Oden v. Oktibbeha County MS

POLITZ, PARKER, Before SMITH and Judges. Circuit PARKER, M. Judge: ROBERT Circuit Defendants Oktibbeha County, Sheriff Dolph Bryan in his official capacity, and Dolph Bryan individually appeal from the judgment of district court in which compen- awarded Jesse Oden satory punitive damages and for Sheriff Bryan’s promote to chief Oden to failure deputy. punitive We reverse the com- and pensatory damages against Oktibbeha County Dolph Bryan individually and and jury’s damage affirm compensatory against Bryan award Sheriff in official his

I. Facts In and September Jesse Oden joined George Carrithers the Oktibbeha County Department. Oden Sheriffs part operator, worked time as radio part while served as a time Carrithers jailer. Department promoted Oden in deputy full time road 1979. Carrithers received the same rank in 1980. Dolph Bryan Sheriff dismissed his for- Oden Deputy mer chief job, Bryan inquired but Sheriff about informed him he would not fill time, vacant At the position. same Sheriff Bryan assigned Deputy Carrithers of- (argued), Colom Colom Wilbur O. gave him the fice duties and title “adminis- Columbus, Firm, MS, Law for Plaintiff- Deputy trative Oden remained assistant.” Appellee. in the field. Sheriff working Jackson, Cole, Bryan promoted Deputy III (argued), William J. Carrithers MS, Brown, M. deputy. Jackson Brown Law Of- chief not complaint responsible filed a with the entities that are

Deputy Oden discriminatory unlawful con- Opportunity employer’s Equal Employment Commis- Moore, sion, Huckabay duct. claiming race age and discrimination. Cir.1998) only County, (holding Oden then sued Oktibbeha Sheriff employers are liable for unlawful conduct Dolph Bryan capacity, official and his VII). individually, Dolph asserting under Title Because the remedies Sheriff defendants Title under Title of the under VII causes action VII 1981, § separated, deter- Rights Act were we must Civil mine whether the district court erred and U.S.C. 1985.1 assessing compensatory punitive dam- presented evidence trial show- ages and the Oktibbeha law ing seniority, superior his enforcement capaci- and individual training, background business man- ties. Oden, According to agement. these assets promotion should have ensured his to chief A. Defendants Remedies deputy. argued The defendants that the under deputy position chief was not a promotion may Plaintiffs causes of ac plead Carrithers; rather, in favor of Deputy § Title 1981 under both VII tion assignment of the chief rank was against employers private remedy dis job merely a in title. change The defen- private employment crimination in con that Deputy dants also claimed Oden Runyon McCrary, tracts. 427 U.S. See close of unqualified. plaintiffs At the the 160, 174, 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d 415 ease, judge the district entered a directed (1976); Express v. Raihuay Johnson dismissing verdict for the defendants Inc., 454, 459, Agency, 95 S.Ct. age Oden’s discrimination claim. The (1975). 44 295 L.Ed.2d Plaintiffs a in of Deputy returned verdict favor may § pursue a action also 1983 cause of race for discrimination com- assessed against persons acting color of state under pensatory punitive damages all against law in order to assert their substantive three defendants. §

rights under 1981. We must determine II. Proper Defendants Under Title can independent whether Oden assert an § 42

