| Ark. | Jun 22, 1914
(after stating the facts). 1. This suit, as to all the grounds alleged for invalidating the deeds of the commissioner except that the taxes were paid, was a collateral attack on the decree of the chancery court condemning the lands to be sold. See, Hall v. Morris, 94 Ark. 519" date_filed="1910-04-18" court="Ark." case_name="Hall v. Morris">94 Ark. 519; Crittenden Lumber Co. v. McDougal, 101 Ark. 390" date_filed="1911-12-18" court="Ark." case_name="Crittenden Lumber Co. v. McDougal">101 Ark. 390; Beck v. Anders on-Tully Co., 113 Ark. 316" date_filed="1914-06-08" court="Ark." case_name="Beck v. Anderson-Tully Co.">113 Ark. 316.
The record of the proceedings of the chancery court under which the lands in controversy were condemned and sold for delinquent drainage taxes shows that those proceedings were in all things regular and according to Act No. 172 of the Acts of 1905, as amended by Act No. 235 of the Acts of 1909. There is nothing on the face of the proceedings, as shown by this record, evidencing a want of jurisdiction in the chancery court to decree a sale of the lands in controversy. It is clear that Act No. 235 of the Acts of 1909 did not intend to abolish any causes of action that had accrued and that were then in existence, for the delinquent taxes of prior years. But the act of 1909 was intended to furnish the remedy that should thereafter be pursued for the collection of all delinquent taxes, no matter for what year the same had accrued. Since the proceedings of the chancery court condemning the lands in controversy were regular on their face, and did not show any want of jurisdiction in the chancery court, all the. matters alleged in the complaints of the appellees as grounds for invalidating the sale made under the order of the chancery court and the deed of the commissioner in pursuance thereof, can not avail here. Because the chancery court had jurisdiction, its decree, as to all things necessary for adjudication before the rendition thereof, can not be overcome and set aside by this collateral attack. See, Lumber Co. v. McDougal, supra.
2. However, Acts No. 235 of the Acts of 1909 contains this provision: “Provided, that at any time within three years after the rendition of the final decree under which the sale is made, the owner of the land may file his petition in the court rendering the decree, alleging the payment of the taxes on the lands for the year for which they were sold,, and that upon the establishment of that fact, the court shall vacate and set aside the decree,” etc.
It will thus be seen that the act itself provides a direct method for an attack on the decree of the chancery court condemning the lands for sale where the “taxes have been paid.on the lands for the year for which they were sold.” Under this provision appellants were entitled to have the decree set aside, and the deeds made in pursuance thereof cancelled, as to those tracts of land where they showed that the taxes were paid for the years for which they were sold.
The chancellor was warranted in finding, under the testimony set forth in the statement, that the taxes were paid on the east half of the -northwest quarter of section 33, township 19 north, range 8 east, for the years 1905, 1906 and 1907. But as to the other tracts in controversy, there is no testimony to contradict or rebut the testimony of the witness to the effect that the taxes on these tracts were not paid for all the years for which they were sold.
The decree of the chancery court therefore, will be affirmed as to the east half of the northwest quarter of section 33, township 19 north, range 8 east; but as to the other tracts, it will be reversed and remanded with directions to enter a decree dismissing the appellee’s complaints for want of equity.