ODIORNE LANE SOLAR, LLC, et al. v. TOWN OF ELIOT et al.
Yor-23-80
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
November 7, 2023
2023 ME 67
STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.
Argued: October 5, 2023; Reporter of Decisions
CONNORS, J.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Odiorne Lane Solar, LLC1 applied to the Planning Board in the spring of 2021 for site-plan review and change-of-use approval to build a large solar array project on land located in the Town‘s Rural District.2
[¶3] The Planning Board approved the application. Abutters appealed that approval to the Board of Appeals, which sustained the appeal, vacating the approval of the Planning Board. Odiorne appealed that decision to the Superior Court pursuant to
II. DISCUSSION
A. We review the decision of the Planning Board de novo.
[¶4] “In a Rule 80B appeal, the Superior Court acts in an appellate capacity, and, therefore, we review the agency‘s decision directly.” 21 Seabran, LLC v. Town of Naples, 2017 ME 3, ¶ 9, 153 A.3d 113 (quotation marks omitted). The administrative decision on review here is that of the Planning Board because the Eliot Board of Appeals acts only in an appellate capacity in this context. See
[¶5] The determinative question in this appeal is whether the array constitutes a “public utility facility” within the meaning of the Ordinance.3 With respect to the characterization of a use, we have explained that
[w]hen there is no ambiguity in the language of the ordinance, we ordinarily review a Board‘s characterization of a structure as a finding of fact, giving deference to the Board‘s ultimate conclusion. . . . Interpretations of municipal ordinances, however, are questions of law subject to de novo review. . . . Thus, we review the interpretation of the ordinance de novo, but we afford the Board‘s ultimate characterization of the structure substantial deference.
Jordan v. City of Ellsworth, 2003 ME 82, ¶¶ 8-9, 828 A.2d 768. Here, the dispute focuses on the meaning of the text of the Ordinance, as opposed to whether the bundle of factual characteristics of the project fit an unambiguous ordinance definition. Therefore, the question is subject to our de novo review.
[¶6] Finally, “[w]e examine an ordinance for its plain meaning and construe its terms reasonably in light of the purposes and objectives of the ordinance and its general structure. If an ordinance is clear on its face we will look no further than its plain meaning.” Town of Minot v. Starbird, 2012 ME 25, ¶ 14, 39 A.3d 897 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
B. The solar array project is not a “public utility facility” within the meaning of the Ordinance.
[¶7] The Ordinance does not define “public utility facility.” It defines “public utility” as “any person, firm, corporation, municipal department, board or commission authorized to furnish gas, steam, electricity, waste disposal, transportation or water to the public.”
[¶8] To furnish electricity to the public in Maine, an entity must be authorized to do so by the Public Utilities Commission pursuant to
[¶9] Odiorne admits that it is not a public utility within the meaning of
[¶10] Instead of being a component of a public utility transmission and distribution network, this solar array would be classified by statute as a non-utility “distributed generation resource,” defined as “an electric generating facility with a nameplate capacity of less than 5 megawatts that uses a renewable fuel or technology under section 3210, subsection 2, paragraph B-3 and is located in the service territory of a transmission and distribution utility in the State.”
[¶11] As a factual matter, this solar array would not sell its generated electricity to the public. Rather, it would connect its generation plant to the network of Central Maine Power Company, the T&D utility authorized to serve the public in Eliot. CMP would then deploy the electricity generated from the solar array, as well as a host of other generators, throughout the region to serve its retail customers.
[¶12] Odiorne is correct that some approvals from the Commission are required for large solar arrays and that some solar generators have subscribers, but these arguments are not helpful to either its cause or its position. Nothing in the record indicates that this solar array has subscribers, and generators—solar or otherwise—are not authorized to be a public utility.7
public. Whether an applicant may furnish service to the public is a function of state law, and
[¶14] To interpret the Ordinance to include generation within the definition of a public utility would also produce absurd results. See Jordan v. City of Ellsworth, 2003 ME 82, ¶ 10, 828 A.2d 768 (“A court‘s interpretation of an ordinance must not create absurd, inconsistent, unreasonable or illogical results.“) (quotation marks omitted). Such inclusion could result in large industrial biomass, natural gas, or nuclear plants being located anywhere in the Town, including the Rural District. It would also ignore the logical reason why the Ordinance allows public utility facilities in every district—to ensure that the heavily regulated monopoly T&D electricity network can be deployed throughout the municipality.
[¶15] Finally, the Ordinance provides that any use not listed is prohibited.
[¶16] In sum, under the plain language of the Ordinance, “public utility facility” means a facility of a public utility authorized to furnish service to the public. The solar array does not meet this definition.9
III. CONCLUSION
[¶17] Whether the location of solar arrays in rural districts is a good idea as a matter of policy is not the question before us. It is up to the voters in the Town of Eliot to decide what uses may be allowed, reflected in the language they adopt in their ordinances. Given the language they chose to define the permitted use of public utility facilities, we agree with the Board of Appeals that, at the relevant times for this application, the Ordinance did not permit the location of the project within the Rural District.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to enter a judgment affirming the decision of the Board of Appeals.
Patrick S. Bedard, Esq. (orally), Bedard & Bobrow, P.C., Eliot, for appellant Jay Meyer
Leah B. Rachin, Esq. (orally), and Amy K. Olfene, Esq., Drummond Woodsum, Portland, for appellee Odiorne Lane Solar, LLC, and NHSOLARGARDEN.COM, LLC
Sandra L. Guay, Esq. (orally), Archipelago Law, LLP, Portland, for appellee Town of Eliot
York County Superior Court docket number AP-2022-9
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
