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Ochoa v. State
573 S.W.2d 796
Tex. Crim. App.
1978
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*1 796 statute, 358, presented jurors any person “Under the Art. C.C.P.

array of or juror. other grand way 19.27, In no shall V.A.C.C.P.], as a and the con- Art. [now qualifications legali- to and objections the thereof, it is an ac- struction clear that grand jury Any the be heard. ty of challenge the having opportunity cused the jail county confined in in shall person array jurors, person grand of or request brought into court to be upon impanelment, at the time of thereon challenge.” make such who do so has the fails to waived interpreted to This statute has been the in- challenge by quash so motion to challenged be at array that the must State, mean Tyson v. 171 dictment.” S.W.2d Valdez v. 408 opportunity, the first 496, 498.7 109, ordinarily means when which S.W.2d The is ground of error overruled. jury Challenge is at grand impaneled. the The the is af- judgment of trial court impossible is as early date sometimes this firmed. grand the offense occurs after the when challenge impaneled. When on im- jury is array is not the can be

panelment possible, the quash in a indict

attacked motion parte trial commences. Ex

ment before

Covin, If the 277 S.W.2d 109. defendant challenge array opportunity

has so, he impaneled is and does not do

when it challenge it at a later date. Ar

may not 479. mentrout v. 135 S.W.2d OCHOA, Appellant, Felix Garcia early Appellant was arrested v. 23, 1976. He morning hours of December Texas, Appellee. The of STATE counsel pauper’s affidavit filed for him on December 28. appointed No. 55669. impaneled him was jury that indicted grand Texas, Appeals Court of Criminal of 11, challenge No was January 1977. on En Banc. array that time. made to the at January murder on capital indicted for was 8, Nov. 1978. Thus, custody, repre in appellant was 12. Rehearing State’s Motion for En Banc aware, counsel,6 by the time sented 13, Denied Dec. 1978. was jury impaneled, grand scrutiny. object its He failed to be of at that challenge grand jury time but in a months later motion

did so several

quash. beyond question by appel- “It relatives of is that under the Due was retained 6- Counsel attorney. appointed an the court had Process of the Fourteenth Amend- lant after Clause completely may from the record clear reasonable It is ment Louisiana attach time January 6th whether he retained federal consti- limitations to assertion of 12th, during particularly, counsel oral rights. but statements of More tutional may State probable argument date. make 6th the more require prompt assertion one, therefore, Appellant, had at least challenge discriminatory practices in the two, ample attorneys probably lenge time to chal- 97, jury. make-up grand of a U.S. at 76 [350 impaneled. array it was when procedural principle ‘No S.Ct. 158at is 162]. this more familiar to Court than that a con- Supreme also held that this right may Court has 7. The be stitutional forfeited criminal may by failure to be assert matter timely challenge as well as civil cases timely the failure to make ’ ” jury. grand In Michel rights. of assertion Louisiana, 91, 76 S.Ct. U.S. at 76 S.Ct. at [350 163] (1955), addressing issue waiver L.Ed. 83 in Estelle, (5th See Dumont v. F.2d 793 also statute similar to context a Louisiana 1975). Cir. 19.27, stated: Article Court *2 initially ap The State contends that ground error, pellant has waived this in his since own behalf at trial substantially and testified to the same facts as Where a contained statement. defendant testifies own behalf and *3 the testimony admits the truth of to which objected, he he previously right waives his to claim that he was the intro harmed objection. duction of such evidence over his Martinec, D. Joseph F. and Hector Fabela However, he has not his waived Austin, appellant. for rebutting claim if he evi harm introduces Cuero, Cheatham, Atty., L. Dist. Wiley attempt meet, destroy dence in or for the State. explain against evidence him. the offered (Tex.Cr. Jackson v. App.1977); Nicholas 502 S.W.2d (Tex.Cr.App.1973). OPINION testimony, appellant In his chal lenged accuracy of the several statements BROWN, Commissioner. confession, stating in the they that were a appeal is an from conviction for This false he did them. and that not make Appellant of murder. capital the offense deceased, shooting While he admitted the the murder of a York- was convicted for interjected testimony his he a claim of self officer, who was police acting town defense, seeking to explain thus his state peace ap- at the time capacity as officer ments in the confession. He also contra 18, 1976, the shot him. October pellant On relating dicted in the confession statements special to the issues jury answered “Yes” to the in which and the sequence appellant 37.071, Article Vernon’s submitted under Thus, guns. appears deceased drew their it Ann.C.C.P., punishment was as- and the appellant ground that has not waived this at death. sessed error. that the trial Appellant now contends 1976, appellant July On left a bar appellant’s written allowing erred in court his Cuero and drove toward home in York- into at introduced evidence statement be town. Another driver called the Yorktown hearing appellant’s the trial. After a police reported appellant and trial court entered suppress, motion weaving back and forth on the road. The was voluntarily findings that the confession deceased, officer, police Yorktown re- knowingly appellant and that given, report, appellant’s sponding stopped voluntarily his to counsel and car and to see his license. asked driver’s right against self-incrimination. and license, When handed the the deceased stat- court therefore determined appellant ed that he was to take trial, At statement was admissible. refused, police and station. jury relative to charge instructed got in his car and drove off. The back admissibility concerning of confes- law driveway deceased followed 38.22, Article Ver- with in accordance sions home, pulled where his car Ochoa Ann.C.C.P. non’s driveway appellant’s. Appel- behind got lant out of his car started towards confession Appellant argues requirements of The deceased out of his got house. also in violation of obtained ear, Arizona, apparently gun. Appel- drew his 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. Miranda v. upon seeing lant the de- (1966), and that it thus 1602,16 L.Ed.2d ceased’s against gun got him at back into his car used should not have been reached the seat his own under trial. pistol. Appellant “Q loaded further testified Other than the occa- [Prosecution] deceased, hitting that he shot at the sion when you testified that at first fell, twice. The deceased with gun his own the defendant was undecided about him. Appellant get beside told his father to the lawyer, did he ever ask help, police and the arrived a few minutes get a lawyer for him or anything of later. nature further? scene, Appellant was at the arrested No, “A sir. [Adams] m., p. about 11:30 at which time he was given warnings by his Miranda Sheriff J. R. “Q

