90 Ga. 747 | Ga. | 1893
It will appear from the reporter’s statement that one of the issues of fact involved in this case was, whether or not the contents of the cedar chest were shipped as “personal effects” oras “clothing.” The jury manifestly resolved this question in favor of the plaintiff, whose contention was that the goods were shipped as “personal effects,” and accordingly we have dealt with the case from that standpoint.
1. Among the articles alleged to have been damaged were a number of very elaborate fans and parasols. The proof shows that they were made of delicate and expensive materials, highly ornamented with carving, and extremely fragile in construction; and it also shows beyond doubt, we think, that these articles were really intended more for ornament than for use. They may have possessed to some slight extent the quality of utility, but this consideration constituted a very small element of the purpose for which they were designed, and contributed inconsiderably to their value. One of the questions made by the record is, whether or not such articles are “ trinkets ” in the sense in which that word is used in section 4281 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The act of Congress embodied in that section was evidently borrowed from the “ English Carriers’ Act” of 11 G. 4 & 1 W. 4, c. 68. Our act was therefore probably passed in the light of the decisions of the English courts construing the words used in the English act, and it is therefore legitimate
It would seem from the foregoing that fans and parasols of the character involved in the present case may properly be regarded as “trinkets”; and where such articles are shipped by vessel, the masters or owners thereof, under the above mentioned section of the revised statutes, are relieved from liability as carriers in any form or manner, unless the shipper has given a written notice of the true character and value of the articles and had the same entered on the bill of lading thereof. This not having been done, we hold that the steamship company is protected by the law in that section contained.
One meaning often given to the word “trinket” is that it is a mere trifle, possessing but little value. But it seems that to give the word as used in the section, under consideration this meaning would be contrary to
It follows from what has been said that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover anything from the defendant .on account of the destruction of the fans and parasols described in her declaration, except the fan designated as an “ordinary fan,” and valued at five dollars.
2. The plaintiff claimed damages for the mutilation of .a Chantilly lace shawl valued at four hundred dollars, and the question was made whether or not the word “lace,” as used in the section cited, includes an article of this character. We think it does, and this is in accord with the usual and ordinary meaning given to the word. It is customary to speak of handkerchiefs, scarfs, veils and other articles of feminine apparel composed entirely of lace, as “ laces.” The shawl in question contained no material other than lace, and the fact that it was lace manufactured into the form of a shawl does
No reason was suggested in the argument, or now occurs to us, why this shawl might not as well be classified as “lace” as would a piece of crude lace not fashioned into anything of utility or ornament. IJpon the idea that it might be designated as “clothing,” it may he said, according to the finding by the jury, it was not shipped as such, but as “personal effects.” It would be immaterial, however, under the law in question, whether it was shipped under the one designation or the other, for in either event, it was an article of such character and value that the carrier was entitled to have the notice required by law. This view of the question is in .accord, we think, with the spirit and purpose of the act to which reference has been made. Of course, there is a distinction between the shipment of such an article as
3. It is quite clear, in the view we take of this case, that the verdict for $500.00 in favor of the plaintiff cannot be sustained, and consequently the coui*t erred in not setting it aside. Judgment reversed.