VII and U.S.C. 1981 § against cause of action under 1981 Ok County tibbeha and the in his offi County Oktibbeha and Sheriff cial capacities. and individual (“Appellants”) that argue court district by erred their motion denying to dismiss County 1. The and the Sheriff and the Sheriff his individu- Capacity His Official recognizes al This Court that provide Title VII Supreme does the exclusive Court held Jett District, remedy by employers. Independent discrimination v. Dallas School 491 Country See Hernandez v. Hill Coop., Tel. U.S. 105 L.Ed.2d Inc., (1989), 849 § F.2d 142-43 598 1981 provide did not may not, however, indiscriminately separate Courts gov- cause of action local against damage against persons assess awards ernment entities. concluded Court nate, parties 1. Neither analysis nor the court district this Court’s limited to the is contemplated application plaintiffs of 42 U.S.C. causes of Title VII and action under § 1985 to this case. Because Oden failed § U.S.C. 1981. present conspiracy evidence of a to discrimi- (c) plaintiffs only must assert a cause of action section addresses substantive § against state actors under 1983 to reme- rights. only pro- Section 1983 remains the § dy rights of civil under violations expressly remedy vision to create a against See id. Several courts have addressed the persons acting under color of state law. continuing significance plu- of the Court’s (c) The addition of subsection creates no rality Congress passed decision after the more of a need for the judiciary imply Act of 1991. The Act Rights Civil amend- § cause of action against under state (c), § adding ed subsection which actors than existed when the Supreme rights protected by states that the 1981 Court decided Jett. protected against impairment by “are non- legislative history of the 1991 governmental impair- discrimination and supportive amendment is of our conclusion. ment under color of state law.” (c), By enacting Congress subsection stat- 1981(c).2 In order to determine whether ed that it to codify Supreme intended pursue Oden could a separate cause of in Runyon Court’s decision v. McCrary. action under Oktibbeha Butts, 222 F.3d at 894 (citing H.R. County and the Sheriff in his official ca- 102-40(1), (1991), Rep. No. at 92 reprinted pacity, we must address whether the 1991 549, 630; in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. H.R. Rep. abrogated amendment holding Court’s 102-40(11), (1991), No. reprinted separate

in Jett and created a cause 731). 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. See also government action local entities. (2d Anderson v. Conboy, (c) expressly Subsection does not Cir.1998). In Runyon, Supreme Court create a remedial of action against cause implies reaffirmed that a right of entities, government local and we are not action based on racial discrimination persuaded remedy that such a should be against private actors. Runyon, Jett, implied. In the Court held that Con 174-75, at 96 U.S. S.Ct. 2586. There is no § gress intended 1983to be the sole reme congressional statement of intent to over- dy for by persons acting discrimination By codifying Runyon, Congress rule Jett. Jett, under color of state law. See 491 § implies confirmed that 1981 a cause of 731, at U.S. 109 S.Ct. 2702. The Court against private action actors. § implicitly reasoned that 1981 created an why, question follows then if independent against private cause of action Congress only codify Runyon, intended actors because no other statute created (c) language does subsection include refer 732, remedy. such a id. at 109 S.Ct. ring persons acting under color of state § 2702. provided remedy Because 1983 a law? The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this against persons acting under color of state law, persons acting allusion to under color of the Court declined to imply cause of implies Congressional § action state law intent to independent under 1981 of § § remedy 1983. are create a in addition to 1983. persuaded We that the con Oakland, clusion in Jett remains the same after Con See 96 F.3d at 1213. dis We gress agree. judicial enacted the 1991 power imply “[T]he amendments. Sub- or 151, (4th 1995). split fax, 2. The circuit courts are as to the of n. 1 effect 55 F.3d 156 Cir. Rights upon Circuit, however, the Civil Act of 1991 the Court's Ninth concluded that holding in Jett. The Fourth Circuit Elev- implicitly 1991 amendment created a cause of enth Circuit concluded that the 1991 amend- against government action local entities. See opinion. ment had no affect on the Court's Federation American Contractors v. of African Volusia, 891, County See Butts v. 222 F.3d Oakland, (9th 1996). of 96 F.3d 1204 Cir. (11th Cir.2000); County 894 Dennis v. Fair- 464 has ex Supreme ... exer While the Court should not be

