96 N.Y.S. 161 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1905
Lead Opinion
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
The action is to recover the wages of plaintiff and her assignor as teachers in a public school, under contracts with the defendant trustee. The other defendants, taxpayers of the district, were brought into the action by reason of the relations between the teachers and
The defense to the plaintiff’s claim, in brief, is that the contracts of employment are invalid, because made in violation of the orders and instructions of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and that no recovery can be.had for the services rendered,'because While acting as teachers the plaintiff, and her assignor- refused to comply with and disobeyed the orders and instructions of the State Superintendent,
The controversy arose with reference . to the wearing by these teachers, in school, of the garb of a religious order. That the contracts were made, and the services were rendered thereunder, for which the recovery is sought, are facts not iñ dispute. The affirmative defenses raise the questions here involved. .
. There is no dispute about the facts, but there are serious contentions over the law, involving the power and authority of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the binding force of his Orders, instructions and decisions.
It may be well in .the first instance to get a full and correct statement of the fact, so far as the record before us shows. This school district comprises .within-its boundaries the villages of Lima and some other portions of the town of Lima. ■ It has about 1,000 inhabitants and about 200 children of school age. It has but one schoolhouse, a one-story brick building with but two rooms., having a seating capacity of about 16 scholars. It was built in 1860. This schoolhouse is inadequate for the accommodation of the school children of the district. The assessed valuation of the taxable property of the district is about $551,000, and yet - the district instead of enlarging it's own school building, Or constructing a new one, has for years leased for school purposes a brick building known as “ Brendan Sailthe latter Owned by the Román Catholic Church' at Lima. For many years prior to 1901 members of the order of “Sisters of St. Joseph,” hereinafter described, had been employed to teach in that part of the public school conducted in “ Brendan Hall.” In August, 1901, Sylvester, then trustee of the district, employed this plaintiff and one Miss Dougherty as teachers in that hall- They were both members .of said order. In April, 1902, Ferris and other taxpayers of the-district appealed to the State
These teachers were members of a Catholic order known as the* “ Congregation of St. Joseph,” and had been for many years. They were called “ Sisters of St. Joseph,” and their titles were,, the plaintiff “ Sister Prudentia,” and her assignor “ Sister Teresita.” The by-laws and rules of the order provided that their habit should resemble the dress of humble widows, made of common woolen stuff of a black color;, that the body of the dress should be perfectly plain, as also the-sleeves, which should extend to the end of the hand; that the skirts of the dress should not reach quite to the ground, and their shoes should be plain black; that they should wear a band of white linen across the forehead, a plain white linen cap fastened Under the chin, and another cap of black woolen stuff, with a veil of the samé material; that, they shouldxwear a crucifix of brass, attached to the neck, which should hang before the breast; and that they'should wear a pair of black beads, attached to. the left
The plaintiff and her assignor during all the time they were teachers in this school, wore this habit, and were bound to, and did, conform to the rules of this order. They were called by their names, Sister Prudentia and Sister Teresita. The term' Hiss or teacher was never used. They could only engage in teaching by permission of their mother supeiior, and she did consent and send them to render such service. The contracts must have been made by them with her consent and by her direction, and the wages when paid or received must, under the rules, go at once to the mother superior, for such use in the order as she chose to make of
During the time the plaintiff arid her assignor were engaged in teaching in this school they held morning, noon arid evening prayers of the Roman Catholic church in the schoolroo'riis^ just before the opening and just after the closing of the morning sessions arid just .after the close of the afternoon sessioris of the school. The Catholic children-were required to be present at these prayers. Ron-Catholic children were allowed to be absent if they desired. The prayers were said by the teachers .and participated in by the Catholic children and others who desired. " '
This gives a pretty correct statement of the facts- appearing upon the trial of this case as shown by the record before us. There are Some other, undisputed facts found by the court which need not be recited here.
The trial court held that the State Superintendent had .power under the Consolidated School Law of the State to determine the questions and.make the orders contained in the Bates-Hendri'ck appeal, and that the.same was final and conclusive, and, therefore, the plaintiff could only recover for' the services to the time plaintiff ■ and her assignor were notified of that decision and the orders contained therein. Judgment was directed'accordingly, and Hendrick was given costs against the plaintiff, -she receiving less, than ‘ $50. The defendant taxpayers were given no-costs. The amount involved-in this litigation is'not large. The total amount, of the wages was $621.20. There "had béen paid $542, leaving a balance of $79,20, for Which the action was. brought. The recovery was only $25.20 of this amount. Thé plaintiff lost heiffcosts, and was charged with costs of the defense. The litigation is more important by reason of the principles involved than by reason of the moneys sought to be recovered.
