79 N.J.L. 334 | N.J. | 1910
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This writ of certiorari brings up for review the judgment of the state board of equalization of taxes canceling an assessment of taxes against Samuel A. Reeves and ordering the same assessed against The Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the Methodist Episcopal Church.
The controversy arises in the following manner:
The Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the Methodist Episcopal Church was incorporated bj an act of the legislature, approved March 3d, 1870 (Pamph. L., p. 397), “for the purpose of providing and maintaining for the members and friends of the Methodist Episcopal Church, a proper, convenient and desirable permanent camp meeting ground and Christian seaside resort,” as stated in its charter.
It had power to buy and sell real estate, and, on August 4th, 1870, it acquired title to the property known as “Ocean
By stipulation of counsel it appears that each lot, for a monetary consideration, being a' gross sum down “and a yearly assessment or rent not to exceed seven per centum of the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars,” was demised unto the lessee therein named, “his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns * * * to have and to hold the said lot or parcel of ground and all and singular the premises hereby demised, with the appurtenances unto the said (lessee), his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, to his and their only proper use, benefit and behoof * * * for and during the full end and term of ninety-nine years from this day fully to be completed and ended, renewable to the said (lessee), his heirs and assigns for a like term of years forever,” subject to certain conditions and regulations therein mentioned.
The only condition of significance imposed was that of a forfeiture of the estate upon failure to pay the assessment or rental for a specified period, and the regulations were those relating to the camp meeting project.
Of the lots several were so demised to the defendant Samuel A. Reeves.
As we have pointed out, under each lease the holder thereof is required, by the terms thereof, to pay to the association an annual rental of $10.50. This rental or assessment was apparently reserved for the purpose of keeping up the camp meeting grounds.
For many years these lands in Ocean Grove so demised were not assessed for taxes, it being considered by the local tax officials that they were exempt from taxation, the buildings only being taxed, and those to the lessees. This misapprehension having been removed by the decision of this court in an analogous ease (Hanover v. Camp Meeting Association, 47 Vroom 65), the local assessor proceeded to impose taxes in accordance with what he conceived to be the respective rights of the parties. In the year 1908 he assessed the land
The result of the assessment to the lessees, on account of their interest in the leasehold estate, of a sum equal to the market value of the leasehold is that the amount of tax on the respective leaseholds is about double the amount of the yearly rental accruing to the association.
The defendant Eeeves appealed to the county board of taxation from the assessment with respect to the land values. The county board having affirmed the assessment, an appeal was taken to the state board of equalization of taxes, with the result that the assessment was canceled and the. same ordered assessed against the association. That is the judgment now here for review.
The appeal is taken under section 5 of chapter 67 of Pamph. L. 1905, p. 126, creating the board of equalization of taxes.
Assuming, but not deciding, that thereunder the board had jurisdiction to render the judgment under review, we nevertheless think that the judgment was erroneous for the reasons we will now state.
It was not disputed that the lessee’s estate in the land has the value at which it has been assessed, but it is contended that the full value of the land should have been assessed against the association as owner of the fee.
The question presented therefore is as to the validity of an assessment to the lessee on account of his interest in land held under a lease for ninety-nine jears, renewable to the lessee, his heirs and assigns, forever, where the rent reserved is grossly disproportionate to the value .of the lands, and where the lessee owns the buildings and improvements.
We think' such an assessment is not invalid.
The General Tax law requires that all property shall be assessed to the owners thereof. Pamph. L. 1903, p. 397, §§ 5, 6. A tenant for years has an interest in land, and is therefore an owner of property. State, National Railway Co., v. Easton and Amboy Railroad Co., 7 Vroom 181. The act of
11 a ill be noticed in this connection that an assessment is not invalid even though assessed in the name of one not the owner. Pamph. L. 1903, p. 411, § 30. This provision comes from the act of 18.51 (Rev., p. 1165, § 7), and has been construed and applied in Fleischauer v. West Hoboken, 11 Vroom 109; Poulson v. Matthews, Id. 268, and State v. Galloway Township, 13 Id. 415.
It is argued that an estate for years is a chattel interest, and should he taxed as personally and not as realty. If ibis ho
But it will be observed that the estate taxed in the present case is not an ordinary estate for years, nor is the relation between the so-called lessee and the association the ordinary one of landlord and tenant. It is far otherwise. True, the parties to the instrument under which Beeves holds his title call it a lease, and our Court of Errors and Appeals, in Ocean Grove Association v. Sanders, 39 Vroom 631, though avoiding that designation, has declared the sum yearly assessable by the association under a like instrument to be rent, and its non-payment to warrant an action of ejectment, yet it is plain that the instrument was not considered as creating an estate for years stricti juris, and it was expressly held that the Landlord and Tenant act was not applicable thereto.
It is unimportant how the estates of the respective parties to the instrument might properly be technically defined. For the purpose of adjusting the burden of taxation between them we are not concerned with technical definitions but with the substance of things.
jit is quite plain that an instrument demising to one and his heirs and assigns a long term of years in land, renewable in perpetuity, conveys an ownership equivalent to a fee-simple,
In Black v. Delaware and. Raritan Canal Co., 9 C. E. Gr. 455, 465, Mr. Justice Van Syckel said: “For all substantial, practical purposes a lease for nine hundred and ninety-nine years is a conveyance in fee.” This doctrine was re-affirmed by Mr. Justice Gummere (the present Chief Justice), in Meyer v. Harris, 32 Vroom 83, 100, and it was held that lessees under an instrument of that character “in determining the measure of their responsibility in maintaining a nuisance upon the premises conveyed to them by such an instrument, should be considered as owners rather than as tenants for years.” The title under the instrument now before the court is even more subject to such a characterization than a lease for nine hun
The result is that the judgment of the state board of equalization of taxes will bo reversed, and the original assessment affirmed, with costs.