[¶ 1] Daniel Clark, Kelly Girodengo, and Maria Entzel have appealed a judgment declaring Ohio Casualty Insurance Company has no duty to defend or indemnify Daniel Clark in a pending lawsuit for the wrongful death of George Girodengo. We conclude there are no genuine issues of material fact about Daniel Clark’s intent in shooting George Girodengo. Daniel Clark’s killing of *379 George Girodengo was an intentional act for which insurance coverage was excluded, and the issue of self defense is res judicata. We affirm.
I
[¶2] “Early on January 17, 1996, Daniel Clark shot George Girodengo twice, after finding him in Clark’s wife’s bedroom. Giro-dengo died in surgery. Clark was charged with murder. On May 17, 1996, a jury returned a verdict finding Clark not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter.”
State v. Clark,
[¶ 3] Maria Entzel, George Girodengo’s mother, and Kelly Girodengo, his daughter, sued Daniel Clark and his wife, Peggy Clark. Against Daniel Clark, the complaint alleged: “[0]n or about January 17, 1996, Daniel Clark carelessly and negligently discharged a firearm,” resulting in George Girodengo’s death. Against Peggy Clark, the complaint alleged: “On or about January 16 and 17, 1996, Peggy Clark invited George Girodengo into the Clark residence” and “Peggy Clark negligently misrepresented to George Giro-dengo the safety of his presence at the Clark residence.”
[¶ 4] While providing a defense, Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, which had issued a homeowner’s insurance policy to Daniel Clark, brought an action against Daniel Clark, Kelly Girodengo, and Maria Entzel for “[a] declaratory judgment stating that the acts of Daniel Clark are excluded from coverage under the Ohio Casualty policy, and therefore that Ohio Casualty owes no duty to defend or indemnify Daniel in connection with the Girodengo lawsuit.” The policy contains the following coverage provision:
COVERAGE E — Personal Liability
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies, we will:
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.
The policy contains the following exclusion:
1. Coverage E — Personal Liability and Coverage F — Medical Payments to Others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage:
a. which is expected or intended by the insured; ...
The trial court granted Ohio Casualty’s motion for summary judgment. Judgment was entered accordingly, and this appeal followed.
[¶ 5] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. §§ 27-05-06, 32-23-02, and 32-23-06. The appeal was timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 2, and N.D.C.C. §§ 27-02-04 and 28-27-01.
II
[¶ 6] The trial court ruled “this policy, as well as public policy, unambiguously excludes coverage for acts ‘expected or intended’ by the insured.” Daniel Clark, Kelly Girodengo, and Maria Entzel (hereinafter collectively referred to as the appellants) contend the allegations of the amended complaint would support a recovery under a risk covered by the policy and Ohio Casualty had a duty to defend. The appellants argue “[i]t is undisputed that the allegations of the Amended Complaint do not allege any intentional act;” the trial court erred “because of *380 its failure to distinguish between the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify;” the court’s “analysis should not go beyond the face of the Amended Complaint and the language of the insurance policy;” and “[t]here should have been no inquiry by the trial court into the underlying facts; only the allegations of the Amended Complaint were needed for purposes of determining the duty to defend.”
[¶ 7] In
Hins v. Heer,
[¶ 8] Under N.D.C.C. § 32-23-06, a trial court is required “to render a declaratory judgment to determine both coverage and duty to defend, whether or not the insured’s liability has been determined.”
Blackburn, Nickels & Smith, Inc. v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co.,
[¶ 9] The appellants argue “Ohio Casualty has agreed to defend this suit ‘even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.’ ” This Court has previously addressed a similar argument:
Kovash misconstrues the meaning of the clause. It does not oblige the plaintiffs to defend any groundless, false or fraudulent case against an insured; rather, it requires them to defend only those actions which come within the terms of the insurance policy, even if those actions are groundless, false or fraudulent. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.,65 Cal.2d 263 ,54 Cal.Rptr. 104 ,419 P.2d 168 , 175 (1966). In this case Vannet’s claim against Kovash is for intentional acts. Intentional acts are specifically excluded from coverage. Whether the claim for intentional acts is also groundless, false or fraudulent has no bearing on the duty to defend.
National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Kovash,
[¶ 10] We conclude the trial court did not err in looking beyond the face of the complaint to determine if Ohio Casualty had a duty to defend in the underlying action for George Girodengo’s wrongful death.
Ill
[¶ 11] The appellants contend the trial court should not have granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact on Daniel Clark’s intent.
