Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} Thе Ohio Grocers Association and four individual businesses (collectively, “the Grocers”) argue that the Commercial Activity Tax (“CAT”) violates the constitutional prohibition against excise taxes levied upon the sale or purchase of food, whether at retail or wholesale. See Sections 3(C) and 13, Article XII, Ohio Constitution. The General Assembly imposed the CAT “on each person with taxable gross receipts for the privilege of doing business in this state,” R.C. 5751.02(A), and it measured the value of that privilege using gross receipts, see R.C. 5751.03(A). The Grocers allege that to the degree that gross receipts include proceeds from the sale of food, the CAT is a prohibited tax upon the sale of food. The Tenth District Court of Appeals agreed.
{¶ 2} For the following reasons, we hold that the CAT is not an excise tax “upon the sale or purchase of food” and does not violate the Ohio Constitution. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the cоurt of appeals.
Relevant Background
{¶ 3} The Ohio Constitution permits laws providing for “[ejxcise and franchise taxes * * * except that no excise tax shall be levied or collected upon the sale or purchase of food for human consumption off the premises where sold.” Section 3(C), Article XII, Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 5} “No sales or other excise taxes shall be levied or collected (1) upon any wholesale sale or wholesale purchase of food for human consumption, its ingredients or its packaging; (2) upon any sale or purchase of such items sold to or purchased by a manufacturer, processor, packager, distributor or reseller of food for human consumption, or its ingredients, for use in its trade or business; or (3) in any retail transaction, on any packaging that contains food for human consumption on or off the premises where sold.”
•{¶ 6} The CAT was phased in beginning in 2005. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 66, 126th General Assembly. The Grocers acknowledge that the tax is “one of the key components” of “a series of tax revisions generally designed to lessen the burden of taxation on Ohio’s businesses.” For many businesses, the CAT replaces the tax on personal property located and used in business in Ohio, see R.C. Chapter 5719, and it replaces the tax on the privilege of exercising the corporate franchise in this state. See R.C. 5733.01(G)(1) and (2) (phasing out the corporate franchise tax); R.C. 5711.22(E) through (G) (phasing out the personal property tax); R.C. 5751.031 (phasing in the CAT).
{¶ 7} The CAT is levied “on each person with taxable gross receipts for the privilege of doing business in this state.” R.C. 5751.02(A). Businesses grossing less than $150,000 in a calendar year need not register for or pay the tax. R.C. 5751.01(E)(1). Persons receiving between $150,000 and $1 million in gross receipts pay a flat $150 tax. R.C. 5751.03(B). For gross receipts over $1 million, the tax is “the prоduct of two and six-tenths mills [0.0026] per dollar times the remainder of the taxpayer’s taxable gross receipts.” R.C. 5751.03(A). Gross receipts includes amounts received from sales, R.C. 5751.01(F)(1)(a), and there is no exclusion for sales of food.
{¶ 8} On February 17, 2006, the Grocers filed a complaint against the tax commissioner in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas seeking a declaration that the CAT “violates the Ohio Constitution * * * when applied to receipts from the sale of food for human consumption off the premises where sold.” On cross-motions for summary judgment, the common pleas court upheld the CAT. See Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Wilkins (Aug. 24, 2007), Franklin C.P. No. O6CVH02-2278.
{¶ 9} The court of appeals reversed and remanded. In so doing, it held that “a franchise tax is a form of an excise tax” and that “excise taxes on certain food sales are precisely what the Constitution prohibits.” Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Wilkins,
{¶ 10} The tax commissioner appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction to resolve whether the CAT violates Sections 3(C) and 13 when applied to persons whose gross receipts include proceeds from the sale of food. We hold that it does not.
Analysis
{¶ 11} Before analyzing the merits of this case, we note that parties, including the Grocers, who challenge the constitutionality of an Ohio statute, bear a heavy burdеn of persuasion. “Laws are entitled to a ‘strong presumption of constitutionality,’ and the party challenging the constitutionality of a law ‘bears the burden of proving that the law is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin,
The Constitution Permits Privilege-of-Doing-Business Taxes Measured by Gross Receipts that Include Proceeds from the Sale of Food
{¶ 12} Section 3(C), Article XII prohibits any excise tax “levied or collected upon the sale or purchase of food.” Similarly, Section 13 prohibits “sales or other excise taxes” upon food sales аt other points in the distribution chain, such as wholesale sales. It is well accepted that taken together, these sections prohibit a sales tax on food, and indeed, sales of food remain exempt from the sales tax. R.C. 5739.02(B)(2).
{¶ 13} The Grocers, however, assert that Sections 3(C) and 13 do more— namely, prohibit a tax on the privilege of doing business to the degree that the privilege is measured by gross receipts derived from food sales. The court of appeals agreed with this interpretation of these sections.
Applicable Principles
{¶ 15} Our decisions establish three fundamental principles that govern our analysis.
{¶ 16} First, it is permissible to tax the privilege of doing business, and to do so, the privilege must be valued. The privilege of doing business, often called a franchise, is valuable and subject to taxation by the state. S. Gum Co. v. Laylin (1902),
{¶ 17} Second, in this context, we have long recognized a distinction between a tax upon a certain factor and a tax upon a privilege measured by that factor. E.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. As might be expected, the use of a factor to measure a tax on a privilege has raised the issue of whether a tax upon a privilege measured by a factor is the same as a tax upon that factor. But as we explained
{¶ 18} Early on, for example, this “measuring stick” principle was applied to uphold the corporate franchise tax against a constitutional challenge. In S. Gum,
{¶ 19} This principle remains good law. See, e.g., Mut. Holding Co. v. Limbach (1994),
{¶ 20} Third, as implied by the foregoing, the measuring stick of a privilege-of-doing-business tax may include tax-exempt factors. Thus, we have upheld the corporate franchise tax against allegations that it was a tax on tax-exempt factors in disguise. Bank One, 50 Ohio St.3d at 164,
{¶ 21} Likewise, in Fifth Third Union Trust, we held that the franchise-tax base could include federal securities that were exempt by federal law from taxation by the states.
Applying these Principles, Sections 3(C) and 13 Permit a Privilege-of-Doing-Business Tax Measured by Gross Receipts that Include Proceeds from the Sale of Food
{¶ 22} With these governing principles in mind, at a minimum it is plausible to read Sections 3(C) and 13 as permitting the imposition of a privilege-of-doing-business tax on a food seller and measuring that tax by gross receipts including proceeds from the sale of food. In essence, both sections prohibit taxes levied or collected upon the sale or purchase of food. These provisions plainly prohibit a tax (such as the sales tax) that is triggered by and imposed upon each “sale” of food — whatever the tax is called. But given that we must strictly construe these clauses, Welfare Fedn. of Cleveland,
{¶ 23} As we have explained, our decisions have made clear that a tax “measured by” some factor is not the same as a tax “upon” that factor. Those decisions further undermine the Grocers’ expansive reading. In short, Sections 3(C) and 13 do not prohibit a privilege-of-doing-business tax on food sellers, even if that privilege is measured by gross receipts that include proceeds from the sale of food.
{¶ 24} The Grocers, at best, urge a competing plausible reading. But plausibility is insufficient to prevail, because the Grocers must prove the CAT’s unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, it is not enough to show that one plausible reading requires the statute to be stricken as unconstitutional, when another plausible reading permits it to survive. Similarly, the Grocers have not succeeded in showing that considering receipts from food sales in measuring the value of the privilege of doing business is prohibited. Thus, the statute must be upheld.
The Language of Sections 3(C) and 13
{¶ 26} The wording of Sections 3(C) and 13, in different ways, suggests that they were not intended to limit taxes upon the privilege of doing business. We consider each provision in order.
{¶ 27} Section 3, Article XII authorizes the General Assembly to pass laws providing for certain taxes. Among those taxes are “[e]xcise and franchise taxes and * * * taxes upon the production of coal, oil, gas, and other minerals; except that no excise tax shall be levied or collected upon the sale or purchase of food for human consumption off the premises where sold.” (Emphasis added.) Section 3(C).
{¶ 28} As pertinent here, Section 3(C) grants two kinds of taxing power but takes away from only one. The first part of the section authorizes “excise and franchise taxes.” An exception follows, but pertains only to excise taxes. This suggests that franchise taxes are not limited by Section 3(C). Although for many years the franchise tax per se was charged only to corporations, a “franchise tax” has been understood for more than a hundred years to be a tax on the privilege of doing business. See, e.g., S. Gum,
{¶ 29} Likewise, the wording of Section 13 implies that it does not address or limit privilege-of-doing-business taxes. It is structured to prohibit “sales or other excise taxes” on food. A specific tax is listed first (salеs tax), followed by a broader term (“or other excise taxes”). Under the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter term will be read as “ ‘embracing only things of a similar character as those comprehended by the preceding limited and confined terms.’” Moulton Gas Serv., Inc. v. Zaino,
{¶ 30} The Grocers’ counterarguments on this point are unavailing. For example, it is true that a franchise tax is a kind of excise tax. But although Sections 3(C) and 13 use the term “excise,” it does not follow that they are concerned with privilege-of-doing-business taxes. An excise tax cannot operate unless made to fall upon a specified subject. See, e.g., Calerdine v. Freiberg (1935),
{¶ 31} The Grocers also point out that Section 3(C) once had a different structure: the clause prohibiting excise taxation of food sales was adopted in 1936 as Section 12, Article XII, whereas Section 10 contained the clause authorizing “excise and franchise taxes.” In 1976, Sections 10 and 12 were combined to form Section 3(C). According to the Grocers, then, “there is simply no basis to conclude that the use of the term ‘excise taxes’ in the prohibiting clause of Section 3(C) was intended to exclude ‘franchise taxes’ from its scope.” We disagree. The Grocers seem to assume that these provisions were merged by accident, but, of course, they were not. The fact that Ohioans chose to merge these sections and leave intact the distinction between “excise and franchise taxes,” if anything, strengthens the inference that privilege-of-doing-business taxes are not intended to be subject to Section 3(C)’s food-sale limitations. If the drafters had wanted to eliminate the inference that excise taxes and franchise taxes were distinct, they would have eliminated the words “and franchise” from Section 3(C).
{¶ 32} In sum, the structure of Sections 3(C) and 13 reinforces our reading that these provisions do not apply to taxes upon the privilege of doing business.
The History of Sections 3(C) and 13'
{¶ 33} The history surrounding Sections 3(C) and 13 shows that they have never been understood to prevent a privilege-of-doing-business tax from including in its measure proceeds from the salе of food.
{¶ 34} History reveals that Sections 3(C) and 13 were concerned with sales taxes on food, not privilege-of-doing-business taxes on food sellers. The Grocers concede that the prohibition now found in Section 3(C) was adopted in response to the application of the sales tax to food sales in the midst of the Great Depression. Parties for and against the adoption of that section considered it a “repeal of the sales tax on food,” according to the certified ballot language
{¶ 35} Likewise, Section 13 was adopted in response to a tax on the sale of food at wholesale. See Cameron Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Tracy (July 28, 1993), Franklin C.P. No. 93CVH02-729. In 1993, an Ohio court held that the impositiоn of a beverage tax on soft drinks at wholesale did not violate Section 3(C). See id. at 27. Soon after, Ohioans amended the Constitution to prohibit, among other things, any tax “upon any wholesale sale or wholesale purchase of food.” Section 13, Article XII, Ohio Constitution. After Section 13 was adopted, the beverage tax was repealed by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215, Section 6(A), 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1918, which was effective January 1, 1999.
{¶ 36} The history and application of these provisions confirm our interpretation. Without challenge, food sellers have been subject to a tax (the corporate franchise tax) upon the privilege of doing business that included proceeds from the sale of food in its measure for almost 40 years.
{¶ 37} The corporate franchise tax is, as the CAT purports to be, a tax on the privilege of doing business. It was first imposed over 100 years ago, and in 1971, the net-income method for measuring it was introduced. Former R.C. 5733.05, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 475, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1558; see Lakengren, Inc. v. Kosydar (1975),
{¶ 38} As just discussed, Ohioans energetically responded to food-related taxes in the past, but the Constitution was never amended to prohibit the franchise tax on food sellers, even though since 1971 its measuring stick has substantially included food sales. And this is true though the constitutional provisions at issue have been amended twice since the net-income method was introduced. The franchise tax was not at issue or affected by either amendment. Significantly, only five years after the net-income method was introduced, Ohioans merged Section 10’s authorization of “excise and franchise taxes” with Section 12’s prohibition of “excise” taxation on food sales, which resulted in the very structure
{¶ 39} This history demonstrates that when a tax related to food crosses the line, Ohioans amend the Constitution. But those amendments never have been read to prohibit the inclusion of food-sale proceeds in the measurement of a privilege-of-doing-business tax. The Grocers offer no compelling reason to begin reading them this way now.
{¶ 40} In sum, the constitutional text, structure, and history fully establish that Sections 3(C) and 13 permit a tax upon the privilege of doing business that includes in its measure proceeds from the sale of food. This leaves one issue: is the CAT what it purports to be — a tax on the privilege of doing business? Or is it what it purports not to be — a tax on sales?
Substantively, the CAT Is a Tax on the Privilege of Doing Business
{¶ 41} The Grocers concede that the CAT is nominally a tax upon the privilege of doing business but assert that “substantively” it is “a tax on the sale or purchase of food, and suffers from the very same evils as the sales taxes” that prompted Sections 3(C) and 13. We disagree. When the operation of the CAT is considered, one can only conclude that it is not a tax upon the sale or purchase of food.
{¶ 42} When confronted with a challenge to the true nature of a tax, we look to how it operates. Bank One,
The CAT Operates Like a Tax upon the Privilege of Doing Business
{¶ 43} The CAT operates like a privilege-of-doing-business tax, as shown by the factors that follow.
{¶ 44} First, it is described as such by the legislature. R.C. 5751.02(A) (“there is hereby levied a commercial activity tax * * * for the privilege of doing business in this state”).
{¶ 45} Second, it is imposed on the person enjoying the privilege. R.C. 5751.02(A) (tax is levied “on each person with taxable gross receipts”).
{¶ 46} Third, it expressly “shall not be billed or invoiced” to a person other than the privilege holder, and no right of collection from any other person is created. R.C. 5751.02(B). See also Soc. for Sav.,
{¶ 47} Fourth, it is imposed for the exercise of the privilege for any portion of a calendar year. R.C. 5751.02(A) (“The tax imposed by this section is an annual privilege tax * * *”); see also Bank One,
{¶ 48} Fifth, it is calculated based on results over certain business periods (either annually or quarterly), not transaction-by-transaction. R.C. 5751.02(A); see also E. Ohio Gas,
{¶ 49} Sixth, it is computed using a broad measure of market access that is rationally related to the enjoyment of the privilege of doing business. R.C. 5751.03(A) (tax is the product of “taxpayer’s taxable gross receipts [after subtracting the exclusion amount in R.C. 5751.03(C)]” times .0026). See also Cincinnati, Milford & Loveland Traction Co.,
{¶ 50} All of these features are consistent with a privilege-of-doing-business tax. The Grocers nevertheless insist that the CAT is a tax on the sale or purchase of food because it “has the effect of being a tax on food sales.” This is not so.
The CAT Does Not Operate Like a Tax upon the Sale or Purchase of Food
{¶ 51} A tax that is neither triggered by a sale of food nor necessarily reflected in the price of food does not look like a tax upon the sale or purchase of food. This description fits the CAT in its practical operation.
{¶ 52} When there is a sale of food, the customer pays the price marked for the item. At the register, no tax is added to that price: sales tax cannot be added, because of Section 3(C); the CAT cannot be added, because of R.C. 5751.02(B). Nor does the seller incur liability under the CAT at that time. If the seller does not take in enough gross receipts in that year (over $150,000), there will be no CAT liability, period. R.C. 5751.01(E)(1). In that case, the sale, as far as the CAT is concerned, is tax free. A sale of food occurred; CAT liability did not. A tax that is neither triggered by nor imposed on a sale of food does not look like a tax upon the sale or purchase of food.
{¶ 54} And even with greater CAT liability, the cost of the tax might never cause grocers to increase the price of food. As recognized by the Grocers’ own expert, the seller might respond to the cost of the CAT by cutting wages or taking lower profits. Or, having considered relative levels of demand, the seller could opt to build a disproportionate amount of the CAT’s cost into the price of nonfood articles to keep food prices low (e.g., increase the price of paper towels by .52 percent to avoid increasing the price of eggs by .26 percent).
