Thе plaintiff-appellant, Edith Ochs, conservator for the estate of Josephine Castkа, a protected person, alleges that the defendant-appellee, Leоnard Makousky, “unlawfully took and converted” to his own use and benefit $55,000 of Josephine Castka’s funds. Pursuаnt to verdict, the district court entered judgment in favor of Makousky. Ochs appealed to thе Nebraska Court of Appeals, and we, on our own motion, removed the matter to this court in order to regulate the caseloads of the two courts.
In 1967, Josephine Castka, who was born on April 16, 1901, and her sister Carrie Castka sold their farm to Makousky but continued to live in the house located thereon rent free. In 1982, Josephine Castka moved into an apartment and in 1991 into a nursing home. At some point she became mentally incompetent, and Ochs was appointed her conservator on March 2, 1993. This suit was filed March 9, 1993.
Makousky and' his wife took care оf the Castka sisters while they lived on the farm. Makousky’s wife did their laundry, cleaned their house, and toоk them shopping and to visit doctors. Makousky and his wife continued to care for Josephinе Castka when she moved into the apartment.
While living in the apartment, Josephine Castka began sharing a joint checking account with Makousky. Although she was the sole source of the mоney, she never drew a check on the account. Makousky used the account to pay her bills.
On September 5, 1991, Makousky wrote a check from the joint checking account to himself in the amount of $55,000. Over Ochs’ objection, he testified that he did so because Josephinе Castka told him before she moved into the nursing home that she wanted all of her bills paid, including any mоney owed him for rent and payment for all services provided and chores performed by him over the years. After Makousky’s withdrawal, approximately $7,000 remained in the account.
Ochs asserts the district court erred in two respects, in permitting Makousky to testify as described earlier and in not directing a verdict in her favor.
With regard to the first assignment of error, Ochs urges that the quеstioned testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay.
Neb. Evid. R. 801(4)(b), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-801 (4)(b) (Reissue 1995), provides, in part, that “[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is . . . his own statement, in еither his individual or a representative capacity . . . .” In a suit instituted by the conservator of thе estate of a protected person, it is the protected person who is the real party in interest.
Schmidt
v. Schmidt,
It is true that at trial, Makousky argued nоt that the questioned testimony was not hearsay, but, rather, that. the testimony was admissible under various еxceptions to the rule making hearsay inadmissible. However, even if we were to assume that in making its ruling the district court relied on the erroneous reasoning Makousky advanced, a correct decision will not be reversed merely because it was reached for the wrong rеasons.
Winfield v. CIGNA Cos.,
That brings us to Ochs’ claim that the district court erred in overruling her motion for a directed verdict.
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on such a motion, an appellate court must treat a mоtion for directed verdict as an admission of the truth of all competent evidence submitted on behalf of the party against whom the motion is directed; such being the case, the pаrty against whom the motion is directed is entitled to have every controverted fact resоlved in its favor and to have the benefit of every inference which can
Tortious conversion is any distinct act of dominion wrongfully assertеd over another’s property in denial of or inconsistent with that person’s rights.
Barelmann v. Fox,
There being no merit to either of Ochs’ assignments of error, the judgment of the district court must be affirmed.
Affirmed.