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Odiase v. ODDO
3:25-cv-00206
| W.D. Pa. | Jul 31, 2025
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                 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
             FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 OVBOKHAN ADUN ODIASE,                      ) 
                                            ) 
                    Petitioner,             ) 
                                            ) 
        VS.                                 )      Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-206 
                                            )      Judge Stephanie L. Haines 
 LEONARD ODDO, in his official              ) 
 capacity as Warden of Moshannon Valley  __ ) 
 Processing Center, et al.,                 ) 
                                            ) 
                    Respondents.            ) 
                                 OPINION 
     On July 9, 2025, Petitioner Ovbokhan Adun Odiase (“Petitioner”), through counsel, filed 

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) (ECF No.  1) and a Motion for Emergent 

Relief, Immediate Release Pursuant to Lucas v. Hadden, and/or Order to Show Cause (the “PI 
Motion”) with an accompanying Brief in Support of the PI Motion.  (ECF Nos. 2-3).'  On July 17, 
2025,  Respondents  Leonard  Oddo  (in his  official  capacity  as  Warden of Moshannon Valley 
Processing Center (“Moshannon”)), Brian McShane (in his official capacity as Acting Field Office 
Director  of the  Immigration  and  Customs  Enforcement  (“ICE”),  Enforcement  and  Removal 
Operations (“ERO”), Philadelphia Field Office), Kristi Noem (in her official capacity as Secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)), and Pam Bondi (in her official capacity as 

Attorney General of the United States) (collectively, “Respondents”), through counsel, filed a 

Response Brief in Opposition to the PI Motion.  (ECF No. 9).  On July 18, 2025, Petitioner filed a 

1 On July 10, 2025, the Court entered a scheduling order for the PI Motion. (ECF No. 7). The Court also ordered that 
Petitioner not be removed from the United States or transferred outside of the Western District of Pennsylvania until 
further order of the Court.  (/d. at 2-3). The temporary administrative stay did not constitute a ruling on the merits of 
the PI Motion or on the Petition.  (/d. at 3).  Upon the docketing of this Opinion and its accompanying Order, the 
temporary administrative stay shall be lifted. 

Reply Brief in Support of the PI Motion.  (ECF No. 10).  Accordingly, the PI Motion is ripe for 
disposition.  For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the PI Motion at ECF No. 2. 
  I.     Factual Background 
     Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nigeria.  (ECF No. 1 § 11).  In October 2020, Petitioner 
entered the United States on a B2 nonimmigrant visa and was authorized to remain in the United 
States until April 13, 2021.  Ud. ¥ 14).  Petitioner has remained in the United States ever since her 
arrival.  Ud). 
      In  early  October  2021,  DHS  issued  Petitioner  a Notice  to  Appear,  charging  her  as 
removable from the United States for overstaying her B2 visa.  (Jd.  § 16).  Thereafter, in late 
October 2021, Petitioner filed an asylum application with the Immigration Court in Elizabeth, New 

Jersey (“IC”).  Ud.   17).  Approximately six months after filing her asylum application, Petitioner 

became eligible for work authorization and a Social Security number, which she obtained.  Ud. § 
18). 
      On February 20, 2024, New Jersey police officers arrested Petitioner on state charges of 

robbery, conspiracy, aggravated assault, and burglary. (ECF No. 1-5).  A New Jersey court granted 
her release the following day.  (ECF No. 1 § 21).  Upon her release, on February 21, 2024, ICE 
detained  Petitioner.   (/d.  {  22).   Petitioner  is  now  detained  at  Moshannon  in  Philipsburg, 
Pennsylvania.  (/d.). 
      On  January  10,  2025,  an  Immigration  Judge  (“IJ”)  of the  IC  found  Petitioner  was 
removable pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1227
(a)(1)(B).  (ECF No. 1-7).  The IJ also granted Petitioner’s 
withholding of removal to Nigeria on humanitarian grounds.  (Id.).  DHS and Petitioner waived 

the appeal of the IJ’s decision, making the decision administratively final on January 10, 2025.

     On March 12, 2025, New Jersey police officers took Petitioner from Moshannon to New 
Jersey to execute a bench warrant for an alleged violation of Petitioner's monitoring conditions. 
(ECF No.  1   931).  On March 17, 2025 Petitioner appeared before a New Jersey court; learning 
that Petitioner was in ICE custody, the State of New Jersey withdrew the motion alleging the 
violations, and the judge vacated the bench warrant.  (Id. § 32). 
      While in New Jersey, Petitioner filed a habeas petition on April 3, 2025, in the U.S. District 

Court for the District of New Jersey.  (Jd. 434).  The same day, ICE re-detained Petitioner and 
transferred her back to Moshannon.  (/d.).  On April 22, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the 

District of New Jersey dismissed Petitioner’s habeas petition as moot and premature.  (ECF No. 