{¶ 55} Furthermore, even if some food prices reflect an increase relatеd to the CAT, the relationship between the amount of the tax and any particular “sale or purchase of food” would likely remain extremely attenuated. Many of the Grocers are sophisticated business enterprises. It seems doubtful that they would recoup the CAT by simply multiplying the price of every item for sale by 1.0026. One would expect that if a seller did include a CAT component in its prices, the component would reflect the seller’s projections of CAT liability— made at the time prices were set (and thus before the sale), that would derive from both food and nonfood receipts. The seller would also have to consider what price the market would bear. If we consider the effect of the CAT’s various credits, see R.C. 5751.50 through 5751.53, the relationship between the CAT and food sales appears even more remote.
. {¶ 56} The point is that the relationship between a sale of food and CAT obligations is so attenuated and unpredictablе that it simply cannot be said that the CAT operates as a tax upon the sale or purchase of food. It is clear that the tax falls on food sellers, among others. It is far from clear, however, that it falls upon the sale or purchase of food. It does not do so formally, nor must it do so practically. The notion that the CAT “operates” as a sales tax — which is collected from purchasers, imposed at the point of sale, and computed by multiplying the sale price by the applicable rate — is factually incorrect.
Conclusion
{¶ 57} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.
Notes
. For brevity’s sake, any unqualified reference to “the sale or purchase of food” in this opinion means only such sales “for human consumption off the premises where sold.”
. Bearing out the strength of this principle, our 1952 decision to the contrary survived little more than two years. See Wren Paper Co. v. Glander (1952),
. This principle has always been true, although we note that the precise statutory mechanism for measuring and apportioning the components has been altered over the years. Compare Am.Sub. H.B. No. 475, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1558-1565, with Am.Sub.H.B. No. 95, 150 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1931-1941; current versions codified at R.C. 5733.04(Q) and 5733.05(B)(2).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 58} Section 3(C), Article XII of the Ohio Constitution states, that laws may be passed providing for “[e]xcise and franchise taxes * * *; except that no excise tax shall be levied or collected upon the sale or purchase of food for human consumption off the premises where sold.” It is uncontroverted that the Commercial Activities Tax (“CAT”) at issue in this case is an excise tax. The Attorney General conceded the pоint at oral argument and wrote, in the tax commissioner’s brief, that “excise tax is an umbrella term that encompasses both sales and franchise taxes.” Thus, the issue before us can be simply stated: is the CAT “levied or collected upon the sale or purchase of food for human consumption off the premises where sold”? If it is, the CAT is unconstitutional; if it is not, the CAT is constitutional.
{¶ 59} Once sales crest $1 million, assuming that all credits and other allowances have been offset or otherwise adjusted, every additional dollar of sales for “food for human consumption off the premises where sold” subjects the retailer to an additional tax of .26 cents. R.C. 5751.03. It is an incontrovertible fact that if a retailer has sales over $1 million and he sells an additional 40 gallons of milk at $2.50 per gallon, for a total of $100, a tax of 26 cents is levied upon him and the state collects 26 cents. Is this not a tax “levied or collected upon the sale or purchase of food”?
{¶ 60} The fact that 26 cents per $100 is a small sum does not mean that this tax is de minimis, as the majority suggests as to the $150 flat fee. Though there are more than 11 million Ohio residents, assume that only ten million people actually live in Ohio. Further assume that they each consume exactly one gallon of milk per month, that milk costs $2.50 per gallon, and that all of the milk is purchased from a retailer with sales in excess of $1 million — that is, any milk purchased from Kroger, UDF, Giant Eagle, Meijer, Target, Whole Foods, Sam’s Club, Costco, and the like. The excise tax levied and collected by the state based on the sale of ten million gallons of milk would be $65,000. Would this not be a tax “levied or collected upon the sale or purchase of food”?