We think that the State' Superintendent of Public Itistruction Had- power to-instruct, direct and order that this garb should not be worn by these teachers in the schoolroom; that it should be discarded by them, or they should be dismissed' as teachers by the trustee. • . • ' - _
The trial court was careful to deprive them- only of wages frpm the time they were notified of this requirement and disobeyed the
The,Constitution of the State (Art. 9, § 1) directs that “the
These propositions seem: so reasonable and apparent as to need no authority or argument to sustain them. This leads us to. the important question in this case, whether the wearing of this garb in question, under the circumstances, was not at least a part of a scheme for the'teaching of the Catholic religion in this school. '
. It seems to have been considered, for many years,' by the State Superintendents of Public Instruction in this State, that it was improper to wear such a garb in these schools, and that the State Superintendent had power and authority to prohibit its use. See decisions in -áppeal cases in Matter of Colt v. Bd. of Education, etc., of Suspension Bridge (No. 3,520, Mch. 24, 1887); Matter of Durant v. Bd. of Education of West Troy School Dist. (No. 4,516, Nov. 25, 1896) ; Matter of Kennedy v. Bd. of Education of City of Watervliet (No. 4,546, May 15, 1897); Matter of Lockwood v. Bd. of Education, etc., of Corning (No. 4,642, Mch. 31, 1898); Matter of Keyser v. Bd. of Education of City of Poughkeepsie (No. 4,722, Dec. 23, 1898); Matter of Ferris v. Sylvester (No. 5,010, June 6, 1,902). These decisions may be found fully reported. . in the Report of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, transmitted to. the Legislature during the year following the date on which they were made,
In determining this, question we should consider all the circumstances surrounding the school and the teacher and the scholars.
It seems to us these sisters should never be permitted to teach in our public schools.' From the very nature of their vows-and lives*' they should not be permitted to have the care and instruction of young persons, without the free consent of their parents. Catholics may consent to it. Protestants will nót and do not consent to, it. The sisters cannot teach without these garbs,' because their vows and pledges prevent it. They must wear them always in the schoolroom. They .are not proper teachers in the common schools, where Protestants as well as Catholics are practically compelled to send their children, many of them for the- only education they can ever have.
There-seems to be a persistent effort in this sehopl district to continue sisters of this Catholic order as teachers. The State Superintendents. have held for years this garb shall not be worn in the public1 schools of the State. The State Superintendent, held, in an appeal from this very district and as to one of these teachers, this samé thing. That was in the- Férris-Sylvester case. The people had submitted' for years to a condition of things which they were" bound to break up. Hendrick was elected trustee. He was a Catholic, and in defiance of 'the orders of > the State' Superintendent, he made these contracts.- The teachers and their mother superior* whom they were pledged to obey, and who was to receive the fruits of their labors,knew as well as Hendrick what the orders of the State Superintendent were.. These contracts were invalid and illegal, becatise they all knew the sisters must wear the-garbs if they taught at all. Their vows required it, they would keep such vows.
Under these contracts the plaintiff and her assignor acquired no
All concurred, except Nash, J., who dissented in an opinion, and Hiscock, J., in result only.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting):
I fully concur in the proposition that the policy of excluding religious teaching from the common schools is embodied in the Constitution and the laws of the State.
That the saying of prayers of the Eoman Catholic church by the plaintiff and her assignor in the morning, at the noon hour and at the closing of the school in the afternoon, in which the Catholic children were required to join and the Protestant children were permitted if they, desired but were not required to be present, was within the inhibition of the Constitution and a violation of the provision that “neither the State nor any subdivision thereof, shall use its property or credit, or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used directly or indirectly in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of learning, wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught.” (Const, art. 9, § 4.)
That the wearing of the distinctive dress or garb of the religious order or sisterhood to which the plaintiff and her assignor belonged in school hours, was an object lesson which had a tendency to make an impression upon the minds of the children and to render them susceptible to the influence of their religious teaching; certainly the Catholic, if not the non-Catholic,children. We can make no distinction in this respect, whether the children are Eoman Catholic or Protestant to whom religious teaching is imparted in the common schools. It is as much a violation of the constitutional provision to instruct one class of children as the other in the denominational doctrine' or tenet of any religious denomination.
It is within tire general powers and duties of the State Superin-' tendent of Public Instruction to prevent the open and persistent teaching of religious denominational doctrines and tenets in the
The objection is not to their competency or the qualification of the plaintiff and her assignor as teachers in the public schools. It is to the objectionable methods adopted by them in conducting the school, their religions exercises and the wearing of the distinctive' garb of their order. Their competency and qualifications as teachers, and their competency to contract, was settled and determined by their certificates, and, therefore, their right to recover for their services actually rendered rests upon the principles applicable to contracts generally. That part of the judgment which provides “ that the plaintiff and Elizabeth E. Dowd, her assignor, are not entitled to recover for their services as teachers, under their contract with Patrick Hendrick, as such trustee, rendered by them during the three weeks they taught, after they were notified of the decision of the Superintendent of Public Instruction,” is erroneous.
The judgment should be reversed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.