9-1). 
      According to ICE, in light of the IJ’s order to withhold removal to Nigeria, ERO now is 

attempting to effect Petitioner’s removal to other countries.  (ECF No. 9-2 § 7). ERO sent Requests 
for Acceptance of Alien to Brazil, France, Jamaica, Japan, and Spain; all countries denied the 

Request, except for  Jamaica, which remains pending.  Ud.). 
      Pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order  14165, Securing Our Borders, 
90 Fed. Reg. 8467
, ICE elevated Petitioner’s case to Removal and International Operations (“RIO”) for 

review and potential submission of additional Requests for Acceptance of Alien not previously 
contacted by local ERO.  (dd.     12-13).  On July 9, 2025, RIO indicated that there are third- 

country removal opportunities for Petitioner.  Ud. ¥ 14).  RIO has stated that Petitioner’s removal 

from the United States is imminent once a third-country removal opportunity is secured.  Ud. § 
 19). 
      According to ICE, ERO concluded that Petitioner should remain in ICE custody pending 
ERO and RIO’s attempts to secure a third-country removal.  (Ud.  { 15).  Invoking Petitioner’s

overstay of her B2 visa and her arrest for robbery, conspiracy, aggravated assault, and burglary, 
ICE determined that Petitioner poses a  flight risk and danger to the community or to the safety of 

other persons and property, if released.  (dd).  According to ICE, ERO further concluded that a 

likelihood of issuance  of travel documents  and removal to  a third country  exists,  warranting 
detention pending her removal.  (/d.  § 16). 
      According to ICE, ERO has regularly reviewed Petitioner’s custody status.  Ud.   17).  As 

recently as July 9, 2025, ICE states that it has redetermined that Petitioner’s criminal history and 

expectation of removal warrants detention.  Uad.). 
   I.     Jurisdiction 
      Title 
28, United States Code, Section 2241
 grants federal courts the authority to hear habeas 

corpus  matters brought by  aliens  challenging the  lawfulness  of their detention by ICE.  See 

Jennings v. Rodriguez, §83 U.S. 281, 292-96 (2018); see also Bodnari v. Noem, No. 3:24-CV- 

163, 
2025 WL 317985
, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2025); Akhmadjanov v.  Oddo, No. 3:25-CV-35, 
2025 WL 660663
, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2025); Roe v.  Oddo, No. 3:25-CV-128, 
2025 WL 1892445
, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 2025). 
   Ill.    Preliminary Injunction Standard 
      Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy” and “should be granted only in 

limited circumstances.”  Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 
369 F.3d 700, 708
 (3d Cir. 2004).  A 

party seeking to obtain such relief must show: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that 

 it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will 
 not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such 

 relief.”  
Id.

     Failure to satisfy the first factor of the analysis—a likelihood of success on the merits— 
necessitates denial of the injunctive request.  Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 
882 F.2d 797
, 800 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 
689 F.2d 1137, 1143
 (3d Cir. 1982)).  It follows that district courts need not address the other factors if the moving 
party fails to establish the first factor.  See Marvin R.V. v. Tsoukaris, No. 20-CV-5225, 
2020 WL 6689760
, at *5 n.2 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2020) (collecting Third Circuit cases to support the statement 
that “[because the p]etitioner has failed to meet his burden with respect to the likelihood of success 
‘on the merits, the Court need not address the remaining factors”); see also Peter y. Att'y Gen. of 
New Jersey, No. 23-CV-3337, 
2023 WL 4627866
, at *1 (D.N.J. July 19, 2023). 
   IV.    Analysis 
      Regarding  the  likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits  factor,  Petitioner  argues  that  her 
“continued and prolonged detention is unconstitutional and violates her substantive due process 
right to be free from unlawful restraints on her liberty, and [8 U.S.C. §] 1231(a)(6), as interpreted 
by [the Supreme Court in] Zadvydas[v.  Davis, 
533 U.S. 678
 (2001)].”  (ECF No. 3 at 4).  She 
further argues that “ICE has also violated [her] due process rights by repeatedly failing to review 
her custody properly.”  (/d. at 6). 
      In  response,  Respondents  argue  that  Petitioner’s  “detention  accords  with  
8 U.S.C. § 1231
(a)(6) and does not violate her due process rights.”  (ECF No. 9 at 7).  Respondents further  □ 

argue that Petitioner “has received the custody review required under 
8 C.F.R. § 241.4
.”  Cd.  at 
10).  The Court agrees with the Respondents. 
      In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court decided that 8 U.S.C.  3  1231(a)(6), the post-removal- 
period  statute,  authorizes  the  Government  to  detain  a  removable  alien  “only  for  a  period 
reasonably necessary to secure the alien’s removal,” rather than “indefinitely beyond the removal

period.” 
533 U.S. at 682
 (emphasis in original). The Zadvydas Court prescribed the presumptively 
reasonable time period as six months.  Jd at 701.  The presumptively reasonable time period is 
only a presumption—not an ironclad timeframe.  Jd. (“This 6~month presumption, of course, does 
not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months.  To the contrary, an alien 

may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of 
removal  in  the  reasonably  foreseeable  future.”).   The  applicable  burden  only  shifts  to  the 
Government if, in addition to showing that the post-removal-order detention has surpassed six 
months, the alien also shows that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 
foreseeable future.  
Id.
 (“After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe 
that  there  is  no  significant  likelihood  of removal  in  the  reasonably  foreseeable  future,  the 
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”). 
     Here, the Court assumes without deciding that Petitioner has shown that the post-removal- 
order detention has surpassed six months.  Petitioner’s removal was finalized on January 10, 2025. 
(ECF No.  1-7).  Petitioner has been in ICE custody since that date—minus the 22 days that she 

was in the State of New Jersey’s custody.  (See ECF No. 1    31-34).  Assuming that the 22 days 
count toward Petitioner’s post-removal period calculation and that the post-removal period did not 
restart upon Petitioner’s April 22 re-detention by ICE, Petitioner’s detention would have passed 
the six-month threshold on July 11, 2025. 
     However,  regardless  of whether Petitioner has  shown her detention has  surpassed  six 
months, Petitioner has failed to produce evidence demonstrating good cause to believe that there 
  significant likelihood of her removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 
     Conversely, Respondents sufficiently argue that there is a significant likelihood of removal 
in the reasonably foreseeable future.  According to ICE Deportation Officer Alassane Coulibaly’s

Declaration, sworn under the penalty of perjury, ICE is undergoing good-faith efforts to effect 
Petitioner’s removal.  (See ECF No. 9-2).  ERO has sent Requests for Acceptance of Alien to 
Brazil, France, Jamaica, Japan, and Spain.  Although four of the countries denied the Requests, 
the  Jamaica  Request  remains  pending.    Further,  Respondents  have  invoked  the  new 
Administration’s policy—namely, Executive Order 14165—regarding international cooperation 
in entering agreements to facilitate the removal of aliens present in the United States in violation 
of federal law (e.g., Safe Third Country Agreements under 
8 U.S.C. § 1158
(a)(2)).  Pursuant to 
Executive  Order  14165,  Petitioner’s  case has been elevated to  RIO  for review and potential 
submission of additional Requests for Acceptance of Alien to countries not previously contacted 
by local ERO.  Notably, on July 9, 2025, RIO indicated that there are third-country removal 
opportunities for Petitioner.  And RIO has stated that Petitioner’s removal from the United States 
is imminent once a third-country removal opportunity is secured.  Accordingly, Petitioner has 
failed to satisfy the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits factor because she has not met the burden 
prescribed by Zadvydas. 
      Lastly, regarding Petitioner’s argument that ICE has violated her due process rights by 
failing to review her custody, Petitioner also has failed to show that she has a likelihood of success 
on the merits of this clam.  ICE Deportation Officer Alassane Coulibaly has averred under the 
penalty of perjury that ERO has regularly reviewed Petitioner’s custody status.  She further stated 
that as recently as July 9, 2025, ICE redetermined that Petitioner’s criminal history and expectation 
of removal warrants detention.  In sum, ICE has followed the process for custody determinations 
as prescribed by 
8 C.F.R. § 241.4
(d).  Petitioner has offered no evidence to the contrary. 
   V.     Conclusion

     For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s PI Motion at ECF No. 2.  An 
appropriate Order follows. 

                                               ey,      vs           Ao. 
      “se  i    By    Ag                        Soi  edt      wit. f  i        □□ 
DATEDidifted  OF,                            LOND BILD  OF  SEB  □□□□□ 
      Se    ee                                     .   + 
                                             STEPHANIE L. HAINES 
           A                                   U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case Details

Case Name: Odiase v. ODDO
Court Name: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Date Published: Jul 31, 2025
Docket Number: 3:25-cv-00206
Court Abbreviation: W.D. Pa.
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