create remedies involving § liability tended 1981 to cases express of an decision in the face cised contracts, it not private employment has scope of remedies concerning the Congress liability offi imposed personal on elected Jett, particular under a statute.” available in the cials for discrimination terms 732, (citing 2702 at 491 U.S. government employ of local conditions Corp. National Passenger R.R. v. National Brown v. General ment contracts. Passengers, R.R. U.S. A ssn. Cf. Admin., 820, 835, 96 Servs. S.Ct. (1974)). L.Ed.2d 646 S.Ct. (1976) (holding 48 L.Ed.2d 402 Congress expressed neither its Because remedy for seek Title VII is the exclusive Jett, explicitly nor creat intent to overrule money against the federal ing damages in remedy against state actors addi ed a Moore, Huclcabay this government). willing § we are not to devi tion to not Court concluded that an individual was Supreme analysis ate from the Court’s employer purposes for of Title VII Accordingly, Deputy Jett. acting capacity. in his official when independent maintain an cause of could not officials be Only 241. should against Oktibbeha action under discriminatory responsible decisions Dolph Bryan and Sheriff concerning government employment con capacity.3 v. Lone tracts. See id. See also Grant (5th Cir.1994) Co., Star The Sheriff His Individual (“Only ‘employers,’ acting not individuals Capacity capacity in their individual who do not Dolph Bryan claims that ‘employ otherwise meet the definition of by failing the district court erred to dis ers,’ VII.”); can be liable under Title Har miss claims him in his indi Oden’s Blake, 226, 227 vey v. Cir. vidual The Sheriff does not dis 1990) (concluding that an elected official pute provides an implicit cause acts). should be liable for official private private of action actors Likewise, when a asserts cause employment discrimination cases. See of action under 1981 for discrimination Inc., Railway Express Agency, Johnson municipal in the terms and of a conditions contract, U.S. S.Ct. employment proper defen (1975); McDougal, L.Ed.2d 295 Adams government employer dant the in is Cir.1983). (5th Rather, Bryan’s 108 capacity. official Because Sheriff argues proper party he that he is not a promote Deputy choice to Carrithers to decision, acting deputy this suit because he was in his offi chief was an official he is capacity.4 personally § cial liable under 1981.5 We event, any brought 3.In there is no evidence in the 4. "Racial discrimination claims un § subject quali der 1981 are the promotion defense of record that the was to chief Hawk, immunity.” fied Todd v. policy with accordance custom or of (5th 1995). However, 445 n. 6 Cir. Sheriff Rather, County. Bryan's employ- the Sheriff Bryan qualified immunity did not raise in the represented policy ment decision of the court. district Department, separate government Sheriff's a Therefore, entity. judgment against contexts, § 5. In other 1981 serves as an inde- County imposed cannot be on the basis of pendent cause of action individuals respondeat superior. County See Board of discriminatory performed for acts in their of- Brown, Bryan County Comm'rs of See, Todd, capacities. e.g., ficial 72 F.3d S.Ct. 117 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (allowing prisoner prison 446 to sue offi- Jett, (1997); U.S. at 491 109 S.Ct. 2702. discriminatory § cials 1981 for conduct under

465 fix judg- compensation dismiss the district court’s and of his deputies, therefore Bryan subject county in his individu- to the board of supervisor’s ment Sheriff approval budget. of the sheriffs al See Miss. §Ann. Bryan

Code 19-25-19. Sheriff B. Title VII Defendants solely responsible hiring, promoting, for establishing deputies’ wages. employees Title VII allows sue County’s only responsibility ap- was to employers discriminatory employ their for prove budget the Sheriffs and allocate the §§ ment 2000e- decisions. See U.S.C. necessary Bryan funds. Because Sheriff 2(a), “employer” An under Title 2000e-5. was the elected official who made all deci- industry affecting in an “person VII is a concerning promotions sions within the employ commerce who has fifteen or more _” Department, Sheriffs Deputy he was 2000e(b). § A person ees U.S.C. employer Oden’s for purposes of Title individuals, govern “includes one or more VII.7 therefore We reverse the district ments, governmental agencies, politi [or] ” judgment against court’s Oktibbeha Coun- cal subdivisions.... ty Dolph Bryan individually 2000e(a). § desig The trial court failed to under Title VII. nate which of the three defendants was Deputy employer.6 Oden’s Damages C. Punitive Under Title VII

