OHIO GROCERS ASSOCIATION ET AL., APPELLEES, v. LEVIN, TAX COMMR., APPELLANT.
No. 2008-2018
Supreme Court of Ohio
September 17, 2009
123 Ohio St.3d 303, 2009-Ohio-4872
O‘CONNOR, J.
Submitted September 1, 2009
{111} Thе Ohio Grocers Association and four individual businesses (collectively, “the Grocers“) argue that the Commercial Activity Tax (“CAT“) violates the constitutional prohibition against excise taxes levied upon the sale or purchase of food, whether at retail or wholesale. See
{12} For the following reasons, we hold that the CAT is not an excise tax “upon the sale or purchase of food” and does not violate the Ohio Constitution. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Relevant Background
{13} Thе Ohio Constitution permits laws providing for “[e]xcise and franchise taxes * * * except that no excise tax shall be levied or collected upon the sale or purchase of food for human consumption off the premises where sold.”
{15} “No sales or other excise taxes shall be levied or collected (1) upon any wholesale sale or wholesale purchase of food for human consumption, its ingredients or its packaging; (2) upon any sale or purchase of such items sold to or purchased by a manufacturer, processor, packager, distributor or reseller of food for human consumption, or its ingredients, for use in its trade or business; or (3) in any retail transaction, on any packaging that contains food for human consumption on or off the premises where sold.”
{16} The CAT was phased in beginning in 2005. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 66, 126th General Assembly. The Grocers acknowledge that the tax is “one of the key components” of “a series of tax revisions generally designed to lessen the burden of taxation on Ohio‘s businesses.” For many businesses, the CAT replaces the tax on personal property located and used in business in Ohio, see
{17} The CAT is levied “on each person with taxable gross receipts for the privilege of doing business in this state.”
{18} On February 17, 2006, the Grocers filed a complaint against the tax commissioner in the Franklin County Court of Commоn Pleas seeking a declaration that the CAT “violates the Ohio Constitution * * * when applied to receipts from the sale of food for human consumption off the premises where sold.” On cross-motions for summary judgment, the common pleas court upheld the CAT. See Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Wilkins (Aug. 24, 2007), Franklin C.P. No. 06CVH02-2278.
{19} The court of appeals reversed and remanded. In so doing, it held that “a franchise tax is a form of an excise tax” and that “excise taxes on certain food sales are precisely what the Constitution prohibits.” Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Wilkins, 178 Ohio App.3d 145, 2008-Ohio-4420, 897 N.E.2d 188, ¶ 20. “[S]etting nomenclature aside,” the appellate court ruled that “when applied to gross receipts derived from the sales of food,” the CAT is “a transactional tax.” Id. at
{110} The tax commissioner appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction to resolve whether the CAT violates Sections 3(C) and 13 when applied to persons whose gross receipts include proceeds from the sale of food. We hold that it does not.
Analysis
{111} Before analyzing the merits of this case, we note that parties, including the Grocers, who challenge the constitutionality of an Ohio statute, bear a heavy burden of persuasion. “Laws are entitled to a ‘strong presumption of constitutionality,’ and the party challenging the constitutionality of a law ‘bears the burden of proving that the law is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.‘” Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-511, 882 N.E.2d 400, ¶ 41, quoting Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of Health, Hous. Div., 101 Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-Ohio-357, 802 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 16. Moreover, the constitutional provisions that the Grocers rely on to invalidate the CAT are tax exemptions and therefоre must be strictly construed. See Welfare Fedn. of Cleveland v. Glander (1945), 146 Ohio St. 146, 177, 32 O.O. 65, 64 N.E.2d 813 (“strict construction is to be applied” to “constitutional and statutory provisions for exemption from taxation“). These precepts require us to uphold the CAT if it may plausibly be interpreted as permissible under Sections 3(C) and 13.
The Constitution Permits Privilege-of-Doing-Business Taxes Measured by Gross Receipts that Include Proceeds from the Sale of Food
{12}
{13} The Grocers, however, assert that Sections 3(C) and 13 do more—namely, prohibit a tax on the privilege of doing business to the degree that the privilеge is measured by gross receipts derived from food sales. The court of appeals agreed with this interpretation of these sections.
