*1 charges the sentenc- party to both sota (a) insure that the with-

ing court should in a de

holding of credit does not result resulting in departure consecutive

facto (b) length insure the total service and turn the defendant serves not sentence things subject manipulation that are prosecutor

by the or irrelevancies such pleads in- guilty the defendant

whether trial), right his on most

sists on relied Arden, State v.

recently (Minn.1988). summary, that on remand the we hold fully must credit court defendant’s

trial

probationary jail spent term with time

jail sentencing. arrest between

Affirmed as modified. OFFERDAHL,

Rosemary et Sherlock

al., Respondents, OF MINNESOTA

UNIVERSITY CLINICS, AND

HOSPITALS

petitioners, Appellants.

No. C4-87-297.

Supreme of Minnesota. Court

I. 1972, Rosemary us- Offerdahl ing a Daikon Shield intrauterine device (IUD) which inserted physician was at community health service not affiliated University. with Offerdahl attended the University of Minnesota as a student in and hospital- 1973 1974. In she was University Hospital ized at the for abdom- pain inal associated with Inflamma- Pelvic (PID). tory Disease The Daikon Shield IUD was not removed at time. 28, 1977, On June Offerdahl visited the University Hospital complaining of abdom- pain bleeding during inal and excessive menstruation and the Daikon Shield IUD Hutchinson, Paul, C. peti- David St. removal, was removed. After the Offer- tioners, appellants. inquired dahl about methods alternative birth control. She returned to the Univer- MacKenzie, K. Minneapolis, Reed for re- Hospital August 9, 1977, sity and con- spondents. sented the insertion of a IUD Felton, Dr. Patricia a resident University.

at the Offerdahl Fel- ton Copper-7, assuring recommended the it her was safe and would not cause the POPOVICH, Justice. problems experienced she had with the Dai- kon Shield. Offerdahl was instructed to Rosemary Sherlock Offerdahl sued the University year return to the in one for a University Hospitals of Minnesota Clin- and checkup Pap and smear. (hereinafter “University”), ics alleging the University committed medical to experience Offerdahl continued ab- by failing to risks disclose associated with pain Cop- dominal after the insertion (IUD) use of an device intrauterine and for per-7. 9,May On went Offerdahl damages allegedly Hospital incurred as a result of University and asked to have insertion of the IUD. The district court the IUD pregnancy removed. Because was granted University’s suspected, motion sum- IUD not removed. Of- mary holding judgment, ferdahl was asked to return in one Offerdahl’s claim week for removal of IUD if applicable was barred under the results of the negative. pregnancy Although test were limitations as than more pregnant, Offerdahl was not did passed not between the insertion of the IUD University January return to the until and commencement of this suit. The experiencing when she was severe Appeals Minnesota Court of and reversed pain vaginal bleeding abdominal and remanded, holding that the statute of limi- discharge. was re- begin tations did not run until Univ- moved and Offerdahl was admitted to the ersity’s terminated, treatment of Offerdahl University hospital for treatment. raising a jury question as to when treat- ment ceased. University diagnosed having Offerdahl was Offerdahl Clinics, Hospitals Minnesota 411 a result she has under- chronic PID. As N.W.2d 20 (Minn.App.1987). we surgeries, including gone a number of find Offerdahl’s claim based a sin- Fallopian of her left tube and removal gle negligence act of damage University par- at the ovary sustained more prior dispute than two PID ties when treatment for ended action, commencement Following of this 1981 University. we reverse. at the sur- Martin, Abdallah Inc. fertility granted.” counsel- received gery, Offerdahl Nagel, a ing from Dr. Theodore Hospital. February, malpractice against physi Claims healthy gave to a Offerdahl birth hospitals cians and must be commenced

