30 NY3d 1121
NY
2018

People v McCain (2018 NY Slip Op 01018)

Court of Appeals

February 13, 2018

2018 NY Slip Op 01018 [30 NY3d 1121]

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected through Wednesday, April 11, 2018

The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Douglas McCain, Appellant.

The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Albert Edward, Appellant.

Argued January 4, 2018; decided February 13, 2018

People v McCain, 50 Misc 3d 132(A), 2015 NY Slip Op 51939(U), affirmed.

People v Edward, 51 Misc 3d 36, affirmed.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Seymour W. James, Jr., The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Amy Donner of counsel), for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Kayonia L. Whetstone, John M. Castellano and Joseph N. Ferdenzi of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Seymour W. James, Jr., The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Lawrence T. Hausman and Whitney A. Robinson of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (Sheryl Feldman and Alan Gadlin of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

{**30 NY3d at 1123} OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

On each appeal, the order of the Appellate Term should be affirmed.

The factual allegations of a misdemeanor complaint must establish “reasonable cause” to believe that a defendant committed the charged offense (see CPL 100.40 [4] [b]; People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228 [2009]). Reasonable cause “exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it” (CPL 70.10 [2]).

Here, the factual allegations of each misdemeanor complaint establish reasonable cause to believe that each defendant possessed a “dangerous knife” (Penal Law § 265.01 [2]), triggering the statutory presumption of unlawful intent arising from such possession (Penal Law § 265.15 [4]). Accordingly, each accusatory instrument was sufficient to support a charge of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Therefore, we need not address the People‘s alternative jurisdictional argument in People v Edward.

Stein, J. (concurring).

I concur on constraint of our prior precedent.

Wilson, J. (concurring in People v McCain, dissenting in People v Edward). I concur in the result in People v McCain because the officer‘s sworn statement attached to the complaint specifies that the “knife was activated by deponent to an open and locked position through the force of gravity,” which meets the statutory definition of “gravity knife” in Penal Law § 265.00 (5), and therefore a fortiori is a “dangerous knife” under Penal Law § 265.01, when subdivisions (1) and (2) thereof are read together.

I dissent from the result in People v Edward for the reasons set out in Judge Simons’ dissent in Matter of Jamie D. (59 NY2d 589 [1983]).

In People v McCain: Order affirmed, in a memorandum.

Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Rivera, Stein, Fahey, Garcia and Feinman concur, Judge Stein in a concurring opinion. Judge Wilson concurs in result in a separate concurring opinion.{**30 NY3d at 1124}

In People v Edward: Order affirmed, in a memorandum.

Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Rivera, Stein, Fahey, Garcia and Feinman concur, Judge Stein in a concurring opinion. Judge Wilson dissents in an opinion.