Applicable Principles
{15} Our decisions establish three fundamental principles that govern our analysis.
{16} First, it is permissible to tax the privilege of doing business, and to do so, the privilege must be valued. The privilege of doing business, often called a franchise, is valuable and subject to taxation by the state. S. Gum Co. v. Laylin (1902), 66 Ohio St. 578, 595, 64 N.E. 564. It follows that to impose a tax on a privilege, the privilege must be valued. Thus, in a case arising under the corporate franchise tax, we acknowledged that the General Assembly may “determine by uniform rules and as nearly as may be the value of the use of the corporate franchise in this state.” (Emphasis deleted.) Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Evatt (1942), 140 Ohio St. 385, 394, 24 O.O. 405, 45 N.E.2d 118. The value of the privilege may be determined using gross receipts, among other measures. Indeed, where the General Assembly, in levying a tax on the privilege of conducting a public-utility business, chose to use “gross earnings” to measure the value of the privilege as opposed to net earnings, we characterized that choice as wise. Cincinnati, Milford & Loveland Traction Co. v. State (1916), 94 Ohio St. 24, 31, 113 N.E. 654; see also, e.g., State ex rel. Cleveland v. Kosydar (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 183, 184, 65 O.O.2d 401, 305 N.E.2d 803; W. Union Tel. Co. v. Mayer (1876), 28 Ohio St. 521, 1876 WL 27; see also In re State Tax on Ry. Gross Receipts (1872), 82 U.S. 284, 15 Wall. 284, 296, 21 L.Ed. 164 (“nor is it deniable that gross receipts may be a measure of proximate value” of a business privilege).
{17} Second, in this context, we have long recognized a distinction between a tax upon a certain factor and a tax upon a privilege measured by that factor. E.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. As might be expected, the use of a factor to measure a tax on a privilege has raised the issue of whether a tax upon a privilege measured by a factor is the same as a tax upon that factor. But as we explained
{118} Early on, for example, this “measuring stick” principle was applied to uphold the corporate franchise tax against a constitutional challenge. In S. Gum, 66 Ohio St. at 596, 64 N.E. 564, the taxpayer argued that measuring the value of the franchise as a percentage of its capital stock is a second tax, the first being the property tax, on the same property or capital, and that “thereby double taxation results.” But this is not true, we held, because the tax was “not a property tax on property owned by the corporation, but is an excise tax, the amount of which is fixed and measured by the amount of subscribed or issued and outstanding capital stock.” Id.
{19} This principle remains good law. See, e.g., Mut. Holding Co. v. Limbach (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 59, 60, 641 N.E.2d 1080 (”
{20} Third, as implied by the foregoing, the measuring stick of a privilege-оf-doing-business tax may include tax-exempt factors. Thus, we have upheld the corporate franchise tax against allegations that it was a tax on tax-exempt factors in disguise. Bank One, 50 Ohio St.3d at 164, 553 N.E.2d 624. In Bank One, it was argued that the franchise tax, measured in part by tax-exempt federal stocks and obligations, violated federal statutory law and thus the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. We rejected the argument, noting that “a franchise tax may be measured by tax-exempt income or property and still be a valid tax on the franchise and not on the property.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 167, 553 N.E.2d 624.
{21} Likewise, in Fifth Third Union Trust, we held that the franchise-tax base could include federal securities that were exempt by federal law from taxation by the states. 161 Ohio St. at 172, 53 O.O. 75, 118 N.E.2d 398. This was because the tax levied “is a franchise tax based on the value of the capital stock
Applying these Principles, Sections 3(C) and 13 Permit a Privilege-of-Doing-Business Tax Measured by Gross Receipts that Include Proceeds from the Sale of Food
{1122} With these governing principles in mind, at a minimum it is plausible to read Sections 3(C) and 13 as permitting the imposition of a privilege-of-doing-business tax on a food seller and measuring that tax by gross receipts including proceeds from the sale of food. In essence, both sections prohibit taxes levied or collected upon the sale or purchase of food. These provisions plainly prohibit a tax (such as the sales tax) that is triggered by and imposed upon each “sale” of food—whatever the tax is called. But given that we must strictly construe these clauses, Welfare Fedn. of Cleveland, 146 Ohio St. at 177, 32 O.O. 65, 64 N.E.2d 813, we note that they do not prohibit a tax upon sellers of food. Nor do they prohibit the consideration of receipts from food sales in measuring the value of the privilege of doing business.
{123} As we have explained, our decisions have made clear that a tax “measured by” some factor is not the same as a tax “upon” that factor. Those decisions further undermine the Grocers’ expansive reading. In short, Sections 3(C) and 13 do not prohibit a privilege-of-doing-business tax on food sellers, even if that privilege is measured by gross receipts that include proceeds from the sale of food.
{124} The Grocers, at best, urge a competing plausible reading. But plausibility is insufficient to prevail, because the Grocers must prove the CAT‘s unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, it is not enough to show that one plausible reading requires the statute to be stricken as unconstitutional, when another plausible reading permits it to survive. Similarly, the Grocers have not succeeded in showing that considering receipts from food sales in measuring the value of the privilege of doing business is prohibited. Thus, the statute must be upheld.
The Language of Sections 3(C) and 13
{26} The wording of Sections 3(C) and 13, in different ways, suggests that they were not intended to limit taxes upon the privilege of doing business. We consider each provision in order.
{27}
{28} As pertinent here, Section 3(C) grants two kinds of taxing power but takes away from only one. The first part of the section authorizes “excise and franchise taxes.” An exception follows, but pertains only to excise taxes. This suggests that franchise taxes are not limited by Section 3(C). Although for many years the franchise tax per se was charged only to corporations, a “franchise tax” has been understood for more than a hundred years to be a tax on the privilege of doing business. See, e.g., S. Gum, 66 Ohio St. 578, 64 N.E. 564, paragraph five of the syllabus (“[a] franchise tax may be imposed by the general assembly upon corporations, both domestic and foreign, doing business in this state“); cf. Black‘s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009) (defining “franchise tax” as “[a] tax imposed on the privilege of carrying on a business“). Thus, by permitting franchise and excise taxes but limiting only excise taxes, Section 3(C) implies that taxes on the privilege of doing business are not subject to its food-sales limitations.
{1129} Likewise, the wording of
{30} The Grocers’ counterarguments on this point are unavailing. For example, it is true that a franchise tax is a kind of excise tax. But although Sections 3(C) and 13 use the term “excise,” it does not follow that they are concerned with privilege-of-doing-business taxes. An excise tax cannot operate unless made to fall upon a specified subject. See, e.g., Calerdine v. Freiberg (1935), 129 Ohio St. 453, 457, 2 O.O. 437, 195 N.E. 854, quoting 26 Ruling Case Law 257 (“[i]t is for the legislature to determine the subjects of excise“). The only excise tax prohibited by either section is upon sales of food or certain food-related items—not upon the privilege of doing business. And as just discussed, the wording of each provision rules out a broad reading of “excise” to encompass taxes that are like franchise taxes.
{131} The Grocers also point out that
{32} In sum, the structure of Sections 3(C) and 13 reinforces our reading that these provisions do not apply to taxes upon the privilege of doing business.
The History of Sections 3(C) and 13
{133} The history surrounding Sections 3(C) and 13 shows that they have never been understood to prevent а privilege-of-doing-business tax from including in its measure proceeds from the sale of food.
{134} History reveals that Sections 3(C) and 13 were concerned with sales taxes on food, not privilege-of-doing-business taxes on food sellers. The Grocers concede that the prohibition now found in Section 3(C) was adopted in response to the application of the sales tax to food sales in the midst of the Great Depression. Parties for and against the adoption of that section considered it a “repeal of the sales tax on food,” according to the certified ballot language
{135} Likewise,
{36} The history and application of these provisions confirm our interpretation. Without challenge, food sellers have been subject to a tax (the corporate franchise tax) upon the privilege of doing business that included proceeds from the sale of food in its measure for almost 40 years.