baby. within time the cause of Meanwhile, com- 541.01, action accrues. Minn.Stat. 541.- §§ Robins A.H. *3 menced lawsuit Esser, 07(1) (1986). v. In Schmitt Inc., damages as a Company, sustained Minn. 226 N.W. 196 we set forth using the Daikon Shield IUD. result pertaining rule to accrual of in 1984. litigation settled She malpractice. claims for medical this medical then commenced plaintiff sued for mal medical on against University June action alleging practice, physician the defendant alleges University 1984. Offerdahl properly failed to and heal a treat broken it failed to disclose because physician ankle. The treated the ankle her the risks associated with inser- to from March to including Copper-7, the in- of the tion plaintiff on June 1928. commenced suit contracting aggravating risk of creased rejected This court the defendant’s conten complications. She fur- PID and associated two-year tion that the University was ther claim, holding plaintiffs barred “the treat Copper-7 failing to her the manu- advise employment be considered should against inserting facturer recommended whole, and, if as a there occurred therein the circumstances that under malpractice the statute of limitations be inserted in when the IUD was Of- existed gins to ceases.” run when the treatment ferdahl. 86, 226 N.W. II. surrounding Of- The circumstances following ap- issues are raised The unique issue ferdahl’s treatment raise peal: proper regarding application of the set treatment rule” "termination of against 1. Whether Offerdahl’s claim patient re Schmitt by to a claim a who more because than University is barred patient the clinic as a as a ceived care passed two between physician. than an individual whole rather by Dr. and the commencement Felton claim University asserts Offerdahl’s the lawsuit. the statute be against it is barred under is barred claim Whether Offerdahl’s passed between cause more than exception” to the under the Felton, resident who by Dr. applied rule” “termination of treatment Copper-7 IUD with allegedly inserted malpractice. medical risks, and the advising of the out The Univ of the lawsuit. commencement III. Dr. no evidence out there is points summary judg appeal On an care or treatment medical Felton rendered ment, reviewing court is to the role of the subsequent the removal to Offerdahl purpose of an review the for the record University IUD 1979. (1) swering whether there questions: part is vica on its any liability maintains genuine any of material fact to are issues negligence committed liability for rious determined, (2) the trial whether be suit Dr. Felton. of the law. application court erred in its Felton, the against Dr. would be barred Minneapolis, M.R.R. St. St.P. & S.Ste. claim barred argues the University Co., Indem. Mercury Paul against well. it as When University position, the its support reviewing summary judgment, we “must Bulluck, cites Grondahl view evidence most favorable take a of the Grondahl, plaintiff (Minn.1982). In against one whom the motion was defendant, Bulluck, sued Dr. physician and his employed clin- failing properly diagnose clinic for generally hold, ic physician. as her plaintiff's malfunction of system. balance unique patient under these facts where the Id. at 242. The court remanded for deter- sought treatment from a clinic as a whole mination when Dr. Bulluck’s treatment of rather than physician, an individual plaintiff terminated, noting that if jury whole, treatment of the clinic as a rather against found the claims Dr. Bulluck than that of the individual al- barred, the claims the clinic would leged to have committed the act of mal- well, despite be barred as the fact practice, purposes is relevant for of deter- plaintiff had been treated another doc- mining when treatment terminated and the tor at the clinic within two statute of limitations to run. Id. at 244. lawsuit. 2. The next issue raised is whether the Grondahl distinguishable from this alleged negligence “single- falls within the matter. Unlike the defendant exception” to the termination of treat- *4 Grondahl, Dr. Felton was not Offerdahl’s ment rule. While the “termination of regular treating physician at the time the applies treatment rule” in most cases of Copper-7 IUD was inserted. Offerdahl alleged malpractice, medical recog- we have testified in her deposition that she received exception general nized an rule. from several different Universi- Schmitt, we stated: residents, ty apparently assigned at ran- would seem advisable not to apply [I]t dom, receiving outpatient while care at the demurrer, the bar statute on un- University. In very a real sense Offerdahl clearly less it appears complaint from the hired the clinic and not an physi- individual that negligent the unskillful or act which cian problems. to treat or cure her injury caused place the took at a date more than We have not before the previously action addressed the brought. that, issue It applicability of of is true if the there be termination of single malpractice, but a act rule to of patient a claim of a subse- who quent received time and merely remedy care from effort to a clinic as a whole rath er or In Wat than an cure that act physician. individual could not toll the run- Fromm, kins v. ning of the statute. 108 A.D.2d 488 N.Y. (App.Div.1985), S.2d 768 the New York 226 N.W. at 197. court held the termination of treatment Hauser, In Swang 288 Minn. doctrine tolls the statute of limitations for (1970), applied we this a medical action physi “single exception, holding act” plain- alleged cians to have malprac committed tiffs’ claim for technical assault and bat- tice while members of a group, medical tery stemming allegedly from unauthorized group practice, who have left provided the surgery by two-year barred stat- patient was treated group patient as a ute of limitations despite physi- the fact the subsequent treatment was for origi cian-patient relationship continued within nal complications condition or resulting of commencement of the suit. holding, therefrom. In so the New York We reasoned that alleged tort was a “[t]he * * court noted patient patient was “a of single surgery *; is, act of that it was group, any rather than of particular time, complete precise at that for no contin- doctor, every right and had to believe that ued course of treatment could either cure group, such, was, effect, in phy his in Murray Id. or Similarly, relieve it.” sician, and that he could continue to be Fox, 373, 376-77, 300 Minn. by treated that until either he or 358-59 patient’s we held a that physician-patient ended the malpractice, alleging claim for physi- relationship.” 488 N.Y.S.2d at 775. deciding cian was in upon and adopt the reasoning undertaking of the New York surgery, by was barred court Watkins. Offerdahl did not seek in of despite limitations other treat- any particular from ment within two because the event irrevocably Copper-7 on and the IUD alleged malpractice occurred was removed. Be- surgery Offerdahl’s the statute cause cause of action accrued date of January 28, began to run on that date. and this action was limitations not commenced until June her similarly claim falls Offerdahl’s two-year claim barred statute of termination of treat general outside set in Minn.Stat. alleges the rule. Her claim Universi 541.07(1). § failing in to disclose ty was Reversed. with the insertion her the risks associated IUD, failing and in Copper-7 YETKA, JJ., dissenting. WAHL and her IUD manufac advise WAHL, (concurring part; Justice dis- against inserting the recommended turer senting part). Offerdahl, patients, such as who IUD Dis history Inflammatory a of Pelvic respectfully holding I dissent Thus, solely claim rests ease. majority opinion that Offerdahl’s claim upon single act omission the Univ “single exception” is barred under the University physi when the to the “termination treatment rule.” inserted the without cian view, exception” inap- my informing of the risks.1 plicable the facts this case. For that I reason would reach the issue and concur practical A reason for the “ter that, holding patient seeks in the where a of treatment rule” is that action mination whole, from clinic as medical treatment ordinarily does consist able treatment not *5 of the clinic as a is the treatment whole does, or, single even if most of a act it it is determining purposes of when relevant precise to determine the time of its difficult begin- treatment and the the terminated 309, at Swang, 288 Minn. 180 occurrence. ning period. the of present at is not N.W.2d 189. concern case, alleged this has an in as Offerdahl malpractice The in rule medical single act as identifiable the treatment “should con- cases that the be negligence whole, and, the basis for her claim. Offer- if sidered a there occurred sharp in to the dahl’s claim is contrast statute of limita- therein the Schmitt, pre begins claim set where the to run when the treatment tions 82, negligent readily Esser, event could not be ceases.” v. 178 Minn. cise Schmitt 83-84, 86, 196, (1929). Today, 197 178 Minn. 226 identified. See N.W. long-standing from majority departs N.W. this 226 by holding ac- rule that Offerdahl’s claim Alleged negligence coupled with al- ended, crued, not but when treatment when resulting damage gravamen in leged is the alleged and negligence act” of deciding the date when the cause of action damage occurred. Co., accrues. v. Dow Dalton Chemical 580, attempts support draw majority Minn. 584 The 280 158 N.W.2d Swang (1968). negli- holding from our decisions in allegation Offerdahl’s for its 306, Hauser, 187 Minn. gence acts omissions v. 288 relates to Fox, Minn. University August 9, (1970), Murray and v. 300 the date the This reliance Under Dal- 220 356 IUD was inserted. misplaced. Those ton, Murray and Swang her of action accrued cause when distinguishable from the resulting negli- damage sustained from this decisions are previous cases in that gence. damage, present and case Offerdahl sustained surgery was single act of which damage, by January aware of such involved time, con- precise for no “complete hospitalized PID at that when she was was barred under Recently, Eighth Appeals, insertion of a Circuit Court of law, similarly applying "single exception" to the termination Minnesota concluded Butler, patient’s negligence, that a claim for 836 F.2d rule. Goellner misrepresentation nondisclosure and (8th Cir.1988). hospital regarding and YETKA, (concurring part, of treatment could either dis- tinued course Justice senting part). Swang, or relieve it.” cure 190; Murray, 180 N.W.2d at see I concur in the view of Justice Wahl. Thus, at 358. Minn. at stemming unauthorized or claims from un

