57 Wis. 243 | Wis. | 1883
It will aid materially in disposing of the questions so ably discussed on the argument, to bear in mind the leading facts of this case. The jury found, in answer to. questions submitted, that the plaintiff did, on the 7th of October, 1881, find a purchaser for, and make a sale of, the whole of the land in towns 32 and 33, for $20,000, $5,000 cash down, the balance to be paid as the timber was cut from the lands, with interest at eight per cent, per annum; that such purchaser was ready, prepared, able, and willing to carry out the purchase on his part; that the plaintiff and the purchaser after th'e sale used due and reasonable diligence to notify the defendant of the sale, and to complete and carry it out; that the defendant made no objection to the purchaser that he was irresponsible, or on any other personal ground, but refused on his part to carry out the sale; that the defendant first received information from the plaintiff that he had secured a purchaser on the 12th of October. It cannot justly be claimed that the jury were not warranted in finding these facts from the evidence, and they must therefore be deemed correct.
The contract of employment, as contained in the letter bearing date June 25, 1881, and as modified by that of Sep-
We have said that the plaintiff had a reasonable time after the 10th of October to bring the purchaser to the defendant. The defendant’s agents, in reply to the plaintiff’s letter of September 18th, say: “We have decided to give you till October 10th to close out ” the lands, etc. This language is rather indefinite, but it does not admit of the construction that the plaintiff was not only bound to make a sale, but likewise to produce the purchaser to the defendant within the period limited. The object of both letters was to give power to the agent to make or negotiate a sale, or produce a satisfactory customer by the given time. T-he parties resided at considerable distance from each other, — • the plaintiff at Eau Claire; the defendant at Waukechon, Shawano county. A day or more would necessarily be consumed in getting notice of a sale to the defendant, or in producing a purchaser at his residence, even if he remained at home. In view of the situation of the parties, it is fair to assume, if the defendant had intended to limit the authority of the plaintiff, not only of making the sale to a responsible party in the time limited, but also to producing such purchaser to him, so that the final contract could be consummated before October 10th, he would have said so in clear language.
But it is further said by defendant’s counsel,that the plaintiff never made a sale of the lands to any one so as to earn his commissions. This objection is based on the assumption that it was necessary for the plaintiff to have entered into a valid written agreement which would have bound both parties in order to entitle him to them. This he did not do, nor was it essential that he should. In a written note delivered by Murphy to plaintiff, dated October 7th, the
Within the well-established doctrine the plaintiff, then, is entitled to recover his claim. True, the jury found that the defendant did not receive information from the plaintiff that he had effected a sale until the 12th of October. But, as a question of law, we should have no hesitation in saying that notice was given within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances. It is also true that the purchaser did not see the defendant or his agent, but he used diligence and made an honest effort to see him and complete the purchase on his part. The evidence shows, and the fact is not denied, that plaintiff and Murphy left Eau Claire about midnight of the
P. Semple must have been satisfied of that fact from the interview he had with him at Chippewa Falls on the 4th of November, when Murphy offered to pay in cash the entire consideration and a bonus of $500 if he would let him have the lands. So it is apparent it was not through any fault of the plaintiff, or of the purchaser produced by him, that the sale made on the 7th was not carried out. It is not difficult to discover the reason 'why it was not. The defendant made a sale of the timber on the lands to the Chippewa Lumber & Boom Company for about $20,000, which was a much more advantageous trade for him. The plaintiff claims that the sale to the lumber and boom company was brought about through his agency or procurement, and the jury in effect so find.
A number of other points were discussed, but it is deemed unnecessary to consider them. The view which we have taken of the plaintiff’s employment is decisive of the case. That the complaint is sufficient to enable the plaintiff to recover for the sale made on the 7th, it seems to us is quite too plain to require argument. The case appears to have been fairly submitted under a charge which contains nothing of which the defendant can justly complain. All exceptions in regard to the admission or exclusion of evidence given or offered become immaterial in view of what has been said.
By the Court.- — The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.