Adams. He was then Did he make any request handcuffed and tak- for an at- jail, arriving en to the Cuero at about 1:00 torney other than when he said that a. m. He was taken magistrate before a first, he was undecided there at where he was read his Miranda he might might not want a law- *4 rights. Justice of Ley the Peace Albert yer? that he explained rights these to No, sir, “A he did not. appellant, appellant and that stated that he rights understood signed paper. his a “Q Adams, Mr. you did testi- [Defense] point, At this sequence exact earlier, fy not, you did that at the

events becomes somewhat confusing. How- beginning ever, nearly ascertain, interrogation as as he this Court can appellant was then taken did make interroga- to an some statement about a Post, tion room. Robert the County lawyer, Attor- about wanting to talk to a ney, testified that he spoke appellant to lawyer? rights.

advised him of his He stated that Yes, sir, “A he did. [Adams] appellant did not wish to talk to him at this time, appellant and he felt like was not telling anything so he left. Apparent- “Q Do I understand that [Prosecution] ly, other present unidentified officers were he was undecided at time on during period and off this short of time. whether he wanted one or not? Appellant testified that he requested an “A He did not make a formal [Adams] attorney during this interrogation, although request for a lawyer or say I don’t appellant Post denies that did so while he want to talk you; to I want to see a present. first, no, lawyer sir.” Appellant jail was then taken to his cell. Then, trial, at the the following testimo- m., At about 3:30 a. Adams appellant ny was heard: from his cell and took him to the interroga- “Q Well, didn’t [appellant] [Defense] tion room. Adams testified that he actually wanting mention to talk to appellant read his rights. Appel- Miranda lawyer you? a point lant testified that at this he told Yes, sir, “A he did when we [Adams] thought

Adams that he talk should to an first went into the room. He said attorney answering any before questions or that he probably ought to talk to a signing anything. At the hearing on the lawyer suppress, something motion to Adams testified: this effect or sign didn’t want to anything until he [appellant] “A He said that [Adams] lawyer, talked to a if I recall correct- would talk with me. ly. He then something “Q request He did not an at- [Defense] effect, ‘Well, I will you, talk to but I torney? don’t want sign anything.’ “A I think that he had made some men- “Q And that might possibly get tion as to he want to wasn’t notice to talk an attorney. press He didn’t this man lawyer?

