Offet v. SolemOffet v. Solem
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Bowman
Lead Opinion
Gary Offet appeals pro se from a decision of the District Court dismissing his complaint. We affirm.
Offet is an inmate at the South Dakota State Penitentiary. He was convicted in November 1979 of first degree robbery and obstruction of justice, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of nine and three years, respectively. At that time,
In 1981, the South Dakota legislature amended the forfeiture provision.
The District Court held that Offet failed to state a cognizable claim under
To the extent that Offet directly is attacking the length of his confinement and is seeking restoration of his good time credits, the District Court was correct in finding that the appropriate vehicle for asserting these claims would have been a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
This case requires us to explore the “ ‘ambiguous borderland’ ” between habeas corpus and
Our Court has not been consistent in either applying or not applying the exhaustion requirement to such an indirect attack on the length of a state prisoner’s confinement. Compare White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 533, 66 L.Ed.2d 292 (1980) and cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1089, 101 S.Ct. 882, 66 L.Ed.2d 816 (1981) and Kelsey v. State of Minnesota, 565 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.1977) (permitting adjudication of damages claims) with Miner v. Brackney, 719 F.2d 954 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259, 104 S.Ct. 3554, 82 L.Ed.2d 856 (1984) and Franklin v. Webb, 653 F.2d 362 (8th Cir.1981) (requiring exhaustion of state proceedings before adjudicating damages claims).1 Accordingly, we approach this case as one in which our decision will establish the rule for this Circuit. Because a prisoner who wins a
We believe it is clear that the question whether exhaustion should be required should not be determined solely by reference to the relief the plaintiff requests. See Franklin v. Webb, 653 F.2d at 364; Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93, 96 (7th Cir.1986) (per curiam). Such a facile distinction between habeas and other claims quickly would subvert the policy announced in Preiser. In Offet’s case, a federal ruling on the constitutional issue underlying the
The distinction adopted by some other federal courts between a challenge to the “manner” of applying prison disciplinary sanctions and one challenging the “outcome” of a particular proceeding, see, e.g., Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078, 1086-87 (3d Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1229, 89 L.Ed.2d 339 (1986), seems to us no answer to the concerns of federalism that cases such as this one raise. Here, a judgment that a disciplinary decision revoking good time credits was rendered in an unconstitutional manner ineluctably would lead to a different outcome in the disciplinary proceeding, and hence to a reduction of Offet’s period of confinement. In a case such as this one, the distinction between “manner” and “outcome” becomes meaningless. Although Offet ostensibly challenges the system by which his good time cedits were deprived, a finding in his favor on the underlying constitutional issue inevitably would lead to the restoration of those credits in a subsequent habeas proceeding against the state. The indirect effect of a successful
We are unable to read Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), to the contrary without sacrificing the underlying rationale of both Wolff and Preiser. In Wolff, inmates at a Nebraska prison brought suit under
The Court noted that the threshold issue was whether the validity of the disciplinary system could be considered in a
We do not lightly dismiss Wolff. Wolff appears to direct federal courts to determine the appropriate remedy in cases such as this one solely by reference to the relief requested. 418 U.S. at 554, 555 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. at 2973-74, 2974 n. 13. On the other hand, to read Wolff as allowing a state prisoner to avoid the exhaustion requirement by artful pleading is to set Wolff at odds with the rationale of Preiser, and we do not believe that the Court intended such -a result. See Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d at 95-96 (exhaustion requirement applied to
At least three factors suggest that Wolff was not intended to undercut Preiser‘s policy requiring exhaustion. First, the relief provided in Wolff clearly was intended to be entirely prospective in nature, and was not intended to effect the early release of the plaintiffs or even the review of the state’s prior disciplinary decisions. 418 U.S. at 555, 573-74, 94 S.Ct. at 2974, 2882-83. In a decision that so carefully avoided invalidating prior state disciplinary decisions, it is unlikely that the Court would have intended to sanction the use of
Finally, the Supreme Court recently has suggested that Wolff did not settle the issue, at least with respect to an attack on the validity of the conviction. In Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 922, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 2825, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984), the Court observed that it had “no occasion to decide if a Federal District Court should abstain from deciding a
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed insofar as it applies the exhaustion requirement to Offet’s
Notes
. Other circuits have also had occasion to consider the potential impact of
. We believe it is appropriate to stay rather than dismiss the
.Under South Dakota law, habeas corpus is not an available remedy for such a challenge to a statute providing for forfeiture of good time credits. Tibbetts v. State, 336 N.W.2d 658, 661 (S.D.1983); see also
. Contrary to the suggestion made by the dissent, post at 1262, “ ‘a proper respect for state functions’ . . . has as much relevance in areas of particular state administrative concern as it does where state judicial action is being attacked .... The strong considerations of comity that require giving a state court system that has convicted a defendant the first opportunity to correct its own errors thus also require giving the States the first opportunity to correct the errors made in the internal administration of their prisons.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491-92, 93 S.Ct. at 1837-38 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
With all respect, I believe that the Court’s holding that the exhaustion requirement of
Two leading cases govern this inquiry: Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). In Preiser, prisoners brought suit under
The Court responded to this argument as follows:
The answer to this contention is that the respondents here sought no damages, but only equitable relief — restoration of their good-time credits — and our holding today is limited to that situation. If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release — the traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy. Accordingly, as petitioners themselves concede, a damages action by a state prisoner could be brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies.
