200 Mo. App. 292 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1918
— This is an action prosecuted under sections 5426 and 5427, Revised Statutes 1909, by the widow of Michael O’Hara, deceased, to recover damages for the death of said Michael O’Hara alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant corporation. The cause has been twice tried below, and this is its second appearance in this court. The first trial resulted in a judgment in plaintiff’s favor, in the sum of $5000, which was set aside by the trial court. Upon plaintiff’s appeal that ruling was affirmed by this court (see opinion of Reyitolds, P. J., in O’Hara v. Lamb Construction Company, 197 S. W. 163). A new trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $7500' from which the defendant prosecutes this appeal.
I.
The first point made by appellant’s learned counsel is that the petition wholly fails to state a cause of action in that it does not aver that plaintiff sustained ioss or damage by reason of the death of her husband. It is true that plaintiff does not in direct terms plead that she ■ sustained a pecuniary loss in the premises. The petition begins by averring that “plaintiff is the widow of Michael O’Hara, deceased,” and then proceeds with allegations as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of Michael O’Hara and the alleged negligence of defendant, concluding with a prayer for judgment.
In support of the argument of appellant’s counsel that the petition is fatally defective in the respect mentioned, we are referred to language in the majority opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Mining Co., 171 Mo. App. 134, 156 S. W. 33, where (l. c. 143) it is said: “The courts of this State have uniformly held that sections 5426 and 5427 are in no sense penal, but purely compensatory. For that reason the husband or wife suing under this section must show the pecuniary loss bnd the damages must be pleaded
As to this language we need only observe that in so far as it purports to state what is necessary, as matter of pleading and proof, in a case brought under this statute by a widow for the negligent killing of her husband, it is obiter dicta and affords no authority for appellant’s contention. In the Johnson case the suit was not one by a widow, but was prosecuted by an administrator, and there was no allegation in the petition of the existence of next of kin. The case went on certification to the Supreme Court where the conclusion reached by the majority of the Springfield Court of Appeals, affirming the action of the trial court in sustaining a demurrer to the petition, was approved. [See Johnson v. Dixie Mining Co., 187 S. W. 1.] But it by no means follows that the language quoted supra has the approval of the-Supreme Court.
Appellant also relies upon language used in the opinion of the Supreme Court (Division No. 2) in Smelser v. Railroad, 262 Mo. 25, l. c. 42, 170 S. W. 1124. In that case, as in the Johnson case, the suit was one by ah administrator, and the question now before us was not therein involved. But irrespective of this, it is to be noted that the language of the opinion upon which appellant relies is, in any event, but the expression of the individual views of the learned author thereof; for it will be observed that in that portion of the opinion the other members of' that division of the Supreme Court did not concur. Consequently, while we have much respect for the individual views of the learned member of our Supreme Court who wrote the opinion in the Smelser case, we are in no way bound by the language thus employed.
It is contended by appellant’s learned counsel that the petition is fatally defective in that it makes no reference to the minor children of plaintiff and deceased, whereas the evidence disclosed that the deceased left surviving him three young children horn of his marriage with plaintiff. But we perceive no merit in this contention. By the terms of the statute the widow is entitled to prosecute the action within six months after the death, though there he minor children. And plaintiff instituted the suit within the required time, and thus appropriated the cause of action. If, as a matter of good pleading, the petition ought to have contained appropiate allegations as. to the existence of minor
It is further contended that the petition is fatally defective for the reason that it does not in terms allege that the action was brought within six months after the death of Michael O’Hara. This contention is obviously without merit. The record shows that the suit was instituted on June 18, 1914; and the petition alleges that Michael 0 ’Hara came to his death on May 14, 1914. Manifestly this suffices to show that the suit was brought in ample time; and the record discloses that at the trial below counsel in open court admitted “that this suit was filed within the proper time.”
II.
Error is assigned to the action of the trial court in refusing to peremptorily direct a verdict for defendant upon the ground that the deceased was shown to have been guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar a recovery herein.
There is no dispute as to defendant’s negligence in the premises. It fully appears that defendant’s vice-president and general manager, in charge of the quarry, knew that this cable was in bad condition; that there was a weak spot therein where a strand or strands of the wire composing the cable had been broken; and a new cable had been ordered to take the place of this old one. The evidence is that the new cable arrived a few minutes after the casualty. It also appears that the weak spot was about twenty feet from the drum upon which the cable was wound when lifting the boxes out of the quarry, and that consequently after a few coils of the cable had been wound upon the drum there was no danger from this weak spot. Although the old cable was thus defective, it appears that the manager, after examining it, was of the opinion that it would hold for the time being’, and hence it was used awaiting the arrival of the new cable.