[¶ 12] The appellants argue: “It is clear that there exists a reasonable inference of negligence or recklessness based on the facts presented in this record.” We said in
State v. Clark,
[¶ 13] The appellants argue there are genuine issues of fact about which shot killed George Girodengo and about whether both discharges of the gun were intentional. Clark argued below “he intentionally pulled the trigger. There is no question about that, none. And the second shot is irrelevant.” The trial court ruled:
On this issue, the Court finds that, whichever gunshot ultimately killed Girodengo, both shots were inextricably linked and part of the same series of events. Since it is undisputed by Clark that he intended to do Girodengo harm by firing a weapon at him at point blank range, it is irrelevant whether he can specifically remember pulling the trigger for the second shot.
We agree with the trial court’s analysis.
See Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heim,
[¶ 14] We conclude the trial court correctly determined there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Daniel Clark intentionally fired the shots that killed George Girodengo.
IV
[¶ 15] The appellants contend the insurance policy language does not exclude coverage of the actions of Daniel Clark.
[¶ 16] In its complaint for a declaratory judgment, Ohio Casualty originally relied upon an exclusion contained in the property loss portion of the policy. Ohio Casualty relied on the liability exclusion quoted earlier in this opinion in the hearing in the trial court, but did not amend the complaint. The appellants argue Ohio Casualty did not properly raise the intentional acts exclusion in the liability portion of the policy. However, the appellants also argue in their brief: “The significant issue of whether Ohio Casualty may change its reasons for denial was not ripe for decision at the trial level and is not ripe for decision in this appeal.” Because we consider this to be a waiver of the issue, we do not address it.
[¶ 17] The policy excludes liability for bodily injury “which is expected or intended by the insured.” This Court has held intentional-act exclusions exclude liability for intentional, willful, or criminal acts.
See, e.g., Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heim,
[¶ 18] We conclude Daniel Clark’s unexcused shooting and killing of George Giro-dengo was an intentional act for which *382 coverage is excluded by his homeowner’s insurance policy.
V
[¶ 19] The appellants contend self defense is not excluded by the insurance policy. At the trial court hearing, Daniel Clark’s attorney raised the issue:
MR. NODLAND: So we’ve come full circle to the real question, whether or not in every instance does the act of self-defense preclude coverage under an insurance policy that says, an intentional act of self-defense precludes coverage in an instance of where someone exercises self-defense.
The trial court did not decide if acts done in self-defense are excepted from an intentional acts exclusion. The trial court ruled it “need not speculate what our own Supreme Court would rule on this issue, because the jury in Daniel Clark’s criminal case has already found that this shooting was not justifiable self defense.”
[¶ 20] Some courts have held acts of self defense are not covered by insurance policies because the insured intends to injure, while other courts have held acts of self defense may bar application of an intentional acts exclusion. 7 Lee R. Russ, Couch on Insurance § 103:32 (3d ed.1997). However, like the trial court, we need not determine if liability for acts done in reasonable self defense are excluded from coverage by the intentional acts exclusion. Daniel Clark’s conviction for killing George Girodengo renders relitigation of the question of whether Daniel Clark acted in self defense unnecessary.
[¶ 21] If there is evidence to support a self-defense claim, an accused is entitled to an instruction on it, and the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the accused did not act in self defense.
State v. dander,
Clark,
[¶22] In insurance coverage litigation, a criminal judgment may preclude relitigation of intent:
In some cases, the doctrine of collateral estoppel will be applied to prevent relit-igation of the issue of intent with regard to coverage under an insurance policy where the insured has already been found to have acted with intent in a criminal trial. The rule applies even where the civil complaint alleges negligence, rather than intentional wrongdoing.
7 Russ, Couch on Insurance, supra, § 103:35. Generally, the modern rule gives res judicata effect to criminal convictions to prevent relitigation in later civil proceedings:
[T]he modern rule, as ■ expressed in the Restatement 2d, Judgments, is to accord judgments in criminal proceedings collateral estoppel effect, i.e. to preclude re-litigation of any issues necessarily and actually decided therein in later civil proceedings, similar to that of judgments in civil eases, at least with respect to judgments for the prosecuting authority....
[[Image here]]
Generally, the higher standard of proof and numerous safeguards in criminal proceedings are given as rationale for the rule allowing judgments in criminal proceedings to have a preclusive effect in subsequent civil actions.
47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 732 (1995).
[¶ 23] Courts bar relitigation of claims and issues to promote the finality of judgments, which increases certainty, discourages multiple litigation, conserves judicial resources, and avoids wasteful expense and delay.
