Mr. Schmelter made monthly rental payments of $950.00 for both units for the months of March, April and May, 1986 and of $1150 for the months of June through November, 1986. Defendant vacated the premises on December 13, 1986. He acknowledged that he paid no rent for December. As a month to month tenant, he owes $482.30 for this thirteen days of occupancy in that month. Plaintiffs had received a $400.00 security deposit from defendant, leaving a balance due plaintiffs of $82.30 for defendant's use and occupancy in December.
Plaintiffs also claim that defendant is liable for the cost of restoring the premises to two separate residential units. Defendant began his renovations on the second floor in March, 1986. He had a dumpster outside to contain the debris from the work. As part of the renovations, defendant removed the wall between the two units, the bathtubs from both bathrooms and a kitchen sink. He upgraded the electrical service, installed new sheetrock, wallpaper and paint, He argues that plaintiffs were aware of the changes he was making and, by taking no steps to stop him, acquiesced in them. While defendant further claims he is entitled to be reimbursed for his costs of renovation, that claim is untenable in light of his agreement with his landlord that he would be responsible for the CT Page 4061 costs of his renovations. There was no agreement between the parties that the defendant would restore the premises to separate units before or after vacating. While the evidence showed that the parties at one point in their relationship expected to enter into a lease, they never did because they could not reach agreement on its terms. The conduct of the parties themselves belies the existence of an agreement. See Brighenti v. New Britain Shirt Corp.,
Even were the court to find such an obligation under a quasi-contract theory, plaintiffs still have the obligation to prove their damages. Plaintiff spent about $6,000 to put up a wall in place of the one defendant removed. While damages for breach of contract regarding real estate are limited to the diminution in value of the property, that may be determined by the cost of restoration if the restoration does not enhance the value of the property over what it was before the injury. Spera v. Audiotape Corp.,
SUSCO, J.