Federal law controls whether a VII, an person employer Appellants argue is under Title but the Civil Rights courts can look to state law to understand Act of Bryan’s 1991 limits Sheriff employment relationship. liability the nature of the capacity compen his official See, e.g., County, satory damages. Calderon v. Martin The Act plaintiffs allows 1981) (deter B asserting Cir. Unit a Title VII claim to recover com mining pensatory punitive damages, provided whether constituted VII). employee Mississippi recovery under Title is unavailable under remove, 1981a(a)(l).8 law appoint, pre- allows sheriff to See U.S.C. The Act (M.D.N.C.1995) (con- concerning “punishment, pains, F.Supp. [and] 1981). penalties” county, provision cluding that the Our decision rather than the sher- iff, regarding personal liability only employer under was an under Title because VII county applies liability government limited the number of to the of local the sheriff’s deputies provided deputies’ compen- affecting officials for decisions their munici- sation); County Johnson v. Board Comm’rs pal employment contracts. Fremont, County F.Supp. (D.Col.1994) (holding that the ties economic Biyan 6. Oktibbeha and Sheriff in his between the Board of and the Commissioners capacity eligible employers are under sheriff demonstrated that the Board was the personally Title VII. Sheriff is not lia- employer). Title VII performance wrongful ble for the acts in capacity. Huckabay, his official See 142 F.3d 1981a 8.Section states: at 241. brought by complaining In an action a 265, Lyons, 7. See Simmons v. 746 F.2d 270 party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil 1984); Ryals Cir. v. Mobile Sher (42 U.S.C.2000e-5) Rights Act of 1964 ... (S.D.Ala.1993). F.Supp. Dept., 839 25 respondent engaged a who in un- iff’s County, (not See Lee v. also Coahoma lawful intentional discrimination an 220, (5th Cir.1991), part, employment practice amended in 37 is unlawful be- (1993) (holding Mississippi disparate impact) prohibited F.3d 1068 that a cause of under 704, (42 "employer” sheriff was an under the Fair or 717 of Act section Act). ..., 2000e-3) Spencer Byrd, provid- Labor Standards v. or U.S.C.2000e-2 and Cf. ness, judi- of recovering punitive integrity public reputation or from plaintiffs eludes Id. governments, govern proceedings.” cial damages against subdivisions. agencies, political ment er- “plain The district court committed 1981a(b); Run Baker v. 42 U.S.C. See by assessing punitive damages against ror” (7th Cir.1997), cert. yon, F.3d puni- prohibits the Sheriff. Section 1981a denied, 119 S.Ct. 525 U.S. against governments awards damage tive (1998). L.Ed.2d political Subjecting the subdivisions. $80,000 applicability punitive damage an dispute does not Sheriff to Oden inapposite Congress’s to the Sheriff intent to of 1981a award is appel- contends that the capacity. preclude government local entities from appeal on argument lants forfeited their paying judgments. appro- such We find it objections to the district because priate plain even under a error standard to specific. instructions were court’s judgments contrary correct that are to the agree that the See Fed.R.Civ.P. We judi- express imposes limits federal law on properly preserve failed to their appellants authority, cial and therefore reverse the objection. damage award punitive in his official litigant point a a

