Oasis Goodtime Emporium, Guy Holcomb and Harold Oden (Oasis) appeal from the judgment entered after a bench trial in which the court awarded Cambridge Capital Group (Cambridge) liquidated damages and attorney fees on its breach of contract claim. Oasis argues on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding the liquidated damages under the contract and also argues there was insufficient service of process and improper venue. We find no error and affirm.
The contract at issue is a Loan Commitment for Collateralized Financing agreement (loan commitment) for a loan of 1.3 million dollars from Cambridge to Oasis. The loan commitment was signed by Guy Holcomb as presidеnt of Oasis and by Guy Holcomb and Harold Oden individually.
Under the contract, Oasis was to pay Cambridge a travel stipend of $3,500 for an on-site inspection of the collateral, and a loan
At the close of the bench trial, the court found in favor of Cambridge on its breach of contract claim and ordered Oasis to pay the remaining $20,000 of the loan commitment feе, $50,000 liquidated damages, and $7,025 in attorney fees. This appeal followed.
1. We first address Oasis’s claim that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss for lack of service. The record shows that the specially appointed process server left a copy of the Complaint with Allen Holcomb, the day manager at Oasis Goodtime Emporium. Oasis, in its Answer, stated as its second and third defenses that the court lacked jurisdiction over it because of “insufficient proсess” and “insufficient service of process.”
Oasis never raised the issue again until after Cambridge finished presenting its case at trial. At that point, counsel for Oasis made an oral motion to dismiss for insufficient service. In looking at the transcript of the hearing on the motion, we find that counsel never presented any argument to the trial court as to why Allen Holcomb was not authorized to accept service of the Complaint. Oasis does make an argument in its briеf on appeal; however, since the evidence referred to is unsupported by the record below, we cannot consider it on appeal.
Trevino v. Flanders,
2. Because we hold the court did have personal jurisdiction over Oasis, we neеd not address the claim that venue was improper as to defendant Guy Holcomb.
3. Counsel for Oasis also appeared to be raising the issue of service on defendant Oden at the motion to dismiss. According to counsel for Cаmbridge, Oden was never served and the record shows that Oden raised insufficient service of process in his Answer.
After a party has properly raised such a defense, it may be found waived only if the party later engages in conduct so manifestly indicative of an intention to relinquish a known right or benefit that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.
Heis v. Young,
But, a defendant has the obligation to bring this affirmative defense to the attention of the court at the proper time if he wishes to make an issue of it.
Wheeler’s, Inc. v. Wilson,
Hеre, defendant Oden participated in discovery and waited until midway through the bench trial of the case before raising the issue again. That was not the proper time as “neither the court nor the opponent was put on nоtice that this waivable preliminary jurisdictional defense would be insisted on.”
Wheeler’s,
supra at 623. As this Court pointed out in
Wheeler’s,
the orderly
Therefore, we hold that defendant Oden, by his actions, waived any defense of insufficiency of service of process and thus consented to the jurisdiction оf the trial court. The trial court did not err in refusing to grant Oden’s motion to dismiss.
4. In its final enumeration of error, Oasis argues the trial court erred in enforcing the liquidated damages provision in the contract. “Upon appellate review, factual findings made after a bench trial shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). The clearly erroneous test is thе same as the any evidence rule. Thus, an appellate court will not disturb fact findings of a trial court if there is any evidence to sustain them.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Lyon v. State of Ga.,
On appeal, Oasis enumerates as error only the triаl court’s finding that the liquidated damages provision was enforceable. 1 This provision reads as follows: “In the event that Lender and/or its affiliate is ready, willing and able and is prepared to fund this Loan in accordance with the agrеed terms and conditions, and Borrower uses an alternative source (or sources) of financing and/or funding, debt or equity, to otherwise meet the requirements of the herein-described financial transaction, or Borrower is unable to provide Lender with insurable title to the real estate Collateral from a title insurance pro vider reasonably acceptable to Lender, or Borrower fails to settle this transaction for any other reason, Borrower shall be obligated to pay Lender, simultaneous with such failure to settle, the sum of $50,000.00, exclusive of the Commitment fee and travel and inspection stipend, as liquidated damages, plus any legal fees incurred by Lender in connection with collection of such liquidated damages.”
With regard to contract provisions for liquidated damages, OCGA § 13-6-7 provides: “If the parties agree in their contract what the damages for a breach shall be, they are said to bе liquidated and, unless the agreement violates some principle of law, the parties are bound thereby.” In determining whether a liquidated damages provision is enforceable, this Court looks at three factors: (1) whether the injury cаused by the breach is difficult or impossible to estimate; (2) whether the parties intend to provide for damages rather than a penalty; and (3) whether the sum stipulated is a reasonable pre-estimate of the probable loss.
Southeastern Land Fund v. Real Estate World,
Hеre, Oasis argues the $50,000 was a penalty because it was not a reasonable pre-estimate of probable loss. Cambridge introduced evidence at trial of its losses due to Oasis’s failure to close on the loan. Ronаld Hirsch, a senior vice-president for Cambridge, testified as to the actual damages suffered by Cambridge because the loan did not close. He stated that the total loan origination fee would have been $117,000, with the $30,000 already рaid by Oasis credited toward that amount as well as the other $20,000 of the loan commitment fee. Hirsch said it would have been difficult to estimate the amount of damages caused by the breach because it was difficult to estimate the amount of money Cambridge would receive over the course of the loan. The loan was a two-year loan with a one-year option with no pre-payment penalty and a fluctuating interest rate with 16.5 percent intеrest as the floor.
Oasis did not introduce any alternative figures as to what would be a reasonable pre-estimate of the loss and, on appeal, points us to no authority from which we
Oasis’s only argument on appeal is that Cambridge “performed precious little” for the amount of money it received. This argument avails it nothing because “[w]here a party seeks damages for violation of a contract, the measure of damages is not what he has suffered by performing his part but what he has suffered by the failure
of the other party to perform his part.”
Gainesville Glass Co. v. Don Hammond, Inc.,
Looking at case law, we find no cases directly on point. In a case with similar facts,
Oran v. Canada Life Assurance Co.,
Applying Liberty to our facts, ten percent of 1.3 million dollars is $130,000; therefore, even including the $50,000 loan commitment fee as part of the liquidated damages, for a total retained by Cambridge of $100,000, we find this is well within the figure found reasonable and enforceable by the court in Liberty.
In light of this and for the reasons outlined above, Oasis was unable to show the liquidated damages provision was a penalty because it was not a reasonable pre-estimate of Cambridge’s probable loss under the contract. The trial court did not err in enforcing the provision.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Oasis makes three separate assignments of error under this one enumeration in violation of OCGA § 5-6-40. When an appellant asserts more than one error within a single enumeration, this Court may, in its discretion, elect to review none or one оr more of the errors.
Toledo v. State,
This loan commitment fee was to be refunded upon satisfactory delivery of the loan. Oran, supra at 519. Here, the $50,000 loan commitment fee was to be applied at closing to the loan origination fee of $117,000.