This аction was brought by appellee First National Bank of Arizona as the executor of the estate of Edwin L. Peterson, deceased, to quiet title to certain land in Maricopa County. Appellants counterclaimed requesting specific performance 01 certain written instruments, or in the alternativе, damages for breach of contract. Judgment was entered in favor of appellee quieting titlе and dismissing appellants’ counterclaim. From that judgment appellants bring this appeal.
It appears that one Edwin L. Peterson was in 1953 the owner of a 14-acre tract of land, the land which is now the subject mаtter of this dispute. Odom and Cooper, appellants, became interested in purchasing the land fоr a housing development, and in March of 1953 signed an agreement with Peterson as the owner giving them an option to purchase. Thereafter, on June 26, 1953, they notified Peterson of their intention to exercise thе option and on July 6th of the same year, all the parties signed an instrument called “escrow instructions.” Subsеquently, certain disagreements arose between the parties which resulted in Peterson and apрellant Cooper signing a real estate sales agreement ; however, Odom did not sign. Later, both Cooper and Odom demanded conveyance of the land pursuant to the purported terms of the оriginal option contract and escrow instructions. This demand was refused by Peterson.'
Peterson died on June 15, 1954 and the First National Bank of Arizona, as executor of his estate, filed this action to quiet title to the property. It appears from an examination of the transcript of testimony and the answer to thе counterclaim that the appellee asserted in the court below three claims: First, that the оption contract and escrow instructions were obtained by undue influence; second, that these instruments were so vague and indefinite as to be incapable of being specifically performed оr the predicate of an action in damages; and third, that the instruments were rescinded by the subsequent reаl estate sales agreement signed by Cooper as a representative of the partnershiр of Cooper and Odom.
There are seven assignments of error, five of which attack the actiоn of the trial *241 court in entering judgment quieting title in appellee and dismissing appellants’ counterclaim for the reason that the evidence showed the option contract and escrow instructions were valid, binding and legal agreements to sell and convey the land.
It is to be noticed that the effect of these assignments of error and, in fact, appellants’ entire argument devoted thereto is simply to re-examine the evidence in a light most favorable to them. The rule is firmly established in this jurisdiction that this court will examinе the record only to determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the action of the court below. Bank of Arizona v. Harrington,
Appellants complain of the rulings of the trial court sitting without a jury as to the admission of certain evidence. A discussion of this assignment is unnecessary since the trial court is presumed to have considered only competent evidence in аrriving at its decision. Home Owners’ Loan Corporation v. Bank of Arizona,
Appellants’ final assignment of error complains of the exclusion of certain testimony, all of which was evidentiary of the damages sustаined by the appellants. However, even where evidence is erroneously excluded, its exclusiоn is not reversible error if the outcome of the case is such that it would have been warranted,' evеn had the excluded evidence been admitted, and the probabilities are such that its admission would not have changed the result. J. & B. Motors v. Margolis,
The judgment is affirmed.