necessary easily from surgery, arose identi single single excep

fiable events. to such cases.

tion should be limited treatment, in contrast giving to the causes rise of ac- Murray, Swang consisted of tion OELRICH, Respondent Duane J. single merely act. Her more than treat- (C5-88-61), (CX-88-69), Relator contemplated, in, in fact resulted ongoing contraceptive and gynecological Moreover, damage SCHLAGELS, resulting Employers care. INC. and Wausau, alleged negligence manifested it- Insurance of Respondents, period self over a of time. Under these circumstances termination Jack Roach Ford and American Mutual applies. rule Company, Insurance Relators analogous Cress, This case is Bush v. (CX-88-69), (C5-88-61), Respondents 227 N.W. where plaintiff employed physi- defendant cian “attend her in childbirth.” 227 Department Minnesota of Human plaintiff's at 432. held N.W. Services, Intervenor, claim, brought more than two after Company, MADA Insurance child, the birth not barred on Intervenor, Respondent, pleadings, alleged complaint phy- as the plaintiff sician treated conditions Compensation Special related to the within two childbirth *6 Fund, Respondent. the commencement of lawsuit. Id. at C5-88-61, Nos. CX-88-69. Supreme of Minnesota. Court sought at the univ- prevention pregnancy. merely treatment did not involve insertion contemplated also

periodic follow-up gynecological visits As appeals,

care. noted the court of

treatment Offerdahl received after the IUD necessary

was removed was to relieve Disease,

symptoms Inflammatory of Pelvic condition ag- was caused or

gravated by presence Copper-7. for PID was the prevention

direct result of

pregnancy, both treatments are relevant in

determining which the date stat-

ute of to run. I would appeals

affirm the decision of court of remand this case for determination of

the date of last treatment for

PID at the university.