524 N.E.2d 532 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1987
Lead Opinion
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing the appeal of appellant Ohio Association of Public School Employees ("appellant"), because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Appellant filed an unfair labor practice charge on March 17, 1984 with the State Employment Relations Board ("SERB") asserting that the Cleveland City School District Board of Education ("school district") had violated R.C.
SERB conducted an investigation of the charge, pursuant to R.C.
Appellant appealed to the trial court which, in pertinent part, held:
"* * * [N]either O.R.C. § 4117. 13(D) nor O.R.C. §
Appellant asserts the following assignments of error:
"I. The court of common pleas erred in dismissing this appeal on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to review a refusal by [the] State Employment Relations Board to issue a complaint.
"II. The SERB order dismissing appellant's unfair labor practice charge is not supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and [is] not in accordance with law."
SERB also advances an assignment of error:
"The lower court erred by overruling SERB's Motion to Intervene."
Appellant contends that the court of common pleas has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from SERB's order dismissing its unfair labor practice *128
charge for lack of probable cause because SERB is subject to R.C. Chapter 119 pursuant to R.C.
"Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section, theboard is subject to Chapter 119. of the Revised Code, including the procedure for submission of proposed rules to the general assembly for legislative review under division (H) of section
Appellant cites specifically R.C.
"Any party adversely affected by any order of an agency issued pursuant to any other adjudication may appeal to the court of common pleas of Franklin county * * *."
Appellant, however, does not have a remedy under R.C.
"Before an appeal can successfully be brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County under the provisions of R.C. Chapter 119, the proceedings of the administrative agency must have been quasi-judicial in nature. Section
"`Proceedings of administrative officers and agencies are notquasi-judicial where there is no requirement for notice, hearingand the opportunity for introduction of evidence.'" (Emphasis added.)
SERB's decision dismissing appellant's unfair labor practice charge was not made in a quasi-judicial proceeding. Hence, R.C. Chapter 4117 does not require such a proceeding to be conducted. R.C.
It is noteworthy that the General Assembly based unfair labor practice proceedings before SERB upon the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), Section 151 et seq., Title 29, U.S. Code, which also does not provide for a formal hearing or determination of an unfair labor practice charge unless the general counsel finds there is probable cause for believing that an unfair labor practice has been or is being committed. It is recognized that the procedural format or structure involved in labor practice proceedings at the federal level is different from that required by R.C.
R.C.
Appellant also maintains that it has a right to appeal SERB's order to the trial court under R.C.
Appellant relies upon this court's decision in Staples v. OhioCiv. Serv. Emp. Assn./American Fed. of State, Cty. Mun. Emp.,Local 11, AFL-CIO (1986),
It is the statutory duty of SERB or its designated agent to investigate an unfair labor practice charge. R.C.
"(A) The investigation of charges shall be limited to thefacts and issues raised in the charge and any facts or issuesreasonably related to the charge. If the board determines that it has probable cause for believing that an unfair labor practice has been or is being committed, it shall direct issuance of a complaint and cause the complaint to be served upon the charged party.
"(B) If the board determines that it does not have probablecause to believe that an unfair labor practice has been or isbeing committed, it shall not issue a complaint, shall dismissthe charge, and shall so notify the parties." (Emphasis added.)
A special proceeding, pursuant to R.C.
The General Assembly could have provided for a formal hearing to be conducted whereby parties are notified, witnesses are sworn, testimony is taken, and a record is maintained concerning whether there is probable cause to issue a complaint. Notwithstanding, the General Assembly did not provide for such a proceeding unless a complaint is issued. *130
R.C.
The legislature could also have provided for a right of appeal from an order by SERB dismissing an unfair labor practice charge for lack of probable cause. It apparently chose not to include such a provision. In any event, SERB is required to act within the provisions of R.C. Chapter 4117, particularly R.C.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, SERB's order dismissing appellant's unfair labor practice charge was not a final appealable order within R.C.
Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled as the trial court properly sustained appellee's motion to dismiss because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this court does not reach the merits of appellant's second assignment of error, which is overruled.
SERB's motion to intervene was properly overruled as being moot by the trial court. Therefore, neither the trial court nor this court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this appeal. Consequently, SERB's assignment of error is overruled.
This judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
YOUNG and BRYANT, JJ., concur.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the foregoing opinion on the understanding that it does not address or determine any constitutional issues presented by the facts of this appeal.