the issue. No, sir, “A he did not insist lawyer on a at that time. . . recognized specifically can be unless appellant made right after Apparently, we warnings after the delineate gave lawyer, Adams statement about given. [Emphasis been began have cigarettes and added.]” coffee and families, horses appellant about talking to emphasized that once a de- The Court about they had talked children. After that he want- any way fendant indicated in minutes, to 45 for about 30 other matters attorney interrogation must cease ed an Ad- talking about the murder. they began further stated that altogether. Court and intent purpose that his ams admitted change a defendant could his mind while children and discussing problems, marital counsel, if he right once he invoked his calm appellant was to matters with other continues, interrogation does so and the side,” good “get him and to and relax to demonstrate heavy State bears a burden to make a state- get appellant and to thus knowingly intelli- that the defendant m., appellant signed a At 6:20 a. ment. gently waived his to counsel. Adams. prepared statement language in Miranda We read this himself, but the confession not read did literally; where a defendant indicates these it to him. On rather had Adams read he desires to invoke his any way that facts, ruled the confession the trial court counsel, interrogation must cease. admissible.1 sup- is reading literal of Miranda Such that, the facts from We conclude Mosley, 423 ported by Michigan v. heavy met the shown, has not the State 321, 325, (1975). In 46 L.Ed.2d 313 96 S.Ct. Arizona, su by Miranda imposed burden *5 the invocation of the analo- a discussion of appellant know demonstrating that pra, of necessi- gous right to remain silent and the right waived his intelligently ingly and interrogation at that ty of a cessation of counsel. Supreme Court stated that: point, the Supreme Miranda, the United States In question turns almost “Resolution of the for requirements procedural out set Court single interpretation on the of a entirely during in-custody officials law enforcement opinion passage in the Miranda clear the The made interrogations. Court given, the sub- warnings have been ‘Once defendants of advising criminal necessity of is clear. If the indi- sequent procedure and right against self-incrimination their manner, any any in at vidual indicates counsel, requirement and the right their prior during questioning, time to or a Miranda invokes that once a defendant silent, interroga- he wishes to remain cease. The interrogation must right all cease.’ tion must stated: Court See also Hearne effectuation may waive “The defendant (Tex.Cr.App.1976). waiver is provided the rights, of these Thus, must conclude this Court knowingly and intelli- voluntarily, manner indicated appellant any if in however, If, he indicates gently. lawyer, the continued his desire to have a process any stage of and at manner of his Miranda interrogation was a violation with an attor- to consult he wishes confession obtained there ques- rights no and the can be speaking there ney before appel We hold that need from is inadmissible. individual An tioning. ... concerning Adams for lant’s statements to request pre-interrogation make a right to invoke his attorney were sufficient request affirma- While such lawyer. a a one, Although he did not make his to counsel. to have right his tively secures demand for a request” or absolute not con- “formal lawyer a does to ask for failure in some manner indicate to lawyer, he did effective waiver No stitute a waiver. right to exercise his Adams that he wanted interrogation during right to counsel However, the fact-finder is to resolve relat- testified. as he that the facts contends 1. conflicting testimony, apparently the trial happened that more ed them indicate interrogation against appellant. such conflict court resolved which Adams than that to room to counsel. This was sufficient require majority appellant, stated that while interrogation.2 cessation of testifying, interjected a claim of self-de- thereby fense and sought explain” “to The burden was on the State to show statements in his confession. What did he appellant specifically affirmatively explain? An examination of the doctrine of counsel, right waived this and it did not harmless error or curative admissibility af- only do so. The evidence that he waived his firmatively demonstrates appellant’s right to an attorney is the fact that subse- or, testimony least, at rendered quent to his conversation with Adams about harmless any error in the admission of the families and horses he made a confession. confession. Williams, In Brewer v. Appellant’s testimony was (1977), nothing S.Ct. 51 L.Ed.2d 424 more the Su- than a self-serving elaboration preme Court of the state- showing held that such a is not ments contained in the confession. sufficient The to show a waiver. only conflicts concerned whether Since the has not met its State burden of had drawn gun before the deceased had showing voluntary, knowing that a and in- drawn his and whether appellant had made telligent waiver to counsel was threatening statement to the chief of made, the confession was inadmissible. Mi- police. Arizona, supra; randa v. Brewer v. Wil- regard With to the sequence in which liams, supra. appellant and the deceased drew guns, their State contends the confes the confession reads: sion was nevertheless upon admissible since (the “. He deceased) cross-examination, appellant admitted that ‘You’re go.’ I back my voluntarily signed the statement. A car got my gun out. I had it in a confession, in order to meet constitutional holster under the seat. When I came out standards, must voluntary be both tak of the car he had his gun out of the compliance en in with Miranda. If it meets holster. I said myself ‘he’s not going other, requirement one but not the it is still to kill me here my yard.’ own I inadmissible. imposes rigid Miranda re shot at him three or four times. *6 I saw quirements in order to insure the voluntari ground. fall to the . . confession, ness of a requirements and these Appellant testified on direct examination must themselves be satisfied in order for a as follows: confession to be admissible. Well, “A. I drove to the house and he Accordingly, judgment is reversed got in got behind me. I out of and the cause remanded. the car and go in, started to told in, him I was going I was Opinion approved by the Court. sleep. He told me that I had VOLLERS, J., not participating. go with him. DOUGLAS, Judge, dissenting. “Q. you Did he tell at that time you that were under arrest? majority The reverses this conviction “A. No. though appellant even took the stand and “Q. you Did he tell why he you wanted guilt. majority admitted his The holds that to go in? the confession was inadmissible and revers- “A. No. though es the conviction even appellant tes- substantially tified to the same proved “Q. facts Okay. So he told you you by Summarily rejecting the confession. would have to go with him. What theory error, of waiver or State’s harmless happened next? question defendant,

