84 F.2d 844 | 10th Cir. | 1936
This action is on an accident policy brought by the named beneficiary. It insured Rupert E. McClung, a newspaper publisher of Trinidad, Colorado, against “loss or disability resulting directly, independently and exclusively of all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through Accidental means.” It further provided:
“Special Indemnity. — Sunstroke, freezing, hydrophobia, asphyxiation, or septicaemia resulting from such injuries shall be deemed to be covered by this policy. * *
“The insurance hereunder shall not cover any loss or disability resulting directly o'r indirectly from: * * * disease.”
The complaint alleges that Rupert E. McClung came to his death on January 20, 1934; and that his “death resulted directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means * * * in this, that the mattress on which he was sleeping became ignited through the accidental dropping of a burning cigarette thereon, and said mattress burned and caused the death by asphyxiation of the said Rupert E. McClung.” The answer put at issue the material allegations of the complaint. The trial was by jury. The sole question presented here is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and judgment in favor of appellee. No exceptions were saved to the court’s charge to the jury, and no requests were made by appellant for other or different instructions.
The insured was a periodic drinker. Occasionally he went on a protracted “spree.” He died on January 20, 1934. A post mortem examination held about two weeks after death disclosed an enlarged liver, an alcoholic liver. H.e owned a ranch about 25 miles from Trinidad to which he
The doctor, who was called early on the morning of January 20, -testified that he had treated Mr. McClung on two prior occasions for intoxication to get him off of drink and quiet him down; that Mr. McClung was a strong healthy man; that when he arrived that morning Mr. McClung’s body, particularly his head, was blue. Death had occurred before he arrived. He assisted in giving artificial respiration and administered oxygen, but of no avail. He formed the opinion at that time that McClung’s death was caused by asphyxiation or suffocation from smoke. He was still of that opinion at the time of trial.
Another physician of Trinidad, who had practiced his profession for thirty-five years, had known Mr. McClung for many years. He gave it as his opinion that Mr. McClung died of asphyxiation; that he attended the autopsy; that all his organs were in good condition except the liver was enlarged, but in his opinion the condition of the liver was not such as to indicate death from that source.
Also two physicians testified in behalf of defendant, stating that in their opinion the autopsy disclosed no evidence of death by asphyxiation; that it was negative as to asphyxiation. Each was unable to assign any immediate cause of death. One of them further testified that deceased’s liver was not in itself in such a condition as to cause death. The other said he did not come to any positive conclusion as to the cause of death, but that chronic alcoholism must be given serious consideration as the cause of death.
The body was embalmed, and the proof tends to show that that fact may have rendered it more difficult to discover the cause of death at the autopsy. An expert witness for appellant so testified.
The undertaker, who was also coroner of Las Animas County and had been deputy-coroner for six years prior to January, 1934, testified that he made some investigation of the cause of death, and in the death certificate which he signed he ■ fixed the cause, “accidentally asphyxiated by smoke from burning mattress which was ignited by lighted cigarette.” He had been in the undertaking business for twenty-four years. He lived near Mr. McClung for a
The principal inquiry is whether the dropping of the burning cigarette on the mattress, under-the circumstances, was accidental means causing the injuries to assured which resulted in his death, within the terms of the policy. Clearly there was evidence to support a conclusion that the burning mattress caused injuries to assured which effected his death. Was the dropping of the lighted cigarette on the mattress accidental, and was there substantial evidence to support the conclusion that death resulted directly, independently and exclusively of all other causes from the bodily injuries effected thereby? If these inquiries must be answered in the affirmative, then clearly the one error assigned and now relied upon is wholly without merit.
The policy contains no prohibition of recovery because of the assured’s negligence. Negligence on his part that caused or resulted in whole or in part in bringing about his death will not relieve from liability. None was pleaded in defense, and if made an issue it would have been one for the jury. Cooley’s briefs on Insurance (2d Ed.) vol. 6, p. 5376; Zurich Gen. A. & L. Ins. Co. v. Flickinger (C.C.A.) 33 F.(2d) 853, 68 A.L.R. 161; Ashenfelter v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corp. (C.C.A.) 87 F. 682; Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Randolph (C.C.A.) 78 F. 754.
The assured was asleep at 5 o’clock a. m. on the morning of his death. Sometime after that, perhaps not later than 7 o’clock a. m., he arose from his bed, took off his night clothes, partly clothed himself, put on his shirt, trousers, socks, and shoes, and lighted a cigarette. He then lay across his bed, probably induced to do so from a sense of physical weakness or because he had discovered that it was earlier than he thought. His head rested on his right arm. The lighted cigarette was in his right hand. He fell asleep, and the cigarette then fell from his fingers onto the mattress and ignited it.' These are the reasonable inferences and deductions from the testimony in the case.
The definition of accidental means given by Judge Walter H. Sanborn in Western Commercial Travelers’ Ass’n v. Smith (C.C.A.) 85 F. 401, 40 L.R.A. 653, has been widely accepted by the courts. On page 405, of 85 F., we find this:
“An effect which is not the natural or probable consequence of the means which produced it, an effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reasonably anticipated from the use of those means, an effect which the actor did not intend to produce and which he cannot be charged with the design of producing under the maxim to which we have adverted, is produced by accidental means. It is produced by means which were neither designed nor calculated to cause it. Such an effect is not the result of design, cannot be reason-' ably anticipated, is unexpected, and is produced by an unusual combination of fortuitous circumstances; in other words, it is produced by accidental means.”
Indeed, the assured was asleep when the cigarette fell from his fingers onto the mattress — a combination of fortuitous circumstances. The learned judge cites a number of instances of unusual accidental means which were held to be covered by policies of this kind. (1) Death from the rupture of a blood vessel caused by swinging Indian clubs for exercise. (2) Total disability caused by straining the back while lifting a heavy burden. (3) An event which takes place without one’s foresight or expectation, that is, a strain of the abdominal muscles produced by pitching hay that caused an inflammation that resulted in death. (4) Death by drowning or by involuntarily inhaling illuminating gas. (5) Death caused by lock jaw which was produced by a shot wound unexpectedly inflicted by the assured himself without design. (6) A stricture of the duodenum which produced a disease causing death by jumping from a platform, two others having jumped at the same time from the same platform without any ill results. The last reference just made was to the case of United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 9 S.Ct. 755, 762, 33 L.Ed. 60, in which the court said:
“The term ‘accidental’ was used in the policy in its ordinary, popular sense, as meaning ‘happening by chance, unexpectedly taking place, not according to the usual course of things, or not as expected;’ that if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual, occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means.”
Appellant seems to put much reliance on Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Erickson (C.C.A.) 42 F.(2d) 997. The opinion in that case dealt with the distinction between an accidental result and the result of bodily injuries effected solely through accidental means. That and other cases like it have no application here bacause, as we have already said, appellee carried the burden by showing to the satisfaction of the jury that the death of assured resulted from bodily injuries and that those injuries were effected directly through accidental means.
We are constrained to hold that the learned District Judge did not err in law in submitting the case to the jury.
Affirmed.