92 So. 709 | La. | 1922
The following facts appear in a petition filed by plaintiff, praying for writs of injunction against the police jury of Red River parish and the Louisiana Highway Commission, to wit:
The police jury of Red River parish established road district No. 1, which comprises wards 4, 5, and 6 of that parish. Plaintiff is the owner of considerable property, and is a resident of ward 5, which is the southern part of road district No. 1. In January, 1919, the police jury ordered an election in that district, at which there was submitted to the duly qualified taxpayers thereof the proposition to incur a debt of $150,000, and to issue negotiable bonds therefor, to bear 5 per cent, yearly interest, payable semiannually, the proceeds' of the bonds, when sold, to be used to construct and repair bridges, and to build a permanent hard road in the district from the Caddo parish line to the Natchitoches parish line, with a branch from Armistead to the west bank of Red River opposite Coushatta. The taxpayers of the district authorized the proposition. The bonds were issued and sold, and the required tax is being levied annually and collected to pay the interest on the bonds, as it becomes due, and to retire the bonds themselves as they mature. The proceeds derived from the sale of the bonds are on deposit in the People’s Bank of Coushatta.
The police jury of Red River parish and the Louisiana Highway Commission are preparing to withdraw from the People’s Bank the proceeds of the sale of the bonds for the purpose of building a road only 15 miles in length, from the northern line of said district to a point near Coushatta, thus omitting the south half of ward 6 and all of ward 5, or overman of said road district, and at the same time consuming, for that purpose, all of the proceeds of the bonds.
The petition then declares:
“That under the special election held, as hereinabove set forth, to authorize the .levy of a special tax on all taxable property in said road district No. 1, composed of wards 4, 5, and 6 of Red River parish, the levying of a special tax upon all taxable property in said road district No. 1 pursuant thereto and the sale of the negotiable bonds there authorized, was for the sole purpose, of constructing a road in conformity with the resolutions of the police jury of Red River parish in calling said election, and the other proceedings had, and that to carry out the purposes of said police jury of Red River parish and the Louisiana Highway Commission will be to appropriate said special taxes for a purpose not authorized by the said special election and by the property taxpayers and qualified voters in said road district No. 1.”
The petition then recites that the Louisiana Highway Commission has advertised for bids
The Louisiana Highway Commission filed an answer to plaintiff’s demand. The police jury did not answer, but instead filed an exception of no cause of action. This exception was maintained by the lower court, and plaintiff’s suit dismissed.
Be the above as it may, the point at issue must be decided on the allegations contained in plaintiff’s petition. In determining the intention of the police jury and the Louisiana Highway Commission, when the question is presented on an exception of no cause of action, that intention must be sought for in the allegations of the petition, which, for the purposes of the exception, must be accepted as true. We are without right, in determining such an exception, to take into consideration the averments of an answer filed in the case. For the purposes of the exception, full effect must be given to all allegations of fact contained in the petition, and they are not overcome by allegations that conflict with them, contained in an answer. Lewy v. Wilkinson, 135 La. 106, 64 South. 1003; Darcourt v. Brunet, 139 La. 486, 71 South. 776. The petition, as stated, clearly discloses a contrary intention to that set
It may be that on the trial of the case on the merits it will be shown that plaintiff is in error as to the intentions of the police jury and the Louisiana Highway Commission, but we cannot anticipate that and rule accordingly, nor do we mean, at present, to express an opinion as to what the result will be, should the case be tried on the merits. It will be time enough to decide that, when the question is presented, should it be presented, after a trial on the merits.
The police jury also contends that the fund realized from the bond issue is insufficient for the purpose for which the bonds were voted, and that plaintiff suggests no remedy. It is sufficient to say that plaintiff’s petition contains no such admission. The police jury, in submitting the proposition to authorize the issuance of the bonds, and the taxpayers, in voting for the issue, deemed the amount to be derived from their sale, which necessarily had to be, under the law, for not less than par, sufficient. If the fund should prove otherwise, this would not authorize the police jury to carry out its intentions, as they appear on the face of plaintiff’s petition. The fund is a trust fund, to be used in accomplishing the purpose for which it was Toted. It may be necessary to supplement it to accomplish that purpose, or to take some other appropriate step, though this does not appear. The fund, nevertheless, cannot be used except to accomplish the purpose for which it, was brought into existence.
For the reasons assigned, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be annulled, avoided, and set aside; that the exception of no cause of action be overruled, and this suit remanded to the lower court to be proceeded with according to law and the views herein expressed; the costs of appeal to be paid by the police jury, and the remaining costs to await the final determination of the case.