2. There is no that Adams was continu- from the as Adams admitted his ing interrogation by here, ap- interrogation. his conversation with were it is See Brewer v. pellant. long Williams, 1232, So as the officer’s statements are 430 U.S. 97 S.Ct. 51 designed incriminating (1977). to elicit statements L.Ed.2d 424 802 Well, turned just “A. I didn’t know. I Heretofore, the doctrine of curative ad- and, know, I facing you around missibility may accused not com- —that I around house and when turned plain of the admission illegally obtained him, gun. he had a I looked seen evidence where he testifies to substantially had Do “Q. gun. saw that he You the same proven facts by challenged you mean in his holster or been consistently evidence —has followed hand? See, g., State, this Court. e. v. Cameron it his hand. “A. He had in 530 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); S.W.2d 841 v. Lovell you next? “Q. right. What did do All State, 525 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); 511 S.W.2d me. going to kill thought “A. he was I State, v.Wood 523 (Tex.Cr.App. S.W.2d 248 my my car and just I went in 1975); State, v. Melton 511 S.W.2d 957 gun. State, (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Owens v. 503 “Q. you did do? What (Tex.Cr.App.1974); S.W.2d 271 DeLeon v. I out he turned “A. When came back State, 500 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); S.W.2d me; around, I pointed gun State, (Tex.Cr. Moulton v. 486 S.W.2d 334 shot.” State, App.1972); Williams v. 479 S.W.2d was clarified on cross- The second conflict (Tex.Cr.App.1972); and Palmer v. con- Appellant stated in the

