20 Md. 212 | Md. | 1863
delivered the opinion of this. Court:
The action in this case was instituted by the appellant against the appellee in the Superior Court of Baltimore
To these allegations the appellee pleaded “not guilty.” At the trial and after the evidence detailed in the record had been submitted to the jury, the appellant offered nine, and the appellee five, prayers.
The prayers of the appellant were rejected, and those of the appellee were granted by the Court. The verdict and judgment being for the appellee, this appeal was taken.
The law arising out of the relation of the parties litigant in this case, is presented for the first time for our consideration. It affects a large class of citizens, a class, constantly being augmented by the diversity of employment incident to the enterprise of the age.
In the absence of any controlling decision in this State, we find ourselves aided in the formation of our opinion by a current “of decisions both in England and in this country, entitled to our highest consideration and greatly relieving us from the responsibility of settling the law as to the relative obligations of parties holding positions similar to the parties in this case.”
It is proper to state that though the appellant received the injury stated in his declaration while riding on one of the appellee’s cars, it is not claimed that he was a passenger who had paid for the privilege of travel, but one of a number of laborers who were in the employment of the appellee, who were required to ride upon the cars to and from the place of their daily labor.
The appellee rests its defence upon the relation of the parties as employer and employee.
That there is no responsibility if the injury arose from the conduct of a co-employee engaged in the .same .employment, though the co-employee be superior to the one injured.
That the appellee cannot be held responsible if it employed a competent and skillful engineer and superintendent; and does not warrant that these individuals shall faithfully discharge their duty in managing the hands and keeping the machinery in its original safe condition; and that it is a legal and sufficient defence to this action, if the appellee did in fact employ a skillful and competent engineer and superintendent; and if the cars put upon the road were of approved construction, and were in a proper state and condition when put into the hands of the engineer and
Having thus with duo care, stated the character of the claim of the appellant and the defence of the appellee, we fully concur in the opinion that the defence is well taken.
It is sustained in all its aspects by an almost unbroken current of authorities both in England and in this coun-try. See the case of Priestly vs. Fowler, 3 Mees. & Wels. Rep., 1; 24 E. Law & Eq. Rep., 396. Farwell vs. Boston & Worcester R. R. Co.. 4 Met., 49. 1 Seldon, 493. 3 Cushing, 270. 10 Cushing, 228. 32 Vermont R., 473. 23 Penn. R., 384. This last ease .decided in 1854, is almost identical in its prominent features with the case under consideration. In several of the earliest of these cases, the question being regarded as a new and important one, the Courts in view of its novelty and importance, considered and decided it after careful and mature deliberation.
The following conclusions of law applicable to this case, may ho deduced from the above authorities.
When several persons are employed in the same general service, and one is injured by the carelessness of another, though the negligent servant in his grade of employment is superior to the one injured, the employer is not responsible. The liability to injury of one from the carelessness of his fellows, is hut an ordinary risk, against which, the law furnishes no protection, bnt by an action against the wrong doer.
We are of opinion that these rules of law are so directly applicable to the case under consideration, that they constitute a flat bar to the appellant’s right to recover.
It only remains for us to consider the ruling of the Court below in rejecting the appellant’s and granting the appellee’s prayers.
It is manifest from what we have said as to the law controlling this case that the ajjpellant’s 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th prayers, could not have been granted.
We will consider the appellant’s 5th in connection with the appellee’s first prayer. They both embrace the question, on whom is imposed the burden of proof.
Though the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Stokes vs. Saltonstall, 13 Peters S. C. Rep., 191, recognize the doctrine.that a stage proprietor warrants the safety of passengers as far as human care and foresight can go, and that he will transport them safely; and the facts that i£a carriage was upset and the plaintiff’s wife injured, are prima facie evidence that there was carelessness or negligence or want of skill on the part of the driver, and throws upon the defendant the burden of proof that the accident was not occasioned by the drivers fault;” yet a majority of this Court are of opinion that the above case is not applicable to this. The appellant held no such relation to the appellee; it was under no obligation to look to the safety of the appellant under the circumstances of this case; did
The appellee’s 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th prayers were properly granted. They are sustained by the law of this case as herein announced and are otherwise unobjectionable, as they submit the matters of fact contained in them to he found by tbejury.
Judgment affirmed,