If forfeits we review the district appeal, error on Exception D. The Personal Staff plain under the error stan court’s decision from Douglass employers v. Title VII reheves dard. See United Servs. Auto. (5th Cir.1996) Ass’n, liability affecting for decisions members of (en banc). personal For this Court to correct an staff. U.S.C. (1) 2000e(f).9 trial, exception ap error not raised at “there must be includes (2) (3) ‘error,’ ‘plain,’ pointments position. Teney that is ‘af to a staff ” rights.’ County, v. Bexar fect[s] substantial Johnson uca 150-53 States, 461, 467, Appellants United 117 S.Ct. maintain that (1997) (quoting denying 137 L.Edüd 718 the district court erred in their Olano, judgment motion United States U.S. as a matter of law (1993)). 1770,123 deputy position L.Edüd 508 If the chief part because is exists, plain Bryan’s personal error this Court should not Sheriff staff. Oden its Appellants per exercise discretion to correct error claims that the waived the seriously unless “the error fair- exception by asserting affects the sonal staff it for the complaining party political any by ed that the cannot recov subdivision State title, thereof, qualified er under'section 1981 any person of this the com voters or cho- plaining party may compensatory by recover sen such officer to be on such officer's punitive damages as allowed in subsec personal appointee policy staff or an on the section, (b) making tion of this in addition to level or an immediate adviser with 706(g) relief authorized section respect of the to the exercise of the constitutional ..., Rights respon Act legal powers exemp- Civil of 1964 from or of the office. The preceding dent. tion set forth in the sentence 1981a(a)(l). employees subject shall not include to the government, civil service laws of a State 9. Title VII states: governmental agency political or subdivi- "employee” respect employment term means individu- sion. With employed by employer, except foreign country, al an that the such term includes an indi- per- "employee” any term shall not include vidual who is a citizen of the United States. 2000e(f). public son elected to 42 U.S.C. office in State or post-trial legitimate time in their motion for defeat an otherwise first claim for relief relief. must be set forth [and] to avoid surprise give opposing party an 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Rule opportunity respond.’” to 2 James W. Civil Procedure lists nineteen affirmative al, Moore et Moore’s Federal Practice defenses that must be set forth a re (3d 2000) 8.07[1], at 8-35 ed. (citing 8(c). sponsive pleading. See Fed.R.Civ.P. Labs., Blonder-Tongue Inc. v. Univ. Ill. defenses, In addition to these nineteen Found., 1434, 402 U.S. 8(c) “any Rule includes other matter con (1971)). 28 L.Ed.2d Allowing Ap an an stituting avoidance or affirmative pellants jury to wait until after the verdict qualify defense.” Id. To as a defense un personal to assert the exception staff was 8(c)’s clause, residuary der Rule we look to an unfair surprise to Oden. personal logical relationship between the de exception staff is affirmative defense fense and the cause of action and assess 8(c).10 pleaded that must be under Rule timely plead to whether failure the defense Appellants personal waived the staff ex surprise. will result unfair ception by failing responsive to raise it in a States, Ingraham, United 808 F.2d pleading. (5th Cir.1987). “A defendant should permitted log’ not be to ‘lie behind a Sufficiency III. of the Evidence plaintiff

ambush a with an unexpected de id. at personal fense.” See 1079. The Appellants argue also that the exception staff allows the defendant trial by denying court erred their motion liability avoid even if meets his for judgment as a matter of law because proof burden of under Title VII. See id. the record contained insufficient evidence The defendant bears the initial burden of support jury’s verdict. We review a that the demonstrating personal staff ex judg district court’s denial of a motion for ception applies. See Nichols v. Hurley, ment as matter of law de novo. See (10th Cir.1990); 921 F.2d Ten Venture, McKinney Hospital Russell v. eyuca County, v. Bexar 767 F.2d (5th Cir.2000). “Judg ment appropriate as matter law is if legally evidentiary ‘there is no sufficient Appellants raised person jury basis for a reasonable to find for that al staff exception for the first time in their ” party law, (quoting on issue.’ Id. Fed. judgment motion for as a matter of 50(a)). R.Civ.P. After reviewing the evi which was filed after the returned its record, dence in the we draw all reason verdict the district court entered its judgment. nonmoving able inferences favor of the opportu denied the nity present concerning party, disregarding evidence at trial evidence favorable to applicability the personal moving party. staff ex See Reeves v. Sander- “ Prods., Inc., ception. Plumbing ‘Affirmative defenses ... will son Co., (9th Cir.1975) holding Towing 10. This Court’s is consistent with concluding statutory exemptions cases (holding exception that an under the Fair pleaded should be as affirmative defenses. pleaded Labor Standards Act must be as an Inn, Donovan Hamm's Drive defense); Wright affirmative & Miller. Feder 1981) (concluding Cir. Unit A (1990); al Practice & Procedure exemption that an under the Fair Labor Stan- al., James W. Moore et Moore's Federal Prac is an dards Act affirmative defense that is (3d 2000). ed. 8.07[5] tice pleaded); Valley waived if not Brennan v. 468 Antonio, Texas, 2097, 2110, Board 40 147 L.Ed.2d 105 Serv. San 120 S.Ct. of (1994). Patterson, 698, 714 the F.3d

(2000). § restricted claims under 1981 to Court a claim of intentional prove To ini- discriminatory conduct “at the redress discrimination, must first estab a plaintiff “conduct tial formation of the contract” or 2106; id. at facie case. See lish a prima right to enforce contract impairs which the Green, 411 Douglas Corp. v. McDonnell obligations through legal process.” Pat- 1817, L.Ed.2d 668 792, 36 U.S. terson, 179, 109 S.Ct. 2363. U.S. (1973). prima demonstrate a can Oden Ben’s, Inc., Johnson v. See also Uncle (1) showing that by facie case Cir.1992). (5th 1363, The Court (2) class; he was protected a was within § to the reasoned that 1981 was restricted (3) sought; he position for the qualified relationship contractual between an em- (4) position and promoted; was not ployer employee, and while Title VII ad- protect outside the by was filled someone scope of conduct. expansive dresses a more Antonio, City v. San See Blow ed class. of id. at 2363. The con- See S.Ct. (5th Cir.2001) Texas, (citing 236 F.3d 293 analysis promotion tract claims under Community v. Bur Dept. Texas Affairs of necessarily ap- 1981 therefore does dine, 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 450 U.S. ply to Title suits.11 VII 207). record shows that 67 L.Ed.2d “is not to economic or Title VII limited African-American, Oden, was a mem discrimination, tangible ... and it covers class, inquired that he protected ber of a than and conditions in the more terms deputy position, that he about the chief Faragher narrow contractual sense.” v. rank, higher to the promoted was not Raton, City Boca of male, Carrithers, a white was George that (1998) (cita 2275, 141 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 662 appointed position. to the omitted). prima To facie tions establish VII, that Oden Appellants contend Title case for discrimination under that, least, case of race prima very cannot establish a facie must at the show discriminatory discrimination the chief conduct alleged because tended Appel him. appointment promotion. adversely not a affect See Mattern v. Co., analysis in 104 F.3d lants claim that Eastman Kodak (5th Cir.1997) support (stating that the discrimina promotion apply cases should provision their VII. In Patter tion Title VII is “much broad argument under Title Union, provision ap er” than the retaliation son v. McLean U.S. Credit 175-77, plies activity adversely tends 105 L.Ed.2d 132 S.Ct. to. most, (1989), At plain employee). held that affect the Oden must Supreme Court made an must that the failure to receive demonstrate tiffs show promotion op employment of the ultimate decision. See Shack amounts to a denial Touche, LLP, portunity em v. Deloitte & to form a new and distinct elford Cir.1999) (5th (noting that the ployment relationship. also National 406-07 City “ultimate decision” employment Ass’n Gov. Public standard Employees contracts, event, enjoyment 11. In termination of and the the Patterson decision was benefits, terms, Rights legislatively privileges, Civil Act condi- reversed all Harris, relationship.” Harrington tions of the contractual Cir.1997). 1981(b). 367 n. Section 1981 now Both 1981 and Title VII section, that, apply purposes states of this now to the terms and conditions of the "[f]or rendering employment relationship, the Pat- term 'make and enforce contracts’ includes modification, making, analysis inapplicable. performance, terson may apply working in retaliation cases before for the applied Depart- Sheriffs discrimination). Regard- evidence, to claims of race ment. On the basis of this Oden applies, less of standard Sheriff objective which hiring satisfied criteria and es- Bryan’s was an ultimate em- appointment prima tablished his facie case. ployment decision. The Sheriff testified plaintiff aOnce satisfies his prima fill only person that one could the chief case, facie employer must assert a deputy By position. appointing Deputy legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rank, higher Carrithers to the Sheriff his decision. See Douglas, McDonnell Bryan precluded Deputy Oden from be- U.S. at 93 S.Ct. 1817. If employer an coming in second command. Sheriff alleges a nondiscriminatory explanation, Bryan’s appointment employment was “ the factfinder must determine the ‘ulti subject him decision that could to Title VII mate question: whether [the] has liability. ” proven [intentional discrimination].’ Appellants further contend that Russell, 235 at 222 (quoting St. prima failed to Oden establish facie case Hicks, Mary’s Honor Ctr. qualified job. because he was not for the 511-12, 113 S.Ct. 125 L.Ed.2d 407 that depu Sheriff testified the chief (1993)). “It ... enough is not to disbelieve ty position required administration skills employer; the factfinder must believe understanding comput and an of the office plaintiffs explanation of intentional system. er Deputy Carrithers was the Hicks, discrimination.” 509 U.S. at only in person Department the Sheriffs “Thus, plaintiffs prima S.Ct. acquired