Taking this evidence at its full face value, for our present purposes, we think that it cannot he said, as a matter of law, that under the circumstances a reasonably prudent man would not have continued in the work in which O’Hara was engaged, so far as the evidence discloses the manner in which he performed such work and his movements at the time of his injury. No witness who testified actually saw the box fall upon O’Hara, or saw his position or movements immediately prior thereto. The injuries which he sustained, which proved fatal, were to his legs, both of which were crushed.It appears that to draw the box to the ledge, O’Hara used a rope, one end of which was fastened to the chain upon the box at the bottom of the quarry; but that when the box had been brought to the ledge he “steadied” it with his hands. It was not necessary or customary for one to stand directly under the box to thus “steady” it, but to stand at the side thereof, near enough to reach it. Apparently O’Hara did not place himself directly beneath the box; though in some manner not explained by the evidence, (whether by the toppling of the box to one side, in falling, due to the nature of its load, or otherwise) it appears that he was thrown down and that his legs were caught beneath the box and crushed. Evidently defendant’s manager did not anticipate danger to O’Hara in performing this work upon the ledge; though by his note he cautioned the latter,
III.
The first instruction given in plaintiff’s behalf is assailed upon the ground that it fails to require a finding on the part of the jury that plaintiff was damaged as a result of the death of her husband.- As said above, we think that the law will imply a pecuniary loss to plaintiff by reason of . the negligent killing of her husband, and that consequently this instruction does not omit any element necessary to be found by the jury in order to entitle plaintiff to a verdict in some amount; and an instruction was given on the measure of damages, to be noticed later, under which the jury were required to find that plaintiff suffered a pecuniary loss, and the extent thereof, in order to return a verdict for substantial damages. We consequently rule this assignment of error against the appellant.
IV.
Plaintiff’s instruction No. 2 is challenged. This instruction begins by telling the jury that “even though Michael O’Hara did know that the steel wire hoisting rope furnished by the defendant was old, weak and worn out, still the plaintiff is entitled to recover,” etc. The point made against the instruction is that it assumes that the cable in question was “old, weak and worn out.” Whether the wording of this portion.of the instruction is such as to bring it under the ban of the rule invoked by appellant, it is scarcely necessary
Y.
Plaintiff’s instruction on the measure of damages is also assailed. This instruction is as follows:
“The Court instructs the jury that if they'find for the plaintiff they will give her a verdict for such damages, not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), as you may- from the evidence deem a fair and just compensation to the plaintiff for the pecuniary loss, if any, resulting to plaintiff by the death of her husband, Michael O’Hara.”
The attack upon this instruction upon the ground that there is “no pleading upon which to base an instruction with reference to pecuniary loss,” is disposed of by what we have said above. Likewise the argument that there was no evidence that plaintiff sustained any pecuniary loss, since there , is no evidence, that the deceased contributed to her support, is, in our judgment, without merit. The presumption is to be indulged, prima facie at least, that the deceased did that which it was his legal duty to do; and, as said above, the law will imply pecuniary loss arising by reason of the relationship of the parties. And the evidence in the case shows the earnings of the deceased, to-wit, $3.50 per
Appellant further contends that this instruction is too general and furnishes no guide to the jury for the proper assessment of damages under the statute. As to this it need only be said that we regard the instruction as good in its general scope. And such being the case, if the defendant desired that the jury be more explicitly directed in the matter of determining the amount which could be properly allowed plaintiff, it was defendant’s duty to ask a limiting or qualifying instruction. [See Browning v. Railroad, 124 Mo. 55, 27 S. W. 644; King v. City of St. Louis, 250 Mo. 501, 157 S. W. 498; Nelson v. United Rys. Co., 176 Mo. App. 423, 158 S. W. 446; State ex rel. United Rys. Co., v. Reynolds, 257 Mo. 19, 165 S. W. 729.]
VI.
The argument that the verdict is grossly excessive,' warranting interference at our bands, does not impress us.
A point is made regarding alleged improper remarks of plaintiff’s counsel in argument to the jury; but it is unnecessary to dwell upon this since we regard it as quite clear that the remarks in question could not be denominated prejudicial, warranting a reversal.
We perceive no reversible error in the record, and it follows that the judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered.