{¶ 1} This case raises a question of first impression in this court: May a landlord be held liable under R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) for failing to take corrective action against a tenant whose racial harassment of another tenant created a hostile housing environment? We hold that a landlord may not be held liable under R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) for failing to take corrective action against a tenant whose racial harassment of another tenant created a hostile housing environment. The decision of the court of appeals is therefore reversed.
I
{¶ 2} Appellee Fontella Harper and nonparty Beverly Kaisk lived in neighboring apartments at Van Burén Homes, a public housing development managed by appellant June Davidson and owned and operated by appellant Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority (“AMHA”). After a series of confrontations between Harper’s family and Kaisk’s family, appellee the Ohio Civil Rights Commission filed a complaint against AMHA and Davidson, alleging unlawful discrimination based on race in violation of R.C. 4112.02(H)(4). In particular, the complaint alleged that members of Kaisk’s family had harassed members of Harper’s family, that the harassment was racial in nature, and that AMHA and Davidson
{¶ 3} In its complaint and subsequent motion for summary judgment, the commission alleged the following facts. Over the course of approximately a year, Harper’s family and Kaisk’s family had several heated confrontations in the vicinity of their apartments. On one occasion, Kaisk’s daughter referred to members of Harper’s family as “niggers” and “Black bitches,” and the girl’s father threatened Harper and her cousin with serious physical harm. On other occasions, members of Kaisk’s family called Harper and her children “niggers, nigger lovers, Black bitch, * * * [and] Black fuckers.” Before Kaisk and her family moved out of Van Burén Homes, Kaisk spoke with Harper and said, “[Y]ou Black bitch, I’m moving and you can’t do anything about it.”
{¶ 4} Harper spoke with a member of the building management about the first incident with Kaisk’s daughter and the girl’s father, describing the racially derogatory comments made by Kaisk’s daughter. Harper also submitted written reports to Davidson about subsequent racial harassment.
{¶ 5} The Court of Common Pleas of Summit County granted summary judgment in favor of the appellants. The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not recognizing a cause of action for hostile housing environment. The Ninth District further held that the following elements are necessary to establish a prima facie case of hostile living environment: “(1) plaintiffs are members of a protected class, (2) the harassment was unwelcome, (3) the harassment was based on the plaintiffs’ race, (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiffs’ living conditions and create an abusive environment, and (5) either (a) the harassment was committed by a landlord or (b) the landlord, through its agents or supervisory personnel, knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take
{¶ 6} We accepted jurisdiction on the discretionary appeal.
II
{¶ 7} This case raises the following question: May a landlord be held liable under R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) for failing to take corrective action against a tenant whose racial harassment of another tenant created a hostile housing environment?
{¶ 8} At the outset, it is important to distinguish this case from a claim of hostile housing environment in which a tenant alleges that the landlord or building supervisor created a hostile housing environment through his own harassment of the tenant. See, for example, DiCenso v. Cisneros (C.A.7, 1996),
{¶ 9} R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) does not expressly recognize a cause of action against a landlord who fails to take corrective action in response to the creation of a hostile housing environment by one of his tenants. R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) provides only that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to “[djiscriminate against any person in the terms or conditions of selling, transferring, assigning, renting, leasing, or subleasing any housing accommodations or in furnishing facilities, services, or privileges in connection with the ownership, occupancy, or use of any housing accommodations * * * because of race.”
{¶ 10} In the absence of an express statutory command, the court of appeals found support for the cause of action at issue here in two types of cases: federal housing-discrimination cases and Ohio workplace-harassment cases. For the reasons described below, neither provides a compelling argument in favor of recognizing a cause of action against a landlord who failed to take corrective action in response to a hostile housing environment created by one of his tenants.
{¶ 11} We do not agree with the court of appeals’ characterization of its holding as consistent with federal rulings on claims of hostile housing environment. Three of the six cases cited by the court of appeals involved claims of direct landlord harassment of tenants. See DiCenso,
{¶ 12} The remaining two federal cases cited by the court of appeals rely on authorities that are unconvincing. The first, Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp. (C.A.8, 2003),
{¶ 13} In the second remaining case cited by the court of appeals, Bradley v. Carydale Ents. (E.D.Va.1989),
{¶ 14} The court of appeals’ reliance on the cause of action for hostile work environment is also misplaced. The court of appeals implied, and the appellees argue, that we should recognize the present cause of action because we recognize a similar cause of action in the employment context: An employer may be held liable for a nonsupervisory employee’s sexual harassment of his co-worker if the employer, through its agents or supervisory personnel, knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties, Inc. (2000),
{¶ 15} This court first recognized that an employer may be held liable for failing to take corrective action in response to co-worker sexual harassment in Hampel. The court in Hampel established the following elements for a hostile-environment sexual-harassment claim: “(1) that the harassment was unwelcome, (2) that the harassment was based on sex, (3) that the harassing conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of
{¶ 16} The statutory language at issue in Hampel did not explicitly recognize a cause of action against an employer for failing to take corrective action in response to co-worker sexual harassment. R.C. 4112.02(A) provides only that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice “[fjor any employer, because of the * * * sex * * * of any person, * * * to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.”
{¶ 17} The court in Hampel extended liability to employers who “knew or should have known” of the harassment on the authority of applicable federal case law: “[T]he federal courts uniformly apply a ‘known or should have known’ test in determining an employer’s liability for harassment by nonsupervisory coworkers or nonemployees.” Id.,
{¶ 18} In Burlington Industries and Faragher, the United States Supreme Court noted that imposing liability on an employer who knew or should have known about co-worker harassment was an application of negligence liability. In Faragher, the Supreme Court noted in dicta that “combined knowledge and inaction may be seen as demonstrable negligence.” Id. at 789,
{¶ 19} This liability of an employer for an employee’s negligence derives from the established principles of agency law. In Burlington, the Supreme Court discussed employer liability for the tortious actions of an employee in the context of master-servant liability, noting that a master is not liable for the torts of a servant acting outside the scope of employment unless one of four factors exists. Id. at 758,
{¶ 20} The agency principles that govern employer-employee liability have no parallel in the context of landlord-tenant disputes: “The relation of landlord and tenant in itself involves no idea of representation or of agency. It is a relation
{¶ 22} Finally, we decline the request by appellees Harper and FHAA to recognize this action under the statutory command that R.C. Chapter 4112 “shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes.” R.C. 4112.08. Although the conduct alleged by the appellees is reprehensible, we decline to extend liability to behavior so far beyond the reach of the statutory language, especially in light of the absence of an agency relationship between a landlord and his tenants and the landlord’s comparative lack of control over his tenants.
Ill
{¶ 23} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a tenant may not bring a claim against his landlord under R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) when racial harassment by another tenant creates a hostile housing environment.
{¶ 24} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Notes
. AMHA and Davidson challenge Harper’s claim that the building management was aware of the racial nature of the harassment. AMHA and Davidson also challenge Harper’s claim that she submitted written reports about subsequent racial harassment. None of the written reports that were allegedly filed appear in the record.