OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM v. FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, еtc., et al.
CASE NO. 4:08CV0160
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
March 11, 2025
JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
[Resolving
Pending is Plaintiff Ohio Public Employees Retirement System’s (“OPERS”) Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Prof. John Coates (
OPERS alleges that the “primary fraud” here is Freddie Mac’s alleged “failure to disclose” its “true subprime exposure,” focusing on the 170-page 2006 Information Statement (
Prof. Cоates has 30-plus years of experience in the field of large public company disclosures and disclosure customs and practices in the securities industry. See Expert Report of Prof. John Coates (
In arriving at his conclusions, including that Freddie Mac’s processes for drafting and approving sub-sections of its disclosures was the same across the board, Prof. Coates reviewed several categories of kеy documents, including but not limited to: (1) academic articles on public company disclosures, earnings calls, and the housing crisis; (2) depositions of 20 Freddie Mac employees taken in the present case, the SEC civil enforcement action2 or the underlying SEC investigation, and exhibits; (3) Howard S. Shapiro’s Expert Reports (
Prof. Coates examined specific examples of Freddie Mac’s disclosure processes from August 1, 2006 through November 20, 2007 (the “Relevant Period”) for disclosures from each category of at-issue disclosures. He compared Freddie Mac’s 2006 disclosure of its exposure to subprime mortgages to subprime disclosures of other major financial institutions. Next, he examined the disclosure process involved in preparing selected at issue disclosures, including the 2006 subprime-related disclosure in the 2006 Information Statement and the 2006 Earnings Release, i.e., press release regarding financial results. See
The purpose of having a vigorous and customary disclosure process is to increase the likelihood that public disclosures are correct. As Prof. Coates explains, in making any statements contained within disclosures to the public, large public companies like Freddie Mac must comply with particular securities regulations designed to ensure accurate information is provided to the market. See
Disclosure practices at large public companies involve an iterative process across multiple departments with multiple steps to help ensure the sufficiency and accuracy of the information disclosed by the company. See
In paragraph 24.b. of his report, Prof. Coates offers the following summary of his opinion: “Freddie Mac’s disclosure processes for the Information Statements and Earnings Releases containing the at-issue disclosures involved relevant departments and individuals and
II.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically
Furthermore, a Daubert analysis includes consideration of
III.
OPERS does not challenge Prof. Coates’s qualifications as a disclosure expert. It does, however, set forth three reasons to exclude his testimony. First, Prof. Coates’s opinions regarding Freddie Mac’s disclosure practices are irrelevant, and would not help the jury. Second, he did not analyze “disclosure customs and practices in large public companies” in connection with his report. Third, Prof. Coates did not analyze the “at-issue disclosures” in the case at bar to be in a position to determine whether they “were consistent with the Company’s general disclosure practices.” And, with respect to the two “at-issue disclosures” he purported to analyze, OPERS claims that Prof. Coates failed to confirm that Freddie Maс actually followed each step of the disclosure process he outlined. OPERS’ Memorandum in Support (
A.
OPERS argues that Prof. Coates’s testimony regarding Freddie Mac’s disclosure practices (and their consistency with industry customs) should be excluded on both relevance and
B.
Next, OPERS contends, even if the Court finds that Prof. Coates’s opinions regarding Freddie Mac’s disclosure processes for preparing public disclosures are relevant, his full opinion in this situation – that Freddie Mac’s disclosure processes during the Relevant Period were consistent with “disclosure customs and practices in large public companies” – should be excluded under
Q. Professor Coates, I’d like to direct your attention back to paragraph 24.a. of your report, and specifically, I want to talk about the final clause in that paragraph, that Freddie Mac’s processes during the relevant period for determining disclosure of information to the public wеre consistent with disclosure customs and practices in large public companies.
*
*
*
Q. I want to focus on the last part of this opinion, “consistent with disclosure customs and practices in large public companies.”
Did you identify in your report any of the large public companies upon which you based the opinion summarized in paragraph 24.a.?
*
*
*
A. Not by specific name. This opinion is a general one that’s based on my review of large public company disclosures over my career. And the processes they follow, you know, company by company are not typically available real-time in the public domain, but they’re processes that I’ve helped create, been part of, overseen, and have testified about on many occasions.
So this is a general opinion about large public companies subject to the same market and legal and accounting expеctations and norms as Freddie Mac.