{137} The corporate franchise tax is, as the CAT purports to be, a tax on the privilege of doing business. It was first imposed over 100 years ago, and in 1971, the net-income method for measuring it was introduced. Former
{138} As just discussed, Ohioans energetically responded to food-related taxes in the past, but the Constitution was never amended to prohibit the franchise tax on food sellers, even though since 1971 its measuring stick has substantially included food sales. And this is true though the constitutional provisions at issue have been amended twice since the net-income method was introduced. The franchise tax was not at issue or affected by either amendment. Significantly, only five years after the net-income method was introduced, Ohioans merged Section 10‘s authorization of “excise and franchise taxes” with Section 12‘s prohibition of “excise” taxation on food sales, which resulted in the very structure
{139} This history demonstrates that when a tax related to food crosses the line, Ohioans amend the Constitution. But those amendments never have been read to prohibit the inclusion of food-sale proceeds in the measurement of a privilege-of-doing-business tax. The Grocers offer no compelling reason to begin reading them this way now.
{140} In sum, the constitutional text, structure, and history fully establish that Sections 3(C) and 13 permit a tax upon the privilege of doing business that includes in its measure proceeds from the sale of food. This leaves one issue: is the CAT what it purports to be—a tax on the privilege of doing business? Or is it what it purports not to be—a tax on sales?
Substantively, the CAT Is a Tax on the Privilege of Doing Business
{141} The Grocers concede that the CAT is nominally a tax upon the privilege of doing business but assert that “substantively” it is “a tax on the sale or purchase of food, and suffers from the very same evils as the sales taxes” that prompted Sections 3(C) and 13. We disagree. When the operation of the CAT is considered, one can only conclude that it is not a tax upon the sale or purchase of food.
{142} When confronted with a challenge to the true nature of a tax, we look to how it operates. Bank One, 50 Ohio St.3d at 166, 553 N.E.2d 624; see also Soc. for Sav. in Cleveland v. Bowers (1955), 349 U.S. 143, 151, 75 S.Ct. 607, 99 L.Ed. 950 (“We must judge the true nature of this tax in terms of the rights and liabilities which the statute, as construed, creates“).
The CAT Operates Like a Tax upon the Privilege of Doing Business
{143} The CAT operates like a privilege-of-doing-business tax, as shown by the factors that follow.
{1144} First, it is described as such by the legislature.
{45} Second, it is imposed on the person enjoying the privilege.
{46} Third, it expressly “shall not be billed or invoiced” to a person other than the privilege holder, and no right of collection from any other person is created.
{1147} Fourth, it is imposed for the exercise of the privilege for any portion of a calendar year.
{148} Fifth, it is calculated based on results over certain business periods (either annually or quarterly), not transaction-by-transaction.
{1149} Sixth, it is computed using a broad measure of market access that is rationally related to the enjoyment of the privilege of doing business.
{150} All of these features are consistent with a privilege-of-doing-business tax. The Grocers nevertheless insist that the CAT is a tax on the sale or purchase of food because it “has the effect of being a tax on food sales.” This is not so.
The CAT Does Not Operate Like a Tax upon the Sale or Purchase of Food
{151} A tax that is neither triggered by a sale of food nor necessarily reflected in the price of food does not look like a tax upon the sale or purchase of food. This description fits the CAT in its practical operation.
{52} When there is a sale of food, the customer pays the price marked for the item. At the register, no tax is added to that price: sales tax cannot be added, because of
{54} And even with greater CAT liability, the cost of the tax might never cause grocers to increase the price of food. As recognized by the Grocers’ own expert, the seller might respond to the cost of the CAT by cutting wages or taking lower profits. Or, having considered relative levels of demand, the seller could opt to build a disproportionate amount of the CAT‘s cost into the price of nonfood articles to keep food prices low (e.g., increase the price of paper towels by .52 percent to avoid increasing the price of eggs by .26 percent).