{¶ 61} The majority opinion concludes that sales are not being taxed, they are “ ‘merely’ ” being used as a “ ‘measuring stick,’ ” majority opinion at ¶ 17, quoting Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Evatt (1942),
{¶ 62} The majority opinion, citing Bank One Dayton, N.A. v. Limbach (1990),
{¶ 63} The majority opinion cites Fifth Third Union Trust Co. v. Peck (1954),
{¶ 64} The majority opinion concludes from these three cases that “the CAT is ‘measured by’ sales.” But only one of the cases it relies on uses sales as a measure, and then as part of a complicated formula in which sales are only one factor. This court has again cobbled together incongruent cases with an implausible rationale to conclude that a straightforward provision of the Constitution is
{¶ 65} In its discussion of the structure of Sections 3(C) and 13, Article XII, the majority opinion states that “by permitting franchise and excise taxes but limiting only excise taxes, Section 3(C) implies that taxes on the privilege of doing business are not subject to its food-sales limitations.” (Emphasis sic.) To the contrary, it is likely that no thought wаs given to this distinction. 1975 Am.H.J.R. No. 15 states, as to Section 3, that “[t]he remaining portion of section 7, Article XII and sections 8, 10, and 12 of that Article are repealed and reenacted as a single new section 3.”
{¶ 66} Violating the rule of construction against reading more words into the text than are there, Bernardini v. Conneaut Area City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1979),
{¶ 67} In distinguishing between excise and “privilege of doing business” taxes, the majority opinion blithely ignores the fact that franchise taxes are excise taxes, as conceded by the Attorney General. Excise taxes have long been known to encompass franchise taxes. Cincinnati, Milford & Loveland Traction Co. v. State (1916),
{¶ 68} Although the majority opinion’s discussion on the history of Sections 3(C) and 13 is interesting, it is also irrelevant. We only look at legislative history when a provision is ambiguous, see R.C. 149(C), which Sections 3(C) and 13 are not.
{¶ 69} This court in answering the question before us is burdened by a questionable legal principle, which requires us to presume that any statute enacted by the General Assembly is constitutional. This court has not seriously looked at this presumption in decades. The presumption has taken on a life of its own apart from whatever merits ever precipitated its institution.
{¶ 70} The presumption of constitutionality is suspect because it originates from a fallacy: that a conflict between a constitutional provision and a statute is the same as a conflict between two statutes. In State ex rel. Evans v. Dudley (1853),
{¶ 71} Another basic problem with the presumption of constitutionality is that the presumption itself rests on another presumption: “that the Legislature acted with due respect to the Constitution and enacted the law in the belief that it was within legislative power.” State ex rel. Weinberger v. Miller (1912),
{¶ 72} The doubts expressed by Chief Justice Davis in Weinberger and Chief Justice Brinkerhoff in Atty. Gen. are well placed. Even the most casual observer of the General Assembly is aware that members do not always carefully consider the constitutionality of the legislation they vote for or against. They do not thereby abuse their trust or duty, but most members are not lawyers, are not steeped in constitutional law, and are not capable of discerning the often fine lines that separate the unconstitutional from the constitutional. Frequently members state that they don’t have to consider whether a given law to be enacted is constitutional because this court will ultimately make that determination. It has
{¶ 73} “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897), 10 Harv.L.Rev. 457, 469. The presumption of constitutionality is based on a fallacy and an unsound presumption, and I would abrogate it.
{¶ 74} Constitutional provisions are not the kin of statutes; they are the paramount law of Ohio. Constitutional provisions are superior to statutes because they derive from the people, the fount of all political power, whereas statutes derive from the General Assembly, which has only the authority delegated to it by the people. Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville RR. Co. v. Clinton Cty. Commrs. (1852),
{¶ 75} Given the obvious supremacy of the Constitution, a better rule of construction would be to resolve all doubts in favor of the applicability of the Constitution.
{¶ 76} The historical presumption of constitutionality is backwards. The bottom line is that courts are the ultimate arbiters of what is constitutional, and have been since 1803, and we ought not to be saddled with a presumption that restricts our ability to declare a suspect statute unconstitutional. Marbury,
{¶ 77} Furthermore, some laws are “presumptivеly invalid.” See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992),
{¶ 78} Abrogating the presumption of constitutionality would not lead to chaos. This court would not presume that statutes are unconstitutional. This court would not invalidate all challenged statutes if the presumption of constitutionality were to disappear. See State ex rel. Bishop v. Mt. Orab Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1942),
{¶ 79} Even assuming the validity of the presumption of constitutionality, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the CAT violates Section 3, Article XII of the Ohio Constitution. See State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955),
{¶ 80} Referring to Dickman with approval, this court, in State ex rel. Jackman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1967),
{¶ 81} In Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville,