762 N.E.2d 422 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2001
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This case stems from appellant's appropriation of approximately ten acres of appellees' undeveloped land that appellant has added to a state wildlife area known as the Sheldon Marsh State Nature Preserve.2 The value of the ten acres was determined to be $993,900, $400,000 of which appellant was to pay in cash. Appellees agreed to take a charitable deduction for the remaining $593,900. Appellees eventually received the $400,000 in late May 2000.
Appellees moved for an award of interest from the time of the taking to the time that they ultimately received the cash, and the trial court granted interest to *206
appellees. It is unclear from the judgment whether the trial court awarded interest under R.C.
"FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR"The Trial Court erred in awarding interest to the Defendant, payable by the State of Ohio, due to the lack of specific statutory authority authorizing the imposition of interest.
"Even if interest is found to be properly chargeable to the State of Ohio the time period used by the trial court for the calculation of interest was improper and contrary to law."
Appellees appeal as well, setting forth the following assignment of error:
"ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
I. APPELLANT'S APPEAL"THE COURT ERRED IN USING THE VALUE OF CASH CHANGING HANDS IN A PROPERTY TRANSFER TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF INTEREST DUE, RATHER THAN THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE PROPERTY."
We turn to appellant's first assignment of error, in which it claims that there is no statutory authority for awarding interest in this case. Because this assignment of error calls for us to review a legal question, we review it de novo. See Castlebrook, Ltd. v. DaytonProperties Ltd. Partnership (1992),
"(A) In cases other than those provided for in sections
1343.01 and1343.02 of the Revised Code, when money becomes due and payable upon any bond, bill, *207 note, or other instrument of writing, upon any book account, upon any settlement between parties, upon all verbal contracts entered into, and upon all judgments, decrees, and orders of any judicial tribunal for the payment of money arising out of tortious conduct or a contract or other transaction, the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum, and no more, unless a written contract provides a different rate of interest in relation to the money that becomes due and payable, in which case the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate provided in that contract."
According to appellant, if statutory authority exists at all, it resides in R.C.
"Where the agency has the right to take possession of the property before the verdict upon payment into court of a deposit, and a portion of said deposit may be withdrawn immediately by the owner, the amount of the verdict which exceeds the portion of the deposit withdrawable shall be subject to interest from the date of taking to the date of actual payment of the award.
"Where the agency has no right to take possession of the property before the verdict, if the award is not paid to the owner or deposited in court within twenty-one days after journalization of the verdict, interest thereafter shall accrue, except that where the owner appeals, interest shall not accrue until the agency takes possession."
For the reasons that follow, we find that R.C.
First, interest may not be assessed against the state without statutory authority to do so. See State ex rel. Montrie Nursing Home, Inc. v.Creasy (1983),
Second, R.C.
Finally, R.C.
Appellant also argues in its first assignment of error that, even assuming that R.C.
Appellees disagree and point out that, beginning with Boedker v. WarrenE. Richards Co. (1931),
"1. Where an action at law is submitted to the court, trial by jury being waived by the parties, the finding of the court is the equivalent of a verdict of a jury and is to be governed by all statutes relating to verdicts." Boedker,
124 Ohio St. 12 , at paragraph one of the syllabus.
This court followed Boedker in Harbaugh v. Utz (1958),
First, according to rules of statutory construction, words in statutes are to be given their ordinary and customary meaning. See R.C.
Second, and perhaps more important, in construing statutes, we must strive at all times to give effect to the intentions of the legislature. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rose v. Loran Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000),
In sum, we hold that R.C.
To award interest under R.C.
According to the first paragraph of R.C.
Appellant contends that it did not take possession of the property until May 2000, when appellees withdrew the $400,000 that appellant had paid into court. However, the December 14, 1999 judgment entry memorializing the October 4, 1999 settlement provides that the date of the "acquisition" of the property was October 4, 1999. It also provides that taxes would be due on the property only until October 4, 1999. Since the December 14, 1999 judgment entry adopts appellant's proposed judgment entry setting forth the October 4 date, see State of Ohio, Department ofNatural Resources v. Hughes (Nov. 30, 2000), Erie App. No. E-00-002, unreported, appellant cannot now claim that the date is any different. Therefore, we find that appellant took possession of the property on October 4, 1999, and the trial court was correct in finding that interest began to accrue on October 4, 1999.6
Next, we must determine the date on which interest stops running. R.C.
"At the time the agency makes a deposit or pays into court the jury award, the clerk of courts shall give notice by ordinary mail of such payment to the counsel of record of each owner and to the known address of owners not represented. Thereupon any owner may file with the court a motion for distribution. After reasonable notice to all parties and to any additional interested parties who become known to the court, the court shall hear evidence as to the respective interests of the owners in the property and may make distribution of the deposit or award accordingly."
Appellant paid the $400,000 into court on April 10, 2000. Appellees and the trial court make much of the fact that appellant did not notify appellees that it had paid the money into court, and it was not until May 8, 2000 that appellees realized that the money was available from the clerk of courts. After moving for a distribution of the award, appellees were finally able to withdraw the money on May 31, 2000. Since appellees did not receive the money until May 31, 2000, the trial court found that May 31, 2000 was the date that interest stopped running.
Appellant properly deposited the cash with the clerk of courts. It was then the clerk's responsibility to notify appellees that the money was on deposit. The clerk's failure to do so cannot be held against appellant. Therefore, since appellant made the funds available as of April 10, 2000, that is the day that the interest stops running.7 Since we disagree with the trial court's determination of the ending date for interest, appellant's second assignment of error is found well-taken.
In sum, we find that R.C.
II. APPELLEES' CROSS-APPEAL
In their cross-appeal, appellees contend that the trial court erred in awarding interest on the value of the property that actually changed hands in cash — *212
$400,000. According to appellees, the trial court should have awarded interest on the entire value of the property — $993,900 — which includes the $593,900 that appellees took as a charitable deduction. Again, we review this question of law de novo. SeeCastlebrook,
As indicated earlier, the purpose of R.C.
On consideration whereof, we find that substantial justice was not done appellant, and the judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The judgment of the trial court is reversed as it relates to appellant's second assignment of error, and affirmed in all other respects. This case is remanded to the Erie County Court of Common Pleas to calculate the interest owed by appellant to appellees consistent with R.C.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4, amended 1/1/98.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, P.J.
Peter M. Handwork, J. and James R. Sherck, J. CONCUR.