223 Pa. 234 | Pa. | 1909
Opinion by
The plaintiff’s evidence showed a condition existing a day before the accident, with respect to the gas main and service pipe, at the point of connection between the two — both under exclusive control of the defendant company — which resulted in an uncontrolled discharge of gas in the plaintiff’s house. Had nothing been done to correct this condition, it will hardly be questioned that the explosion which so soon thereafter followed and wrecked the plaintiff’s house, could have very safely been referred to this defective condition of defendant’s line of pipes; that is to say, a cause adequate would have appeared, which, in the absence of any evidence of other sufficient cause, would have warranted a finding by the jury that the explosion resulted from the defect shown to have existed. This circumstance marks a clear distinction between the present case and that of Ott v. Boggs, 219 Pa. 614.
We held in the latter case that where the only evidence as to the cause of the accident is such as is derived by inference from conditions existing after the occurrence, and these conditions suggest several causes, either of which operating by itself would be adequate to the result, and the defendant is without responsibility except as to one, there can be no recovery unless the conditions point to the cause to which defendant’s responsibility attaches, with such a degree of certainty as would justify a jury in finding it to be the approximate cause. The evidence in the present case as to conditions existing the day before the accident has decided significance. Except for this, the plaintiff’s evidence would afford ground for conjecture as to the cause of the accident, but nothing more. The plaintiff’s contention was that the break in the connection between the service pipe and the street main was improperly and negligently repaired, and that another break in the same place
Judgment affirmed.