examination. State, 475 797 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). S.W.2d ha- police been fession that local had him, complained about that he had rassing Tex.Cr.R. McLaughlin In he had police, chief of this to the (1928), first used this Court to do chief he “didn’t want warned “meet, explain” phrase destroy testified, anything to them.” where no waiver describe those situations however, did not case, however, It from occurs. is clear who forced to harm officers want to be where the accused the truthful- admits harassing were him. objects to which he he has ness evidence remaining alleged discrepancy error in the admission of such con- merely a matter of semantics. In this evidence. nection, record reflects: words, Well, “Q. except in other Later cases also indicate waiver of said that it is place you where admitting illegally the error obtained you your gun getting error about evidence occurs if accused admits the gun the officer had his out before facts though existence of those even he is out and that about that didn’t “explain” attempting to the circumstances to do to the officer anything want surrounding those facts. In Parker v. Is you talked to Mr. Nobles about. 712 (Tex.Cr.App.1964), 384 S.W.2d the rest of the statement true *7 the was for a stopped defendant traffic correct? arresting violation. The officer observed correct; Well, no, “A. it is not those — two capsules barbiturate in the defendant’s in my not words. hand as the for defendant searched his driv- correct, “Q. right. What is not All trial, er’s license. At the defendant testi- get straight. then? Let’s capsules fied that he have the did he says the man said “A. It there that hand but claimed he noticed them on never going take me in. He was to picked up the floor of his van had them he to me in. going me was take told stopped. to immediately prior being He him. go I with He said had they stated that he did know what “Q. Well, be- is the difference what Nevertheless, contained. he convicted go you having to with tween possession of a dangerous drug. for On Just the taking you and him in? appeal, we held that the defendant had it, are he is that what way said error the admission of talking about? he capsules because had admitted that Right.” “A. possessed despite case, attempt had them In the instant complains “explain away” possession. such of the admission of the confession even though he later on testified direct examina- State, (Tex. Lester v. In 498 S.W.2d 927 tion to the same substantially facts. Ex- Cr.App.1973), narcotics officers established cepting self-serving variations, two he testi- surveillance of an Paso El house as the fied to the same facts as contained in the tip by of a result received United States confession and went greater even into de- Customs Officer that marihuana was going tail about surrounding circumstances be delivered to that address. The offi the offense. cers observed defendants Lester and Shea Appellant’s testimony did not put “explain” what the officers believed to be mari the facts to the relating offense as that huana into an automobile. defendants term has by been construed our cases. away and drove the officers followed them. Rather, he merely confirmed the substance attempted When the stop officers of the defendants, statements made in the shots were confession. numerous ex- His defense of self-defense changed. already had One officer and Lester were been by raised one of those “I statements: wounded. Shea was convicted of assault myself ‘he’s not intent to kill me with to murder without malice and ” my yard.’ here at own The majority aggravated Lester was convicted of assault. point should he explained. out what The defendants on appeal contended Moreover, although appellant guns may well taken from following them their have taken the stand in order to arrest were the an minimize illegal fruits of search injury resulting from the of and were admission erroneously admitted in evidence. the confession, product this was a unnecessary found it of his pass upon We own trial strategy, not result impul- of the of legality arrest since the defendants sion or compulsion part on the of the on direct State. they examination that States, See Harrison v. United guns possession. in their We stated 88 S.Ct. (1968). 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 “[h]aving voluntarily taken His the stand admission that he shot the guilt deceased was stage and on direct examination solely to enhance his defense. Hav- having exchange gunfire admitted of ing admitted officers, to the truthfulness with the of the ques- cannot [defendants] facts confession, contained in the cannot tion lawfulness of the search where the now complain be heard to guns were . the confes- seized. . 498 S.W.2d at sion State, inadmissible. Wood v. su- 929. pra; State, supra; Melton v. Owens v. (Tex. In Nicholas v. State, supra; DeLeon v. supra. To Cr.App.1973), we reasoned the doctrine hold otherwise would allow an accused admissibility of curative is based on the voluntarily testify in his own self-interest introduction accused other evi- protest then appeal that he was facts, objection, dence the same without “impelled” to do so because of strength merely and not the introduction of other against State’s evidence him. subject evidence on the same or a different We should adhere well-established question. Moreover, of an exhibit in use we doctrine of admissibility curative and hold established that where even the ac- *8 that any error in the admission of the con- cused testifies in his own behalf in order to fession was or rendered “meet, harmless. destroy explain” improperly judgment should be affirmed. evidence, objection admitted he waives such proves substantially evidence if he question. Thus, same facts as those DAVIS, JJ., DALLY C. join and W. fact that the accused’s admissions are this dissent. while to establish a attempting de- preclude VOLLERS, J., will not waiver. fense participating.

Case Details

Case Name: Ochoa v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Nov 8, 1978
Citation: 573 S.W.2d 796
Docket Number: 55669
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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