198 Mo. 622 | Mo. | 1906
This cause is brought to this court by appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of St. Louis in favor of the-plaintiff and against the defendant for $41.66.
This action was commenced before a justice of the peace -of the city of St. Louis. The statement, filed by plaintiff before the justice, alleged that he was an attorney and counselor at law; that defendant was a corporation, operating a street railway, and that on or about the 30th day of June, 1902, one Emma French sustained injuries to her person while alighting from one of defendant’s cars, which she alleged to be due to the neglig'ence of defendant’s servants-in charge of said car, whereby she became the ‘ ‘ possessor of a subsisting claim and cause of action for $10,000 damages.” That, thereafter, on the 8th day of August, 1902, said Emma French entered into a written contract with this plaintiff, employing and instructing him to enter and prosecute an action in her favor for said $10,000 dam-ages against defendant-, and that Mrs. French agreed that plaintiff should receive for his services for entering and prosecuting said action one-third of all of any sum of money that should be recovered in said suit, or by or through any compromise of said suit, without regard to the time at which said compromise should be made. That on the 9th day of August, 1902, plaintiff entered an action at law in favor of said Mrs. French on her alleged cause of action. That, thereafter, on the 3rd day of November, 1902, plaintiff served notice in writing of said contract of employment by Mrs. French, and that said action had been instituted in the circuit
There is no necessity for reproducing the evidence introduced at the trial of this cause in the circuit court, for appellant admits in its brief that the evidence preserved in the bill of exceptions substantially sustains the averments of the plaintiff’s statement of this case, and there are no disputed facts in the case.
Upon the submission of the cause to the court there was a finding and judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $41.66. Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were timely filed and were by the court overruled. From this judgment defendant prosecuted its appeal to this court and the record is now before us for consideration.
It is apparent from the record in this canse that the trial court made the order granting the appeal to this court for the reason that defendant challenges the constitutionality of the act upon which this proceeding is predicated. The contentions of appellant upon this constitutional question may thus be briefly stated:
1. That the act of February 25, 1901, upon which this action is based, is unconstitutional and void because in contravention of article 4, section 28, of the Constitution of Missouri, which substantially provides that no act shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title.
2. It is insisted that said act of February 25,1901, is contrary to and violative of the provisions of article 2, section 30, of the Constitution of this State, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
3. ' It is urged that this act is unconstitutional and void for the reason that it is in contravention of article 2, section 20, of the Constitution of Missouri, which substantially provides that “no private property can be taken for private use, with or without compensation, unless by the consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and except for drains and ditches across the lands of others for agricultural and sanitary purposes, in such manner as may be prescribed by law; and that whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and as such judicially determined, without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public.”
4. It is contended by appellant that the act of February 25, 1901, is unconstitutional and void for the reason that it contravenes the provisions of section 1
This act of February 25, 1901, the constitutionality of which is challenged by appellant, was Senate Bill 9, head notes, ‘ ‘ Attorneys-at-Law: Lien Upon Cause of Action,” followed by the following title: “An Act to prevent frauds between attorneys, clients and defendants; making agreements between attorney and client a lien upon the cause of action.”
There is no subject that has more frequently had the attention of this court than the one in which acts of the General Assembly have been challenged for failure to conform its legislation to requirements of section 28, article 4, of the Constitution of this State, which substantially provides that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. We deem it unnecessary, however, to review the numerous cases upon this subject, but shall be content with a brief reference to the rules to be deduced from the adjudications as to the objects and purposes sought by the framers of the Constitution in the enactment of such constitutional provisions.
It has been repeatedly stated by this court that the objects and purposes of this constitutional provision were to prevent incongruous, disconnected matters which had no relation to each other, from being joined in one bill; however, it has always been recognized that all matters that are germane to the principal subject and have a natural connection with it, might properly be incorporated in the same bill. In Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64, it was ruled: “Where all the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it, then the subject is single, . . . . and, if it is sufficiently expressed in the title, the statute is valid.” This rule was approved by Judge Black, in State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439,
It is insisted by appellant that this act embraces more than one subject and is therefore violative of the constitutional provisions now being discussed. "We are unable to give our assent to this contention. It is clear that the subject of this act was the making of agreements between attorney and client a lien upon the cause of action, and the purpose of it was to prevent frauds between attorneys, clients and defendants. The contention upon this proposition is thus stated in the brief by learned counsel for appellant:
“The Attorney’s Lien act embraces four separate’ and distinct subjects, to-wit:
“1. The subject of giving an attorney a lien upon his client’s cause of action or counterclaim, which lien attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client’s favor.
