14 Iowa 264 | Iowa | 1862
Bill for a divorce. At the June Term, 1861, of the Franklin District Court, after the pleadings were filed, an agreement was entered of record which reads as follows, viz.: “ By agreement of counsel, this cause is to be heard at Chambers, and is set for hearing at the town of Iowa Falls, in Hardin County, on Friday, the 23d day of August, A. D, 1861, and decree to be entered as of this term.” The cause was heard at the time and place designated, both parties appearing; proof was taken, the cause was argued, and a decree in favor of complainant was rendered, and entered of record in pursuance of the terms of the stipulation of the parties.
■ The main point of controversy is in reference to the action of the .Court in hearing and determining the cause at Iowa Falls, a place outside of the county in which the cause was pending. It is claimed that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear and try the cause as it did, and that even the consent of the parties could not confer this power. There can be no question as to the authority of the Court to hear the cause and render the decree in vacation, the parties consenting thereto. See Code of 1851, §§ 1821 and 1822; Townsley v. Morehead, 9 Iowa, 565; Hattenback v. Hoskins, 12 Id., 109.
The statute requires the Court to be held at the place designated by law, unless by common consent some other place is fixed upon. See Revision of 1860, § 2687. The Court has the power under this statute to change its place of sitting by common consent. If such consent is given, the question of jurisdiction is waived. The Court, without doubt, when it made this order, had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in controversy. The parties assented to the order to hear at Iowa Falls, and appeared at the hearing, without interposing any objection to the right of the Court, or the Judge to act in the premises. "We think the defendant upon principle, is estopped
It is insisted by the appellant that the Court erred in its allowance of alimony. While it is true that it does not appear affirmatively that the evidence embodied in the record is all that was introduced, and upon which the Court based its decree, yet it does appear both from the bill and answer that the Court decreed to the complainant all of the real estate owned by the respondent. The bill and answer present both parties in a very unfavorable light before the Court, and the evidence introduced in the
In other respects the judgment is affirmed.