who these Oden claims skills. case, facie combined with sufficient evi that, posted because the Sheriff never employer’s dence to find that the asserted qualifications deputy ap for chief before justification false, may permit is the trier Carrithers, pointing the Sheriffs stated of fact to that employer conclude un qualifications pretext. were Reeves, lawfully discriminated.”

A plaintiff must demonstrate at 2109. objective that promotion he meets criteria The Sheriffs asserted nondiscrim prima at the stage facie of his case. See inatory promoting Deputy reason for Car Co., Inc., Ramsey Medina v. Steel Deputy rithers over Oden that was Car (5th Cir.2001); Lindsey F.3d 674 v. Prive qualifications job. rithers met the for the Corp., 987 F.2d that a deputy Sheriff claimed chief employer’s subjective Whether an hiring must be familiar with the administration of pretext criteria serves as for discrimina Department Depart the Sheriffs and the tion is an issue for the trier of fact to system. computer argues ment’s Oden stages decide the later of the burden- Bryan’s qualifications stated shifting analysis. See id. Oden awas pretext. were task to Our then is deter deputy twenty years road with almost supports mine whether sufficient evidence experience appoint at the time the Sheriff favor, jury’s verdict Oden’s viewing Deputy ed Carrithers the chief light the evidence in the most favorable position. seniority every Oden had over Oden, Reeves, the nonmovant. See Department. other officer Other at 2110. S.Ct. deputies testified that Oden was much bet ter at working general public with the than In to the supporting addition evidence addition, case, Deputy prima Carrithers. facie pos Oden established managerial developed completed sessed skills that he law he more enforcement train- juries allows conduct. Section 1981a and that he Deputy than Carrithers ing mental skills, compensatory damages for as award office such proficient some suffering. See U.S.C. anguish deputies’ paperwork. reviewing the other 1981a(a)(l).13 the claim that Appellants Deputy Carrithers Bryan gave Sheriff not damages was compensatory award of his administrative improve to opportunity review the supported by the evidence. We the same giving Oden without skills damages for anguish of mental clearly meet award could Deputy chance. Patterson v. abuse of discretion. See but for qualifications, most of the Sheriffs 90 F.3d Corp., P.H.P. Healthcare groom to someone decision the Sheriffs Cir.1996). (5th position. else for the subjective the Sheriffs To refute further cases, testimony many In “a claimant’s presented evidence qualifications, Oden support to may alone not be sufficient overlooked Bryan previously that Sheriff damage anything more than a nominal applicants for African-American qualified are re- award.” Id. at 938. Plaintiffs appli- in favor of white deputy positions damages for mental an- quired prove Sheriff experience. cants with less suffering “degree speci- to a guish and that, have filled two if he could also stated may corroborating ficity which include then he would have positions, chief deputy testimony or evi- psychological or medical ” The and Carrithers. appointed both Oden (citing Carey Piphus, .... Id. dence that computer therefore admitted S.Ct. knowledge of the of- an acute skills and (1978)). L.Ed.2d 252 We however have were needs not fice’s administrative required corroborating testimony deputy. chief primary qualifications for every involving medical evidence in case fact, that the former transcript shows damages. nonpecuniary compensatory Oden, worked as Deputy deputy, chief like Inc., Vision, Migis F.3d v. Pearle an administrative road instead of (1998); Farpella-Crosby v. Ho- the record in reviewing assistant. After (5th Care, rizon Health verdict, we light most favorable to Cir.1996). In court re- Migis, the district sufficient evi- find that the record contains testimony. solely plaintiffs lied on the in- jury’s finding of support dence to employer’s- The stated that her tentional discrimination.12 self-esteem, caused her low discrimination hardships financial relation to serious Damages Compensatory

IV. child, attacks, stress, anxiety her newborn sleeplessness. Migis, jury awarded Oden $20,000 damages for men 1046. We concluded the district compensatory by stress that he court did not abuse its discretion anguish tal and emotional Bryan’s awarding compensatory damages because suffered a result of Sheriff as any backpay or Appellants that the 13. Section 1981a excludes further claim by 2000e-5(g). irrelevant testi- prejudiced was biased and other relief under mony. Appellants specified in- neither Compensatory damages include awards for alleged when stances in the record as to losses, pain, pecuniary suf- "future emotional supported testimony nor irrelevant occurred inconvenience, fering, anguish, mental loss legal authority. argument adequate their with life, enjoyment nonpecuniary and other are Because we do issues not consider 1981a(b)(3). losses....” 42 U.S.C. briefed, inadequately not address this we do County, v. Harris contention. See Rutherford Texas, Cir., 1999). sufficiently testimony was detailed Migis’ MARTIN, Leslie Dale Petitioner- id. at 1047. support the award. See Appellant, present- have reviewed the evidence

We Oden, testimony included ed which stress, sleeplessness, betrayal, concerning CAIN, Warden, Burl Louisiana State shame, and find that there is sufficient Penitentiary, Respondent- support jury’s award. evidence Appellee.

V. Conclusion No. 99-30585. sum, we reverse the district court’s Appeals, United States Court of County. judgment against Oktibbeha Fifth Circuit. independent Oden could not assert an March against government a local cause of action is not entity under employer of Title VII. We purposes judgment

also reverse the district court’s

against capaci- the Sheriff his individual

ty personally because the Sheriff is not his decisions employment

liable for official

under Title VII and 1981. We reverse judgment

the district court’s as to the

punitive damage award the Sheriff capacity

in his because 1981a official

prohibits punitive damages against govern- Finally,

ment we affirm the dis- entities. judgment assessing compensa-

trict court’s

tory damages the Sheriff PART;

REVERSED IN AFFIRMED

IN PART.

POLITZ, Judge, specially Circuit

concurring: concur,

I specially but conclude that the appropriate disposition

more of the 42 1981(c) presented herein issue

would be as that accorded our col-

leagues the Ninth Circuit Federation American Contractors v. Oak-

of African land, 96 F.3dl204

Case Details

Case Name: Oden v. Oktibbeha County MS

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date Published: Mar 27, 2001

Citation: 246 F.3d 458

Docket Number: 99-60878

Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.