“2. The object of making it ‘lawful for an attorney at law either before suit or action is brought, or after suit or action is brought, to contract with his client for legal services rendered or to be rendered by him for a*635 certain portion or percentage of the proceeds of any settlement of his client’s claim or cause of action.’
“3. The subject or object of making notice in writing to the opposite party that such legalized contract has been made, which notice creates a lien upon the claim or cause of action and upon the proceeds of any settlement thereof.
“4. The subject of making defendant liable for in any manner settling any claim or suit after notice is served, without written consent of the attorney. ’ ’
To fully appreciate this proposition it is well to know what are the provisions of the act to which the contentions of appellant are directed. It provides:
“Section 1. The compensation of an attorney or counsellor for his services is governed' by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law. From the commencement of an action or the services of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client’s cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client’s favor, and the proceeds thereof in whosesoever hands they may come; and cannot be (effected) [affected] by any settlement betwen the parties before or after judgment.
£ £ Sec. 2. In all suits in in equity and in all actions or proposed actions at law, whether arising ex contractu or ex delicto, it shall be lawful for an attorney at law either before suit or action is brought, or after suit or action is brought, to contract with his client for legal services rendered or to be rendered him for a certain portion or percentage of the proceeds of any settlement of his client’s claim or cause of action, either before the institution of suit or action, or at any stage .after the institution of suit or action, and upon notice in writing by the attorney who has made such agreement with his client, served upon the defendant or de*636 fendants, or proposed defendant or defendants, that he has snch an agreement with his client, stating therein the interest he has in such claim or cause of action, then said agreement shall operate from the date of the service(s) of said notice as a lien upon the claim or cause of action, and upon the proceeds of any settlement thereof for such attorney’s portion or percentage thereof, which the client may have against the defendant or defendants, or proposed defendant or defendants, and cannot be aifected by any settlement between the parties either before suit or action is brought, or before or after judgment therein; and any defendant or defendants, or proposed defendant or defendants, who shall, after notice served as herein provided, in any manner, settle any claim, suit, cause of action, or action at law with, such attorney’s client, before or after litigation instituted thereon, without first procuring the written consent of such attorney, shall be liable to such attorney for such attorney’s lien as aforesaid upon the proceeds of such settlement, as per the contract existing as herein above provided, between such attorney and his client.” [Laws 1901, p. 46.]
A careful analysis of the foregoing provisions makes it manifest that the matters therein contained have a legitimate connection and relation to each other, and are clearly germane to the subject expressed in the title, of making agreements between attorney and client a lien upon the cause of action. The first section provides for the attorney’s lien upon his client’s cause of action or counterclaim. That section is clearly in harmony with the subject as expressed in the title. Section two provides the nature and character of the contract which the attorney is authorized to enter into with his client in all suits in equity and in all actions or proposed actions at law, whether arising ex eonr tractu or ex delicto. This is clearly germane to the subject as expressed in the title, for the reason that
We think it is clear that all of the provisions of this act clearly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it, and without the provision requiring defendants, after due service of notice, in lawsuits or contemplated lawsuits, from respecting the agreements between attorneys and clients, this legislation in behalf of the lawyers of this State would be of little avail in protecting them in respect to their lien upon the cause of action, as contemplated by this act.
It is also insisted that the title to this, act does not sufficiently clearly express the subject as to meet the requirements of the constitutional provisions. In discussing this provision of the Constitution applicable to this subject, this court, in State ex rel. v. Ranson, 73 Mo. 78, said that “the adjudicated cases, as well
This court very clearly pointed out the rule which should be applied in the determination of the sufficiency
Applying the rule announced in the foregoing cases to this proposition, we are of the opinion that the subject of the act was sufficiently expressed in its title, and that the provisions of it are germane to. the principal subject and have a natural connection with it, and we discover nothing, either in the title or in the provisions of the act, which were calculated to surprise or operate a fraud upon any of the members of the lawmaking power.
Nor is this act open to the charge of contravening other provisions of the Constitution indicated by appellant in its brief. It is clearly not class legislation, as insisted by learned counsel for appellant, on the ground that it simply applies to attorneys-at-law. The distinction between general and special laws has been very clearly drawn by numerous cases in this State. The rule upon this subject as announced by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338, 348, has repeatedly met the approval of this court. It is there held “that a statute which relates to persons or things as a class is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular persons or things of a class is special.” And it was said by this court in State ex rel. Lionberger v. Tolle,
This act undertakes to cover a certain class of persons engaged in a particular profession. It does, not undertake to select any particular person in that class, but applies to all alike who fall within the class of attorneys-at-law.
