B)(1) of this section that, had a complaint been filed in juvenile court alleging that the child was a delinquent child for committing an act that would be that offense if committed by an adult, division (A) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code would not have required mandatory transfer of the case, and division (B) of that section would not have allowed discretionary transfer of the case, the court shall transfer jurisdiction of the case back to the juvenile court that initially transferred the case, the court and all other agencies that have any record of the conviction of the child or the child‘s guilty plea shall expunge the conviction or guilty plea and all records of it, the conviction or guilty plea shall be considered and treated for all purposes other than as provided in this section to have never occurred, the conviction or guilty plea shall be considered and treated for all purposes other than as provided in this section to have been a delinquent child adjudication of the child, and the juvenile court shall impose one
or more traditional juvenile dispositions upon the child under sections 2152.19 and 2152.20 of the Revised Code. (3) If the court in which the child is convicted of or pleads guilty to the offense determines under division (B)(1) of this section that, had a complaint been filed in juvenile court alleging that the child was a delinquent child for committing an act that would be that offense if committed by an adult, division (A) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code would not have required mandatory transfer of the case but division (B) of that section would have allowed discretionary transfer of the case, the court shall determine the sentence it believes should be imposed upon the child under Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, shall impose that sentence upon the child, and shall stay that sentence pending completion of the procedures specified in this division. Upon imposition and staying of the sentence, the court shall transfer jurisdiction of the case back to the juvenile court that initially transferred the case and the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this division. * * *
(4) If the court in which the child is convicted of or pleads guilty to the offense determines under division (B)(1) of this section that, had a complaint been filed in juvenile court alleging that the child was a delinquent child for committing an act that would be that offense if committed by an adult, division (A) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code would have required mandatory transfer of the case, the court shall impose sentence upon the child under Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code.
{¶ 21} Ultimately, Brookshire was convicted of one offense that would have still been a mandatory bindover for the juvenile – the Aggravated Robbery charge with a firearm specification relating to the Burger King robbery. Pursuant to
{¶ 22} But the remaining five convictions involve Aggravated Robbery and Kidnapping offenses with no firearm specifications. These are offenses that do not appear to be subject to a mandatory bindover but could be subject to discretionary bindover. Consequently, the adult court was required to determine whether these five offenses were subject to mandatory transfer or
{¶ 23} The State disagrees and believes the adult court was not required to reverse transfer the five offenses to the juvenile court. In support of its position, the State cites our prior decision in State v. Washington, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20226, 2005-Ohio-6546. In Washington, we were faced with the question of whether a juvenile court must transfer the entire case to the adult court when at least one of the offenses in the case constituted a mandatory transfer offense. We concluded, at ¶ 24, that the entire case must be transferred:
None of the provisions cited above apply to the CCW charge, which is a non-category offense. However,
R.C. 2152.12(I) provides that when a “case” is transferred pursuant to division (A) of that section “[t]he transfer abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint, and, upon the transfer, all further proceedings pertaining to the act charged shall be discontinued in the juvenile court, and the case then shall be within the jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred as described in division (H) of section 2151.23 of the Revised Code.”R.C. 2151.23(H) likewise terminates the jurisdiction of the juvenile division after a transfer is ordered.
{¶ 24} We further noted that the object of
{¶ 25} But, as we mentioned above, the question of whether an entire case should be transferred from the juvenile court to the adult court is a different question from whether an adult court must transfer back offenses at the time of sentencing, after a single factfinder has heard the evidence and adjudicated the charges.
{¶ 26} We acknowledge that the judicial economy benefits we noted in Washington may not be served by the subsequent enactment of
The state also contends that R.C. 2152.121 “does not affect sentencing; it is a purely procedural issue concerning which court shall have jurisdiction.” We disagree. The very language of the statute demonstrates that it is a sentencing statute. Moreover, juvenile offenders are generally treated differently than adult offenders because the objectives of the juvenile justice system differ from those of the adult criminal justice system.
{¶ 27} The Murphy court noted that the overriding purposes in felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and to punish the offender. Id., quoting
{¶ 28} The plain language of
{¶ 29} We acknowledge that, arguably, the trial court’s error could be considered harmless error, because the court ordered the terms of the sentences for the five non-mandatory transfer offenses to be served concurrently with the sentence for the mandatory transfer offense of Aggravated Robbery with a firearm specification, resulting in an aggregate sentence of nine years. See State v. Mays, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100265, 2014-Ohio-3815; State v. Bradford, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013 CA 00124, 2014-Ohio-904. But we do not agree that the error is harmless. For example, depending on the adult court’s finding pursuant to
{¶ 30} Brookshire’s Fourth Assignment of Error is sustained.
V. Brookshire Has Failed to Demonstrate Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
{¶ 31} Brookshire’s Fifth Assignment of Error states:
DELAQUAN BROOKSHIRE WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF THE
SIXTH ANDFOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ;OHIO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 .
{¶ 32} A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel requires both a showing that trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A reviewing court “must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689.
{¶ 33} Delaquan contends that his trial counsel was ineffective “for failing to object to the constitutionality of the transfer of his case to adult court.” Brief, p. 19. Since we have concluded in Part III, above, that the transfer to adult court was not unconstitutional, we conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object on this basis.
{¶ 34} Delaquan also contends that his trial counsel “was ineffective for agreeing to a void sentence.” Brief, p. 20. According to Delaquan: “Had counsel argued that
{¶ 35} As we found in Part IV, above, the adult court should have followed the mandates of
VI. Conclusion
{¶ 37} Brookshire’s Fourth Assignment of Error having been sustained, and his other assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court will be Reversed, in part, and Affirmed, in part. The cause is remanded for the adult court to make the required determination pursuant to
FROELICH, P.J., and WELBAUM, J., concur.