{155} Furthermore, even if some food prices reflect an increase related to the CAT, the relationship betwеen the amount of the tax and any particular “sale or purchase of food” would likely remain extremely attenuated. Many of the Grocers are sophisticated business enterprises. It seems doubtful that they would recoup the CAT by simply multiplying the price of every item for sale by 1.0026. One would expect that if a seller did include a CAT component in its prices, the component would reflect the seller‘s projections of CAT liability—made at the time prices were set (and thus before the sale), that would derive from both food and nonfood receipts. The seller would also have to consider what price the market would bear. If we consider the effect of the CAT‘s various credits, see
{156} The point is that the relationship between a sale of food and CAT obligations is so attenuated and unpredictable that it simply cannot be said thаt the CAT operates as a tax upon the sale or purchase of food. It is clear that the tax falls on food sellers, among others. It is far from clear, however, that it falls upon the sale or purchase of food. It does not do so formally, nor must it do so practically. The notion that the CAT “operates” as a sales tax—which is collected from purchasers, imposed at the point of sale, and computed by multiplying the sale price by the applicable rate—is factually incorrect.
Conclusion
{157} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
{158}
{159} Once sales crest $1 million, assuming that all credits and other allowances have been offset or otherwise adjusted, every additional dollar of sales for “food for human consumption off the premises where sold” subjects the retailer to an additional tax of .26 cents.
{60} The fact that 26 cents per $100 is a small sum does not mean that this tax is de minimis, as the majority suggests as to the $150 flat fee. Though there are more than 11 million Ohio residents, assume that only ten million people actually live in Ohio. Further assume that they each consume exactly one gallon of milk per month, that milk costs $2.50 per gallon, and that all of the milk is purchased from a retailer with sales in excess of $1 million—that is, any milk purchased from Kroger, UDF, Giant Eagle, Meijer, Target, Whole Foods, Sam‘s Club, Costco, and the like. The excise tax levied and collected by the state based on the sale of ten million gallons of milk would be $65,000. Would this not be a tax “levied or collected upon the sale or purchase of food“?
{161} The majority opinion concludes that sales are not being taxed, they are “‘merely’ being used as a ‘measuring stick,‘” majority opinion at ¶ 17, quoting Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Evatt (1942), 140 Ohio St. 385, 394, 24 O.O. 405, 45 N.E.2d 118. But the quote in the majority opinion omits an important distinction between this case and Aluminum Co. The passage quoted by the majority goes
{162} The majority opinion, citing Bank One Dayton, N.A. v. Limbach (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 163, 167, 553 N.E.2d 624, quotes this court as stating that “a franchise tax may be measured by tax-exempt income or property and still be a valid tax on the franchise and not on the property.” (Emphasis sic.) In Bank One, this court was quoting a United States Supreme Court case in which tax-exempt bonds were used as part of the net-worth valuation for computing New Jersey franchise tax. See Educational Films Corp. of Am. v. Ward (1931), 282 U.S. 379, 388, 51 S.Ct. 170, 75 L.Ed. 400. The relevance of that quote to this case is at best uncertain, but more likely, nonexistent.
{163} The majority opinion cites Fifth Third Union Trust Co. v. Peck (1954), 161 Ohio St. 169, 172, 53 O.O. 75, 118 N.E.2d 398, as holding that “the franchise-tax base could include federal securities that were exempt by federal law from taxation by the states.” The quote is a fair characterization of the holding in Fifth Third Union Trust, but it is not relevant to the issue before us. The crux of Fifth Third Union Trust is that the franchise tax can be calculated based on “‘the value of the issued and outstanding shares of stock’ * * * without deduction therefrom of the value of any federal securities owned by such corporation.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus, quoting G.C. 5498. As a practical matter, tax-exempt bonds are exempt only from certain kinds of taxation. For instance, the interest earned on tax-exempt bonds is exempt from income tax, but capital gains on tax-exempt bonds are not exempt from taxation. Furthermore, the value of the bonds is separate and distinct from their tax-exempt status. And, of course, the Fifth Third Union Trust case did not involve an express constitutional exclusion from taxation. Fifth Third Union Trust is irrelevant.