The history of legislation in this State demonstrates that the lawmaking power found it essential for the purposes of legislation to divide both persons and business in separate classes, and it is now no longer an open question in the courts of this State that legislation applicable to a particular class is not violative of the constitutional provision which prohibits the enactment of special laws. That lawyers in this State belong to a particular class we think there can be no dispute, and we can see no reason, even though they be only lawyers, why legislation which deals in a general way with the affairs of that class, should be held unconstitutional. We have legislation in this State respecting other classes of persons, such as fellow-servants, mechanics, landlords, bankers, insurance laws and other legislation which have reference to only one line of trade or class of persons; yet, wherever-these laws have been in judgment before the courts of this State they have been held constitutional and valid. [Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. Evans, 97 Mo. 47; Hennig v. Staed, 138 Mo. 430.]
The object and purpose of this act, the validity of
It is insisted by appellant that this act restricts or destroys the defendant’s right to contract. We are unable to give our assent to this insistence. The provisions of this act simply create a lien upon the cause of action in favor of the attorney-at-law, and requires the defendant, after due notice, which creates such lien in dealing with the party as to- such cause of action, that such lien shall be respected. If we are dealing with the owner of a horse, and have notice that there is a valid subsisting lien upon the horse, we would not contend for a moment that such lien could be ignored. So it is in respect to other property — in dealing with the owner of it, if we have notice of the existence of a lien, such lien cannot be ignored. Is there any difference, if a defendant has notice of the existence of a
This act is vigorously assailed by learned counsel for appellant on the ground that it tends to> lead to the commission of unprofessional acts on the part of attorneys. This may be true in some instances, but the profession of law, when practiced upon a high plane, is an honorable one, and by no means should an act of the General Assembly, presumably enacted for the benefit of the honorable practicing lawyers of the State, be declared invalid for the reason that instances may arise by reason of the law which enable some of the less reputable attorneys to do acts which are not commendable along professional lines. In our opinion this law is constitutional and valid.
This brings us to the consideration of the only remaining proposition urged by counsel for appellant, that is, that plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the facts in this case,
It is first insisted by appellant that this action is for the enforcement of the lien and that the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction. It will be observed that this action is not strictly to enforce the lien provided-by the statute, but is to recover the amount of such lien by reason of the failure of the defendant to recognize the lien in its settlement with the plaintiff. This cause of action is expressly provided for by the terms of the statute. This same proposition was involved in Yonge
In Young v. Renshaw, 102 Mo. App. 173, the St. Louis Court of Appeals very clearly pointed out the nature and character of the cause of action under the provisions of this statute. Bland, J., speaking for the court in that case, said: “Under the provision of the first section of the act, the lien of an attorney attaches when the suit is commenced or service of an answer containing a counterclaim is made. If the attorney and client enter into a contract that the former shall receive a,s compensation for his services, a percentage of the amount recovered or realized, and the attorney serves a written, notice on the defendant or proposed defendant, of the agreement between himself and client, the lien attaches to the matter or cause of action from the date of the service of such notice, although no suit
The cause of action set forth in the statement before the justice of the peace brought it clearly within the provisions of the statute, and the amount sued for was within the jurisdiction of the justice and the justice had jurisdiction to try and determine the cause.
We deem it unnecessary to pursue this subject further. The cases of Young v. Renshaw and Yonge v. Railroad, by the St. Louis Court of Appeals, correctly announce the law as applicable to the lien of an attorney under the act upon which this proceeding is predicated, and they fully meet the approval of this court.
There is no merit in the insistence of appellant that the court erred in its refusal to make a finding of the facts in this cause. In the first place, the bill of exceptions, as shown in the abstract of record, discloses that there were no objections or exceptions preserved to the refusal of this request. Secondly, it is expressly admitted by counsel for appellant in their brief that there was no dispute about the facts; that the proof in this cause establishes the allegations as contained in the statement of the cause of action before the justice of the peace; that being true there was no necessity for a finding of the facts. Under the plain admission of counsel at the close of the evidence in this case there was nothing left except a question of law.
We shall not prolong this opinion to discuss the numerous instructions requested by the defendant and refused by the court. They have had our most careful consideration. There were nineteen instructions re
We have indicated our views upon the propositions presented by the record in this cause, which results in the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.