{¶ 2} Defendants designed and constructed Cameron Ridge Luxury Apartments ("Cameron Ridge") in Gahanna, Ohio, an apartment complex consisting of ten separate apartment buildings. The City of Gahanna issued a Certificate of Use Occupancy for each apartment building, the first on November 14, 2001 and the last on April 27, 2002. The certificates indicate each building's completion and certify that each "building conforms to the applicable provisions of the OBBC [Ohio Basic Building Code] and Chapters 3781 and 3791 of the Ohio Revised Code when occupied and used in accordance with the conditions of this approval."
{¶ 3} On October 1, 2003, Fair Housing Contact Service ("FHCS") filed a charge with OCRC alleging defendants engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices in violation of R.C.
{¶ 4} After defendants filed their separate answers, OCRC voluntarily dismissed Eyman and MA; the remaining defendants, TRESI and VCC, filed a joint motion for summary judgment. In their motion, defendants argued the statute of limitations barred OCRC's unlawful discriminatory practice claims because FHCS's charge was untimely filed with OCRC. OCRC's memorandum in opposition asserted that its charges of discriminatory design and construction were timely filed pursuant to the continuing violation and discovery doctrines.
{¶ 5} The trial court found the allegedly discriminatory design and construction practices ceased to exist when defendants completed construction of Cameron Ridge, signified by the date Gahanna issued the last certificate of occupancy. Unpersuaded that the case involved a continuing violation or justified applying the discovery rule to the statute of limitations, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding OCRC's claims time-barred. OCRC appeals, assigning three errors:
First Assignment of Error: The State of Ohio is not subject to a statute of limitations, absent an express statutory application, and the trial court erred by applying the limitations period in R.C.
4112.05 (B)(1) against the Commission.Second Assignment of Error: If the one-year period for filing charges with the Commission — R.C.
4112.05 (B)(1) — bars an action by the Commission to remedy discrimination, the discovery rule, the continuing violation theory, and public policy favor extending the statute.Third Assignment of Error: The trial court erred by ruling that Ohio Adm. Code
4112-3-01 (C) requires a person to *4 specifically plead the continuing violation theory when filing a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.
{¶ 6} OCRC's three assignments of error contend the trial court erred by granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. An appellate court's review of summary judgment is conducted under a de novo review.Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc. (1994),
{¶ 7} Summary judgment is appropriate only where: (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the non-moving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978),
I. First Assignment of Error
{¶ 8} OCRC's first assignment of error claims the trial court erred by applying the R.C. {¶ 9} The trial court found that because defendants designed and constructed Cameron Ridge no later than April 27, 2002, the date the city of Gahanna issued the last certificate of use and occupancy, FHCS's charge of October 1, 2003 was filed over one year after the alleged discriminatory practice was committed. The trial court therefore concluded the statute of limitations contained in R.C.
{¶ 10} OCRC contends that as a political subdivision of the state (1) OCRC is not bound by the generally worded statute of limitations set forth in R.C.
{¶ 11} A review of the record, however, reveals that OCRC did not raise either argument in the trial court; consequently, the trial court did not address or rule upon them. Well-settled common law dictates that issues not initially raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Porter Drywall, Inc. v. Olentangy Building Dev.Co. (Feb. 24, 2000), Franklin App. No. 99AP-306; Stevens Skin Softener,Inc. v. Revco Drug Store, Inc. (1997),
{¶ 12} OCRC nevertheless contends the arguments it advances for the first time on appeal are consistent with the arguments asserted in the trial court to explain why OCRC's claims were timely. OCRC's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment contended its complaint was timely because (1) the continuing violation doctrine renews the statute of limitations period with each new day of a continuing violation, and (2) the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until the charge of discrimination is discovered. In essence, OCRC challenged the statute of limitations' range, not its application. Although OCRC's immunity and injunction arguments address the same broad issue of whether the statute of limitations bars OCRC's unlawful discriminatory practice claims, they impermissibly present for the first time before the appellate court new legal theories regarding the applicability of the statute of limitations. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co.v. Estate of Brace (1997),
{¶ 13} Even assuming OCRC properly raised its immunity and injunction arguments before the trial court, we would find them unpersuasive on the facts of this case. Relying on State Dept. of Transp. v. Sullivan
(1988),
{¶ 14} In Sullivan, the court addressed whether the two-year statute of limitations for negligence applied to a negligence claim the Ohio Department of Transportation ("ODOT") filed to collect for damages Sullivan caused to an ODOT guardrail. The statute at issue, R.C.
{¶ 15} Here, unlike Sullivan, OCRC is not pursuing its own claim but that of FHCS. Moreover, unlike R.C.
{¶ 16} OCRC next contends R.C.
{¶ 17} R.C.
{¶ 18} More specifically, OCRC's first injunction option occurs under R.C.
{¶ 19} The federal cases OCRC cites do not address the applicability of the statute of limitations to a request for injunctive relief, but examine doctrines that extend the applicable statute of limitations, both to prevent future violations and to remove "the lingering effects of any past violations * * *." Pacific Northwest, supra; Taigen Sons, supra, at 1148; Hallmark Homes, supra. Because the cases analyze issues that arise after finding a statute of limitations applicable, they do not determine whether OCRC's claim for injunctive relief is subject to R.C.
{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, OCRC's first assignment of error is overruled.
II. Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 21} OCRC's second assignment of error contends the trial court erred by failing to extend the applicable statute of limitations pursuant to (1) the continuing violation theory, (2) the discovery rule, or (3) public policy considerations. OCRC first claims Cameron Ridge's discriminatory design and construction continually violates R.C. *10 {¶ 22} The United States Supreme Court adopted the continuing violation theory in an action brought under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), recognizing that a complaint alleging a continuing illegal practice, rather than an isolated incident of wrongful conduct, is timely when filed within the statute of limitations period calculated from the last occurrence of the illegal practice. Havens Realty Corp. v.Coleman (1982),
{¶ 23} In Havens, even though four of the five racial steering incidents occurred outside the FHA statute of limitations, the Supreme Court found all five incidents timely under the continuing violation theory, because the violation that occurred within the statute of limitations was manifested in the number of incidents that occurred outside the statute of limitations. Id. at 380. Requiring that at least one of the forbidden discriminatory acts occurs within the relevant limitations period ensures the limitation period begins to run in response to discriminatory acts themselves, not in response to the continuing effects of past discrimination. Deck, at 893; Moseke v.Miller (E.D.Vir. 2002),
{¶ 24} Similarly, in Moseke, a case applying the federal counterpart to Ohio's disability discrimination statute and most resembling the facts presented here, the plaintiffs alleged disability discrimination violations under the FHA: non-compliance with the FHA design and construction statutory provision and the FHA reasonable accommodation provision. The lead plaintiff, Moseke, sought an apartment at one of the defendants' three developments, but after inspecting the exterior of the defendants' premises, she determined the premises would not facilitate the use of her motorized scooter. Moseke subsequently filed a complaint with a nonprofit civil rights advocacy group that, in turn, inspected the developments and observed exterior and interior violations, including environmental controls that were positioned too high and doorways *12 that were too narrow. Id. at 495. After exchanging pleadings, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint because the construction and design claim was not timely filed within the FHA's two-year statute of limitations period. The plaintiffs countered by contending their complaint was timely pursuant to the continuing violation theory.
{¶ 25} Because the last FHA non-compliant condominium development at issue in Moseke was constructed more than two years before the suit commenced, the court rejected plaintiffs' continuing violation argument, explaining that "the existence of buildings with inaccessible features is a result or effect of Defendants' prior acts of designing and constructing FHA non-compliant buildings not a continuing violation manifesting itself in a series of incidents." Id. at 507. The court further clarified: "holding that a non-compliant FHA building constitutes a continuing violation, * * * eviscerates the statute of limitations with respect to design and construction claims. If the mere existence of a FHA non-compliant building is a continuing violation under the FHA then there is no limitations period on a disability discrimination claim involving design and construction." Id. at 508.
{¶ 26} Here, OCRC's complaint alleged defendant violated R.C.
{¶ 27} OCRC nevertheless argues for the first time on appeal that its R.C.
{¶ 28} The Board of Building Standards adopted an entire chapter of standards and rules pertaining to the accessibility for physically disabled persons, any section of which can form the basis for an R.C.
{¶ 29} Even if we combine the various statutory and administrative code sections OCRC cites and apply them to the allegations of the only count of the complaint, we are unable to construe OCRC's R.C.
{¶ 30} Because OCRC failed to properly plead the alternative form of discrimination and did not raise the issue before the trial court, the trial court did not address nor rule upon the issue. Issues not initially raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Porter Drywall, Inc., supra. The continuing violation theory thus does not apply to OCRC's R.C.
{¶ 31} OCRC next contends the trial court erred by failing to apply the discovery rule to toll the applicable statute of limitations. Depending on the claim and the applicable statute, the discovery rule may toll the governing statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, the complained-of injury if the injury does not manifest itself immediately. Investors REIT One v. Jacobs (1989),
{¶ 32} When the legislature uses ambiguous or vague terms, and thus fails to define the commencement of the limitation period governing an action, the judiciary may determine when the statute of limitations begins to run. See O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. (1983),
{¶ 33} Here, R.C.
{¶ 34} Moreover, even if this court were to ignore the clear statutory language, the discovery rule would not toll the applicable statute of limitations. The discovery rule was designed to prevent unjust results when the wrongful act does not immediately result in injury or damage, such as in medical malpractice cases, legal malpractice cases, *16
exposure to asbestos, sexual abuse of children, wrongful adoption, fraud or conversion, negligent credentialing of a physician, or a wrongful death action where the victim or the victim's survivors are not immediately aware that a wrongful act has occurred. See Harris, supra, at 205-206 (listing types of cases applying the discovery rule). Here, however, the harm that defendants allegedly caused in the design and construction of Cameron Ridge was readily apparent upon the building's completion. Because nothing prevented FHCS or OCRC from discovering the allegedly discriminatory practice at the time Cameron Ridge was constructed, FHCS or OCRC, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered the alleged violations within one year after the building was constructed. The applicable statute of limitations therefore began to run upon the building's completion. See, e.g., Jones v. Hughey,
{¶ 35} OCRC finally argues that public policy considerations justify applying the continuing violation theory and discovery rule to toll the applicable statute of limitations. Given OCRC's limited resources to directly investigate housing discrimination, OCRC contends that, without tolling, the statute of limitations will significantly inhibit the government's ability to redress housing accessibility issues. OCRC concludes this court should ensure adequate accessible housing for Ohio's disabled citizens even if it requires builders to comply with untimely accessibility claims.
{¶ 36} Our conclusion that the continuing violation theory and discovery rule do not extend the applicable statute of limitations in the context of this case does not frustrate the underlying policy of Ohio's disability discrimination statutes because this court's decision does not foreclose OCRC or another individual from pursuing an alternative claim or theory to redress defendants' allegedly unlawful discriminatory practice. Although *17
the statutory language of R.C.
{¶ 37} Having overruled OCRC's first and second assignments of error, rendering moot OCRC's third assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.