Id. at 494, 93 S.Ct. at 1838 (citation omitted) (first and third emphases supplied).
Thus, Preiser laid down a clear rule: if the relief sought by a plaintiff would be the equivalent of habeas corpus relief, the exhaustion requirement normally applicable in habeas corpus cases would apply. But if the relief sought were something else — for example, an award of money damages — the exhaustion requirement would not apply.
If this is what Preiser means, and I see no other way to read that opinion, there is no inconsistency at all between Preiser and Wolff, either in holding or in rationale. Wolff is quite clear on the point:
At the threshold is the issue whether under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 [93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439] (1973), the validity of the procedures for depriving prisoners of good-time credits may be considered in a civil rights suit brought under42 U.S.C. § 1983 . In Preiser, state prisoners brought a§ 1983 suit seeking an injunction to compel restoration of good-time credits. The Court held that because the state prisoners were challenging the very fact or duration of their confinement and were seeking a speedier release, their sole federal remedy was by writ of habeas corpus, 411 U.S., at 500 [93 S.Ct. at 1841], with the concomitant requirement of exhausting state remedies. But the Court was careful to point out that habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available remedy for damages claims, which, if not frivolous and of sufficient substance to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court, could be pressed under § 1983 along with suits challenging the conditions of confinement rather than the fact or length of custody. 411 U.S., at 494, 498-499 [93 S.Ct. at 1838, 1840-1841].
The complaint in this case sought restoration of good-time credits, and the Court of Appeals correctly held this relief foreclosed under Preiser. But the complaint also sought damages; and Preiser expressly contemplated that claims properly brought under§ 1983 could go forward while actual restoration of good-time credits is sought in state proceedings. 411 U.S., at 499 n. 14 [93 S.Ct. at 1841 n. 14]. Respondent’s damages claim was therefore properly before the District Court and required determination of the validity of the procedures employed for imposing sanctions, including loss of good time, for flagrant or serious misconduct. Such a declaratory judgment as a predicate to a damages award would not be barred by Preiser; and because under that case only an injunction restoring good time improperly taken is foreclosed, neither would it preclude a litigant with standing from obtaining by way of ancillary relief an otherwise proper injunction enjoining the prospective enforcement of invalid prison regulations.
418 U.S. at 554-55, 94 S.Ct. at 2973-74 (footnote omitted).
In short, there is no inconsistency between Wolff and Preiser. There is no occasion for us to wonder whether the Wolff Court was “at odds with the rationale of Preiser, ” ante at 1260, for the simple reason that both Preiser and Wolff state the same rule: if the relief requested is the equivalent of habeas corpus, that is, an injunction restoring good time improperly taken, exhaustion is required. If the relief requested is money damagés, or a merely prospective injunction, it-is not. Cf. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499 n. 14, 93 S.Ct. at 1841 n. 14.
Such a rule, it is true, draws a rather arbitrary line. When money damages are sought, as here, on the ground of the constitutional invalidity of the deprivation of good-time credits, a federal-court decision in favor of such a claim would answer, on its merits, precisely the same underlying legal question that would be presented by a petition for habeas corpus. The award of damages would necessarily imply a judgment declaring the state’s deprivation of good time constitutionally invalid. To that extent, allowing the damages action to go forward does undercut the general policy of allowing the state forum to make the initial judgment on the validity of the state’s action. This problem, however, was expressly noticed by the Wolff Court, which stated, if repetition can be forgiven, that “[s]uch a declaratory judgment as a predicate to a damages award would not be barred by Preiser. . . .” 418 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. at 2974. Perhaps the answer is that the policy favoring exhaustion is not the only policy operating in this area. There is also a policy, stated by Congress in
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court, which dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust state remedies as required by
I recognize that a majority of the Supreme Court in Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 2826, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984), treated it as an open question whether “a Federal District Court should abstain from deciding a
I believe the safer course is to abide by Supreme Court holdings as written, leaving it to that Court to change its mind if it wishes.