{64} The majority opinion concludes from these three cases that “the CAT is ‘measured by’ sales.” But only one of the cases it relies on uses sales as a measure, and then as part of a complicated formula in which sales are only one factor. This court has again cobbled together incongruent cases with an implausible rationale to conclude that a straightforward provision of the Constitution is
{165} In its discussion of the structure of
{166} Violating the rule of construction against reading more words into the text than are there, Bernardini v. Conneaut Area City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 1, 4, 12 O.O.3d 1, 387 N.E.2d 1222, the majority concludes that “sales or other excise taxes,” in
{167} In distinguishing between excise and “privilege of doing business” taxes, the majority opinion blitely ignores the faсt that franchise taxes are excise taxes, as conceded by the Attorney General. Excise taxes have long been known to encompass franchise taxes. Cincinnati, Milford & Loveland Traction Co. v. State (1916), 94 Ohio St. 24, 27, 113 N.E. 654, paragraph two of the syllabus (“An excise tax is a tax assessed for some special privilege or immunity granted, * * * and in the case of a corporation, it is sometimes spoken of as a franchise tax“). There is no credible reason for the majority opinion to differentiate franchise taxes from excise taxes.
{168} Although the majority opinion‘s discussion on the history of Sections 3(C) and 13 is interesting, it is also irrelevant. We only look at legislative history when a provision is ambiguous, see
{169} This court in answering the question before us is burdened by a questionable legal principle, which requires us to presume that any statute enacted by the General Assembly is constitutional. This court has not seriously looked at this presumption in decades. The presumption has taken оn a life of its own apart from whatever merits ever precipitated its institution.
{170} The presumption of constitutionality is suspect because it originates from a fallacy: that a conflict between a constitutional provision and a statute is the same as a conflict between two statutes. In State ex rel. Evans v. Dudley (1853), 1 Ohio St. 437, 441, 1853 WL 50, this court stated, “As repeals by
{71} Another basic problem with the presumption of constitutionality is that the presumption itself rests on another presumption: “that the Legislature acted with due respect to the Constitution and enacted the law in the belief that it was within legislative power.” State ex rel. Weinberger v. Miller (1912), 87 Ohio St. 12, 52, 99 N.E. 1078 (Davis, C.J., dissenting). See State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Cincinnati (1870), 20 Ohio St. 18, 33-34, 1870 WL 2, in which this court explained that the presumption of constitutionality is based on “the presumption that the legislative majority which enacted the statute in question, did so after full and careful investigation, and in the full conviction that whаt they were doing was within the constitutional grant of legislative power.” This court went on to say that “this presumption may not be a very satisfactory one: and, perhaps, sometimes members of the legislative department of the government, instead of examining for themselves whether proposed enactments are warranted by the constitution which they are sworn to support, ignore this duty, with a view to throw it over upon the judiciary in the first instance.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 34, 1870 WL 2.
{72} The doubts expressed by Chief Justice Davis in Weinberger and Chief Justice Brinkerhoff in Atty. Gen. are well placed. Even the most casual observer of the General Assembly is aware that members do not always carefully consider the constitutionality of the legislation they vote for or against. They do not thereby abuse their trust or duty, but most members are not lawyers, are not steeped in constitutional law, and are not capable of discerning the often fine lines that separate the unconstitutional from the constitutional. Frequently members state that they don‘t have to consider whether a given law to be enacted is constitutional because this court will ultimately make that determination. It has
{73} “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897), 10 Harv.L.Rev. 457, 469. The presumption of constitutionality is based on a fallacy and an unsound presumption, and I would abrogate it.
{74} Constitutional provisions are not the kin of statutes; they are the paramount law of Ohio. Constitutional provisions are superior to statutes because they derive from the people, the fount of all political power, whereas statutes derive from the General Assembly, which has only the authority delegated to it by the people. Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville RR. Co. v. Clinton Cty. Commrs. (1852), 1 Ohio St. 77, 85, 1852 WL 11 (“all political power resides with the people“); Federalist No. 78. See Marbury v. Madison (1803), 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (“Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void“).
{75} Given the obvious supremacy of the Constitution, a better rule of construction would be to resolve all doubts in favor of the applicability of the Constitution.