McCarty v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau,
Although collateral estoppel is a branch of the broader law of res judicata, the doctrines are not the same. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is the more sweeping doctrine that prohibits the relitigation of claims or issues that were raised or could have been raised in a prior action between the same parties or their privies and which was resolved by final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction. On the other hand, collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, generally forecloses the relitigation, in a second action based on a different claim, of particular issues of either fact or law which were, or by logical and necessary implication must have been, litigated and determined in the prior suit. (Citations omitted.)
Hofsommer also explained:
For purposes of both res judicata and collateral estoppel in this state, only parties or their privies may take advantage of or be bound by the former judgment.
In general, privity exists if a person is “so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right.” 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 532, at p. 683 (1969) [Footnote omitted.] ... Fundamental fairness underlies any determination of privity. Bismarck Public School District No. 1 v. Hirsch,136 N.W.2d 449 , 453^54 (N.D.1965).
Hofsommer,
[¶ 24] In
State Farm Fire & Cos. Co. v. Reuter,
The point is that, although her present status is that of a claimant, her future status, insofar as any claim against State Farm is concerned, would be as a judgment creditor of Reuter (if she prevails on her claim against Reuter). Within that status, she is subject to the claims or defenses that the insurer has against the one from whom she derives her claim.
With the finding in the criminal ease, Reuter became subject to the collateral estoppel claim that State Farm here asserts. Bullen’s derivative status collaterally estops her.
State Farm,
[¶ 25] In
Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Winker,
[¶26] In
New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Brower,
While Geschke also was not a party to those [criminal] proceedings, he was in privity with Brower. Therefore, he is barred from relitigating any issue necessarily decided against Brower in the earlier criminal action. Geschke’s rights under the insurance policy are derivative from those of Brower. In effect, Geschke stands in the shoes of Brower with respect to the liability policy involved. (Citation omitted.) Moreover, there was an identity of interest between Geschke and Brower at the time of the criminal proceedings. Brower, who was charged with, among other crimes, assault with intent to kill, was afforded a full opportunity to litigate the issue of his guilt. He had every reason to make as vigorous and effective a defense as possible. His personal interests would have been served by establishing that he did not intend to assault Geschke because he would have avoided criminal responsibility for the assault and retained his liability coverage. Geschke had a similar interest in the outcome of the trial because coverage would not be precluded if Brower did not intentionally assault him.
The conviction of Brower for assault with intent to kill stamps the assault upon Geschke as an intentional one. The jury could not have returned such a verdict without making a determination that the assault was intentional, not accidental as now claimed by Geschke. Thus, the finding of guilt conclusively established that Gesehke’s injuries were intentionally caused by Brower and collaterally es-topped Geschke from relitigating that same issue with manufacturers.
Brower,
[¶ 27] In
Poole v. State Farm, Fire & Cas. Co.,
[¶ 28] Daniel Clark raised self defense as a defense in his criminal trial. He had a full and fair opportunity, and an adequate incentive, to litigate the issue of his guilt in the criminal trial. The jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, he was not acting in self defense when he shot and killed George Giro-dengo. Daniel Clark and the other appellants had an identity of interest in establishing self defense in the criminal trial. The rights of Kelly Girodengo and Maria Entzel under Clark’s insurance policy are derivative from his rights. We conclude the jury’s determination Daniel Clark was not acting in self defense when he shot and killed George Girodengo is res judicata, and the appellants may not now relitigate that issue. 3
VI
[¶ 29] Under the rubric of “public policy,” the appellants contend: (1) “Daniel Clark does not have adequate assets to answer if he is found liable for negligently or recklessly causing the death of Kelly Girodengo’s fa *385 ther. The only opportunity for compensation comes from the benefits of his Ohio Casualty insurance policy;” (2) “There is a substantial factual issue which must be resolved in a proper fashion, i.e., did Daniel Clark expect and intend to kill George Girodengo?;” and (3) “The rule of law apparently established by the trial court in its order is that a homeowner with a liability policy gives up any right to protect and defend himself.”
[¶30] While Daniel Clark may not have adequate assets to respond in damages if found liable, as we have already noted, the legislature has manifested a public policy against requiring insurers to cover damages caused by an insured’s intentional acts. We have upheld the trial court’s determination there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Daniel Clark intentionally fired the shots that killed George Girodengo. “ ‘Where an intentional act results in injuries which are the natural and probable consequences of the act, the injuries, as well as the act, are intentional.’
Hins v. Heer,
VII
[¶ 31] The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. Section 9-08-02, N.D.C.C., provides: "All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, the exempting of anyone from responsibility for his own fraud or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”
. Section 26.1-32-04, N.D.C.C., provides: "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of the insured, but the insurer is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured or of the insured’s agents or others.”
. Decisions like
Thornburg v. Perleberg,