Glenn Odom, Respondent, v. Town of McBee Election Commission and Shilon Green, Appellants.
Appellate Case No. 2019-000147
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court
Filed July 24, 2019
Opinion No. 27901
Roger E. Henderson, Circuit Court Judge
Appeal from Chesterfield County. Heard May 29, 2019.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED
Martin S. Driggers, Jr., of Sweeny, Wingate & Barrow, P.A., of Hartsville, Richard E. McLawhorn, Jr., of Sweeny, Wingate & Barrow, P.A., of Columbia, and Karl S. Bowers, Jr., of Bowers Law Office, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellants.
Kathleen C. Barnes, of Barnes Law Firm, LLC, of Hampton, John E. Parker and William F. Barnes, III, both of Peters, Murdaugh, Parker, Eltzroth & Detrick, of Hampton, for Respondent.
“In municipal election cases, we review the judgment of the circuit court only to correct errors of law.” Taylor v. Town of Atl. Beach Election Comm‘n, 363 S.C. 8, 12, 609 S.E.2d 500, 502 (2005). “Our review does not extend to findings of fact unless those findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence.” Id.
“There was no right to contest an election under the common law.” Id. at 14, 609 S.E.2d at 503. In South Carolina, the right to contest an election exists only under our constitutional
I.
On September 4,1 2018, the Town of McBee held an at-large election to fill two seats on its Town Council. The five candidates for the two seats are Odom, Kemp McLeod, Donald Robinson, Sim Tyner, and Appellant Green; the two candidates with the most votes will fill the two seats. During the election, several people attempting to vote were challenged as nonresidents of McBee. This appeal centers upon votes cast by four of the challenged voters.
On September 6, 2018, Odom delivered a letter to the Commission in which he stated, “I would like to contest the official results” of the election. In the letter, he stated the four voters resided in McBee and were therefore qualified to vote
[T]he Municipal Election Commission shall, after due notice to the parties concerned, conduct a hearing on the contest, decide the issues raised . . . and when the decision invalidates the election the council shall order a new election as to the parties concerned.
The Commission convened the required hearing on September 10, 2018; after a recess that day, the hearing resumed and concluded on September 25. The Commission heard testimony from Odom and the four challenged voters and heard arguments from counsel. The four challenged voters testified they were McBee residents at all appropriate times and further testified they voted for Odom. In its written decision, the Commission found the four voters were eligible to vote in the election. The Commission wrote: “Because adding the four votes to the total for Glenn Odom would have changed the outcome of the election, the Municipal Election Commission hereby invalidates the September 5, 2018 election and orders a new election as is required under
Odom appealed the Commission‘s decision to the circuit court, arguing the Commission erred in ordering a new election instead of simply counting the four votes and declaring he was a prevailing candidate. Citing
Section 7-13-830 provides the “Procedure when voter challenged” and requires that “each ballot whose challenge was decided in favor of the voter must be removed from the envelope, mingled, and counted and the totals added to the previously counted regular ballot total . . . .”§ 7-13-830 (emphasis added). This language applies to this voter challenge case and dictates that the four votes the Commission determined should have been counted are added to the previously counted ballots. The result of following this plain language is that Odom is the election winner and the Commission erred in ordering a new election rather than declaring him a winner.To apply
§ 5-15-130 to invalidate an election and require a new election when challenged votes are decided in favor of the voter would render§ 7-13-830 meaningless because its remedy of counting the votes would never be used.
Consequently, the circuit court overturned the Commission and remanded the proceedings to the Commission to count the challenged votes and announce Odom as a prevailing candidate. Appellants appealed the circuit court‘s decision to this Court. At this stage, all parties concede the four votes were legally cast, and the sole issue is whether the four votes should now be unsealed and counted or whether the election should be invalidated and a new election held.
II.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the court ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Greene v. S.C. Election Comm‘n, 314 S.C. 449, 452, 445 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1994). However, we must first attempt to construe a statute according to its plain language, and if the language of a statute is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning, “the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.” Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). “The
After Odom filed his letter of contest, the plain language of
III.
If an irregularity occurs during the course of an election, the election must be invalidated and a new election held only if the irregularity was of the sort that renders doubtful the result of the election. See Broadhurst v. City of Myrtle Beach Election Comm‘n, 342 S.C. 373, 381-82, 537 S.E.2d 543, 547 (2000); Easler v. Blackwell, 195 S.C. 15, 19, 10 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1940). Appellants contend that because the outcome of the election would be changed by adding the four
Even if we were to conclude there was an irregularity as urged by Appellants, we hold the irregularity was not of the sort requiring invalidation of this particular election. Our conclusion is compelled primarily by the simple fact that the four provisional ballots were preserved and delivered to the Commission as required by
In three cases, this Court has ordered a new election when the addition of uncounted but legally cast votes or the subtraction of counted but illegally cast votes cast doubt upon the results of an election. Our holdings in these cases were fact-specific, and the facts of the instant case must guide our determination of whether
In Easler v. Blackwell, 195 S.C. at 23, 10 S.E.2d at 164, we invalidated an election for school trustees in Spartanburg County and ordered a new election. Six candidates ran for three trusteeships. Id. at 18, 10 S.E.2d at 162. The candidate with the most votes would serve for three years, the candidate with the second-most votes would serve for two years, and the candidate with the third-most votes would serve for one year. Id. at 19, 10 S.E.2d at 162-63. A total of 690 votes were cast; the results were remarkably close, with the candidates receiving 347, 346, 346, 344, 339, and 336 votes, respectively. Id. at 18, 10 S.E.2d at 162. The board of canvassers sustained the validity of the election of the top three finishers despite a host of irregularities occurring during the election, including two people who were allowed to vote despite not having paid their poll tax and more than 100 voters being allowed to vote after the polls had closed. Id. at 17-18, 10 S.E.2d at 162. There was no way to tell for which candidate(s) the illegal votes were cast. See id. at 19-21, 10 S.E.2d at 162-63. We considered the closeness of the vote tally and concluded that because there was no way to determine for whom the illegal votes had been cast, the election must be invalidated and a new election held. Id. at 19-23, 10 S.E.2d at 162-64.
In Broadhurst v. City of Myrtle Beach Election Commission, 342 S.C. 373, 378, 537 S.E.2d 545, three candidates were in a runoff election for two seats on Myrtle Beach City Council. Id. at 378, 537 S.E.2d at 545. Voters were permitted to vote for two candidates in the runoff. Id. Rachel Broadhurst finished third, 327 votes behind the first-place finisher and 212 votes behind the second-place finisher. Id. However, an electronic voting machine at a voting
Easler, Gecy, and Broadhurst are distinguishable from the instant case, as all three of those cases involved elections in which there was no way to tell for whom the disputed votes were cast; consequently, the only conceivable conclusion was that the results of the election were in doubt, and the only remedy in those cases was a new election. However, in the instant case, there is no dispute that the four voters were allowed to cast provisional votes. The four votes were placed in envelopes, the envelopes were sealed, and the envelopes were set aside and delivered to the Commission. The four votes are available for counting.
Appellants rely upon Armstrong v. Atlantic Beach Municipal Election Commission, 380 S.C. 47, 668 S.E.2d 400 (2008), for the proposition that the only relief that may be ordered in this case pursuant to
Our statement that “[t]he only relief the Commission may order is ‘a new election as to the parties concerned‘” was made in the context of explaining that
As noted, we also held in Armstrong that the one-vote spread, coupled with four voters not being allowed to vote rendered the result of the election doubtful and required a new election. Some of the facts in Armstrong certainly resemble the facts of the instant case; however, those facts are distinguishable on a key point: in Armstrong, four voters “were denied the right to vote.” 380 S.C. at 48, 668 S.E.2d at 401. Consequently, there were no provisional ballots to be counted once it was determined the voters should have been allowed to vote. However, in the instant case, the four voters were allowed to cast provisional votes, which were set aside and preserved and are available for counting. At the least, the issue raised by Odom in the instant case—that the four challenged votes are identifiable and available for counting—was not raised in Armstrong. This is a critical distinction between Armstrong and the instant case; thus, we conclude our holding in Armstrong is inapplicable to this case.
Appellants contend nothing in
In drafting
IV.
We have concluded that
V.
We affirm the circuit court‘s decision to remand the proceedings to the Commission. We modify the circuit court‘s order in two ways: first, we hold
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.