OLUDARE OGUNDE v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 050212
SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
April 21, 2006
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON
Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J.
W. Allan Sharrett, Judge
The dispositive question in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling that an action filed by a prisoner under the Virginia Tort Claims Act (the Act),
Plaintiff Oludare Ogunde is an inmate incarcerated at the Greensville Correctional Center in Jarratt. In August 2004, he filed this action under the Act against the Commonwealth alleging that the Commonwealth‘s employees negligently assigned him to an upper bunk bed and, in December 2002, ordered him to climb down from the bed for roll call when they knew, or should have known, that he had an injured knee and could fall. He further alleges that as the result of the*
The plaintiff timely filed the notice of claim required by
The Commonwealth filed a plea of the statute of limitations, contending that the action was untimely and was barred under
The inmate statute,
“No person confined in a state or local correctional facility shall bring or have brought on his behalf any personal action relating to the conditions of his confinement until all available administrative remedies are exhausted. Such action shall be brought by or on behalf of such person within one year after [the] cause of action accrues or within six months after all administrative remedies are exhausted, whichever occurs later.”
The Act‘s statute of limitations,
The Act refers to claims filed by inmates and provides that an inmate must first exhaust administrative remedies.
Subparagraph (7) further provides: “The time for filing the notice of tort claim shall be tolled during the pendency of the grievance procedure.”
The question in this case then becomes: When there are two potentially applicable statutes of limitations, which statute applies to an inmate‘s claim under the Act? There is no dispute that if the Act‘s statute of limitations applies, this action was timely filed; if the limitation of the inmate statute applies the trial court‘s ruling was correct.
On behalf of the Commonwealth, the Attorney General contends that the inmate statute applies. He relies on the
Continuing, the Attorney General says that both statutes are clear and unambiguous and that they can be read harmoniously in the following manner. He notes that the purpose of the Act is to carve out an exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity to allow citizens injured by state employees’ negligence to sue the Commonwealth. He says that the Act provides relief generally to those coming within its purview so long as they otherwise comply with the procedures prescribed in the Act, including those in subparagraph (7) above. On the other hand, according to the Attorney General, the inmate statute specifically applies when “the plaintiff is a prisoner and the subject matter relates to the conditions of his confinement.”
Finally, the Attorney General contends that a later enacted statute prevails over an earlier one with which it conflicts. The Act was adopted in 1981. 1981 Acts ch. 449.
We do not agree with the Attorney General‘s several arguments. At the outset, it should be noted that in the view we take of the case we do not reach for decision the question whether this inmate‘s action involving allegedly negligent conduct of state employees relates to “the conditions of his confinement,” as that phrase is used in the inmate statute. For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume, without deciding, that this action does relate to conditions of confinement.
The trial court‘s ruling regarding which statute of limitations applies was based upon the pleadings and presents a pure question of law to be reviewed de novo by this Court. Wilby v. Gostel, 265 Va. 437, 440, 578 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2003). It is elementary that when construing a statute, courts must ascertain and give effect to the legislature‘s intention. Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 547, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2003). In determining that intent, the plain
Employing these settled principles, we hold that the Act‘s statute of limitations applies to this inmate‘s tort action seeking recovery in damages for the ordinary negligence of state employees.
The Act is self-contained, incorporating its own statute of limitations, which likewise is self-contained. The Act‘s limited waiver of sovereign immunity is set forth in
Significantly, the second sentence of subparagraph (7) tolls, during the pendency of the grievance (administrative) procedure, the time for filing the notice of the tort claim. If the inmate statute were to apply here, its final sentence, fixing the time limit for filing suit, would impliedly repeal the second sentence of subparagraph (7) by potentially
We will not attribute to the General Assembly an intention to impliedly repeal the tolling provided in subparagraph (7). “The implied repeal of an earlier statute by a later enactment is not favored. There is a presumption against a legislative intent to repeal where the later statute does not amend the former or refer expressly to it.” Sexton v. Cornett, 271 Va. 251, 257, 623 S.E.2d 898, 901 (2006). Obviously, the inmate statute does not amend the Act nor does it refer expressly to it.
These intersecting statutes can be harmonized. As the plaintiff observes, the inmate statute is not limited to tort actions. It may cover, for example, declaratory judgment actions, suits for injunctive or other equitable relief, and mandamus petitions, so long as they relate to the conditions of the prisoner‘s confinement. The inmate statute deals with all classes of litigation. On the other hand, the narrower Act applies to one type of litigation, tort actions against the Commonwealth. Even if the tort action relates to conditions of confinement, the Act nonetheless applies.
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in sustaining the plea of the statute of limitations and in
Reversed and remanded.