Q. So you can’t identify today any large public companies upon which you based your opinion that’s summarized in paragraph 24.a.?
*
*
*
A. In some generic sense, all of them. I’ve sat at the SEC on top of the “corp fin” division which reviews public filings by companies generally, not a subset, and engages in back and forth with companies about their processes.
I’ve written about Sarbanes-Oxley and the requirements of attestation controls and procedures which are a part of the disclosure of large public companies. I’ve prepared large public company disclosures.
But like I’m not -- what I’m saying is I’m not picking out a single company to benchmark. This is a general process because large public companies
generally are under the same market and other constraints in following those processes.
C.
Finally, OPERS asserts Prof. Coates has no methodologically reliable basis for his opinions. It contends that Prof. Coates should be precluded from offering his opinion in paragraph 24.b. of his report (
The subject of Prof. Coates’s opinion, however, is in dispute. Indeed, OPERS has designated its own proposed expert, Howard S. Shapiro, to offer opinions on the subject. See
1.
OPERS maintains Prof. Coates failed to verify that Freddie Mac actually followed the “iterative processes” he identified in his report for external disclosures (e.g., Information Statements). While Prof. Coates may have articulated Freddie Mac’s “iterative process” for external disclosures in his report, see
Freddie Mac sets forth its reasons for why Prof. Coates is a recognized disclosure expert, whom is qualified to offer his proposed testimony. See
OPERS quotes from the Freddie Mac 2006 Annual Report, which provides as to subprime mortgages, in relevant part:
Participants in the mortgage market often characterize loans based upon their overall credit quality at the time of origination, generally considering them to be prime or subprime. There is no universally accepted definition of subprime. The subprime segment of the mortgage market primarily serves borrowers with poorer credit payment histories and such loans typically have a mix of credit characteristics that indicate a higher likelihood of default and higher loss severities than prime loans. Such characteristics might include a combination of high loan-to-value ratios, low FICO scores or originations using lower underwriting standards such as limited or no documentation of a borrower’s income. The subprime market helps certain borrowers by increasing the availability of mortgage credit.
While we do not characterize the single-family lоans underlying the PCs and Structured Securities in our credit guarantee portfolio as either prime or subprime, we believe that, based on lender-type, underwriting practice and product structure, the number of loans underlying these securities that are subprime is not significant. Also included in our credit guarantee portfolio are Structured Securities backed by non-agency mortgage-related securities where the underlying collateral was identified as being subprime by thе original issuer. At December 31, 2006 and 2005, the Structured Securities backed by subprime mortgages constituted approximately 0.1 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively of our credit guarantee portfolio.
Q. Did you review any documents in which external reporting [was] working with the business areas to determine what percent of the loans in the portfolio came from originators using lower underwriting standаrds such as limited or no documentation of a borrower’s income?
*
*
*
A. Again, I’m not -- did I review any? I believe I have seen, yes, testimony and/or documents reflecting the kind of information you’re just talking about. And in fact, I think that is part of the basis for the statement in on [
ECF No. 298-2 at PageID #: 12479], that based on lender type underwriting practice product structure, the number of loans underlying these securities that are subprime is not significant. And I do believe I remember seeing evidence to suggest that that was а focus leading up to the finalization of that disclosure.
A. So, again, I don’t remember anything specific sitting here today. Again, I will note that where loans have high probability of default, a lending institution has to provide for the loss in the income statement and then reflect the accumulation of that in the allowance account on the balance sheet.
And so actually always, as far as I know, throughout this period required quantitative disclosure of forward-looking information about likelihood of default was embedded directly in the financial statements for the portfolio as a whole, all of which I would have thought would have been something relevant to assessing the question you just asked me.
But no, I don’t have anything memorized today about that in the disclosure process sitting here for, you know, like Bates stamp numbers and the like, no.
2.
OPERS also argues that Prof. Coates failed to verify that Freddie Mac actually followed the “iterative processes” he identified in his report for voluntаry disclosures (e.g., Earnings Releases). As stated above, in paragraph 91 of his report,
IV.
For the foregoing reasons and those that have been artiсulated in the memorandum of the points and authorities on which Freddie Mac relies, OPERS’ Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Prof. John Coates (
IT IS SO ORDERED.
March 11, 2025
Date
/s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge
