610 N.E.2d 1164 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1992
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas which granted summary judgment to plaintiff-appellee and cross-appellant Ohio Bus Sales, Inc. ("Ohio Bus") on its request for a permanent injunction. Defendants-appellants and cross-appellees, Nollenberger Truck Center, Inc. ("NTC") and Transportation Equipment Sales Corporation ("TESCO"), appeal that judgment and assert the following assignment of error:
"The trial court erred by granting the motion for summary judgment of plaintiff Ohio Bus Sales and denying the motion for summary judgment of intervening defendants Nollenberger Truck Center and Transportation Equipment Sales Corporation."
Ohio Bus raises a single assignment of error on cross-appeal:
"The trial court erred by not ruling that R.C. §
On May 30, 1991, Ohio Bus filed a complaint in the Lucas Court of Common Pleas in which it named the Toledo Board of Education ("board") and Lee Fisher, Attorney General of the state of Ohio, as defendants. Ohio Bus alleged that the board had advertised for bids for fifteen fifty-four passenger transit-type buses to be purchased by the board. Ohio Bus contended that despite the fact that its bid was the lowest responsible bid, the board voted to award the contract for the purchase of the fifteen buses to NTC (bus chassis supplier) and TESCO (bus body supplier). Ohio Bus asserted that the board had rejected its bid due to an alleged noncompliance with R.C.
NTC and TESCO were allowed to intervene as defendants in the proceedings below. On June 14, 1991, the board filed a motion for summary judgment. It argued that R.C.
On June 14, 1991, Ohio Bus filed a motion for summary judgment, which was supported by the affidavit of John Blackford, sales representative for Ohio Bus. Subsequently, both the Attorney General of Ohio and NTC/TESCO filed motions for summary judgment. Each summary judgment motion addressed the construction of R.C.
The relevant undisputed facts revealed in the materials filed in support of the various motions for summary judgment are as follows.
Ohio Bus distributes and sells school buses manufactured by the Bluebird Company ("Bluebird"). Bluebird manufactures and sells both bodies and chassis for transit-type buses. Due to the fact that no other manufacturer makes a body or a chassis which is compatible with those made by its company, Bluebird does not permit its distributors to sell its bodies and chassis separately. That is, Ohio Bus markets its buses as a complete unit. On the other hand, NTC and TESCO manufacture separate bus bodies or bus chassis that are assembled with the body or chassis of another manufacturer to make a complete bus.
In April 1991, the board advertised for bids for fifteen fifty-four passenger transit-type buses, inclusive of five buses with wheelchair lifts. Ohio Bus submitted four separate bids for the two types of buses. The forms used for the purpose of bidding were those specified by the board in its specifications manual. The Ohio Bus bids include two school bus chassis bid forms and two school bus body bid forms. However, each bid form contained a base price that encompassed the total cost of both a body and a chassis. For a single bus without a wheelchair lift, the unified base bid for a chassis and body was $41,978 (total bid equaled $42,304 per bus); for a bus with a wheelchair lift, the unified base bid per bus was $42,616 (total bid equaled $45,892 per bus). NTC submitted a bid of $27,392 for each bus chassis. TESCO submitted a bid of $15,741 for each bus body without a wheelchair lift and $18,670 for a bus body with a lift.
On May 28, 1991, the board accepted the bids of NTC (chassis) and TESCO (body). It rejected the Ohio Bus bids because they allegedly did not conform to the requirements of R.C.
On July 31, 1991, the trial court entered a judgment in which it granted Ohio Bus' motion for summary judgment and denied the like motions of the other parties. The lower court did not reach the constitutional issue or the issue of whether the bids submitted by Ohio Bus could be deemed separate and independent bids under R.C.
In their sole assignment of error, NTC/TESCO contend that the trial court erred in its construction of R.C.
Summary judgment is a method for promptly disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to a material fact. Norris v. Ohio Std. Oil Co. (1982),
R.C.
"The purchase of school buses shall be made only after competitive bidding in accordance with divisions (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (I), and (J) of section
The relevant portion of R.C.
"(G) None but the lowest responsible bid shall be accepted. The board may reject all the bids, or accept any bid for both labor and material for such improvement or repair, which is the lowest in the aggregate. In all other respects, the award of contracts for improvement or repair, but not for purchases made under section
The paramount goal in the construction or interpretation of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting that statute. Featzka v. Millcraft Paper Co.
(1980),
NTC/TESCO assert that the language of R.C.
The material clause in R.C.
R.C.
NTC/TESCO also argue that the board could reject the Ohio Bus bids because they did not conform to board specifications. This legal theory was not raised or reached in the trial court and may therefore be disregarded by this court on appeal. In reDismissal of Mitchell (1979),
Lastly, NTC/TESCO assert that the trial court had insufficient evidence before it to determine that Ohio Bus was the "lowest responsible bidder." NTC/TESCO therefore argue that the lower court could not order the board to enter into a contract with Ohio Bus for the purchase of the fifteen school buses.
Pursuant to R.C.
In the case before us, the Ohio Bus bid was eliminated from the competition solely on the basis of the disputed language of R.C.
For these reasons, the sole assignment of error asserted by NTC/TESCO is found not well taken in part and well taken in part. As to Ohio Bus's cross-assignment of error, our decision on the merits relieves this court of any duty to consider the constitutionality of R.C.
The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed as to its construction of R.C.
Judgment accordingly.
HANDWORK, ABOOD and MELVIN L. RESNICK, JJ., concur.