{76} The historical presumption of constitutionality is backwards. The bottom line is that courts are the ultimate arbiters of what is constitutional, and have been since 1803, and we ought not to be saddled with a presumption that restricts our ability to declare a suspect statute unconstitutional. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (“an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void“). See Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville RR., 1 Ohio St. at 81, 1852 WL 11 (“It seems now, however, to be generally, if not universally conceded, that it is the right, and consequently the duty of the judicial tribunals, to determine, whether a legislative act drawn in question in a suit pending before them, is opposed to the constitution of the United States, or of this State, and if so found, to treat it as a nullity“).
{177} Furthermore, some laws are “presumptively invalid.” See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992), 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (content-based regulation restricting free speech); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govt. PAC (2000), 528 U.S. 377, 400, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (Breyer, J., concurring) (laws subject to strict scrutiny bear a strong presumption against constitutionality); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan (1963), 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity“).
{178} Abrogating the presumption of constitutionality would not lead to chaos. This court would not presume that statutes are unconstitutional. This court would not invalidate all challenged statutes if the presumption of constitutionality were to disappear. See State ex rel. Bishop v. Mt. Orab Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1942), 139 Ohio St. 427, 22 O.O. 494, 40 N.E.2d 913 (statute was upheld as constitutional even though presumption of constitutionality was not mentioned). But this court would be less likely to sanction suspect statutes, like the one before us tоday, if the presumption were not in place. See Cass, 2 Ohio St. at 618, 1853 WL 129 (“while we should be careful not to extend the powers of government by far fetched implications, we should be equally careful not to defeat the purpose of the constitution by a narrow and unreasonable construction“).
{179} Even assuming the validity of the presumption of constitutionality, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the CAT violates
{180} Referring to Dickman with approval, this court, in State ex rel. Jackman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 162, 38 O.O.2d 404, 224 N.E.2d 906, stated, “The power to legislate for all the requirements of civil government is the rule, while a restriction upon the exercise of that power in a particular case is thе exception.” In this case, the restriction, although it may be an exception, is clearly enunciated in
{181} In Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville, 1 Ohio St. at 86, 1852 WL 11, we wrоte that “it is always legitimate to insist that any legislative enactment,
Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, L.L.P., Gerhardt A. Gosnell II, Charles R. Saxbe, and Donald C. Brey, for appellees.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, Stephen P. Carney and Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitors, and Lawrence D. Pratt and Julie Brigner, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
Maurice Thompson and Joseph Henchman, urging affirmance for amici curiae Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions and Tax Foundation.
Hahn, Loeser & Parks, L.L.P., and Stephen Chappelear, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Restaurant Association.
Reed Smith, L.L.P., Sara Lima, and Kyle Sollie, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Tyson Sales & Distribution, Inc.
Buckley King, L.P.A., Robert J. Walter, and James E. Melle, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio AFL-CIO, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees Ohio Council 8, Communications Workers of America District 4, Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio, Inc., Ohio Association of Professional Firefighters, Ohio Association of Public School Employees (OAPSE)/AFSCME Local 4, Ohio Education Association, Ohio Federation of Teachers, and Service Employees International Union District 1199.
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell, Mark A. Engel, and Anne Marie Sferra, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, Ohio State Medical Association, Ohio Society of Certified Public Accountants, Ohio Dental Association, and Ohio Chemistry Technology Council.
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., Pierre H. Bergeron, and Thomas D. Amrine, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Legal Assistance Foundation, Coalition on Homelessness & Housing in Ohio, Corporation for Ohio Appalachian
McDonald Hopkins, L.L.C., Richard C. Farrin, and Thomas M. Zaino; and Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and Kathleen M. Trafford, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Business Roundtable.
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, Rebecca K. Schaltenbrand, and Stephen J. Smith; and John Gotherman, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Municipal League, County Commissioners Association of Ohio, Ohio Township Association, and Buckeye State Sheriffs’ Assoсiation.
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Fred J. Livingstone, J. Donald Mottley, and Judson D. Stelter, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio School Boards Association, Buckeye Association of School Administrators, and Ohio Association of School Business Officials.
Shirley Sicilian and Sheldon H. Laskin, urging reversal for amicus curiae Multistate Tax Commission.