THE OAKLAND RAIDERS, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant; PAUL TAGLIABUE et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. S132814
Supreme Court of California
July 2, 2007
Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin, Jerome B. Falk, Jr.; Kaye Scholer, Larry R. Feldman, Robert M. Turner, Paul Gelb; Arnold & Porter, John J. Quinn, Laurence J. Hutt; and Jeffrey E. Birren for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant.
Stephan, Oringher, Richman, Theodora & Miller, Harry W. R. Chamberlain II, Robert M. Dato and Brian P. Barrow for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant.
Covington & Burling, Gregg H. Levy; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Irving H. Greines; Ruby & Schofield, Allen J. Ruby; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and Douglas B. Adler for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant and for Defendants and Respondents.
Reed Smith, Paul D. Fogel and Dennis Peter Maio for Alameda Contra Costa Trial Lawyers Association, Hinton, Alfert & Sumner and Abbey, Weitzenberg, Warren & Emery as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Munger, Toller & Olson and Ronald L. Olson as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
OPINION
KENNARD, J.—
Although ordinarily an order granting a new trial is reviewed only for abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal held that an order lacking an adequate specification of reasons is subject to independent review. Under that standard of review—one that gives no deference to the trial court‘s ruling—the Court of Appeal overturned the order granting a new trial and consequently affirmed the verdict and judgment against the Raiders. We agree with the analysis and conclusion of the Court of Appeal, and therefore we affirm the judgment of that court.
A. Facts Leading to the Raiders’ Move from Los Angeles
The Oakland Raiders is a professional football team owned by Al Davis, with a membership in the National Football League (NFL), which is an unincorporated association governed by its own constitution and bylaws. After the Raiders relocated to Los Angeles from Oakland in 1982, they played their home games at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum until 1995. Unlike newer stadiums, the Coliseum‘s facilities did not permit the team to derive revenues from items such as luxury suites, club seats, naming rights, or other sponsorships.
Throughout the end of 1994 and the first half of 1995, the Raiders negotiated with individuals representing Hollywood Park, a racetrack, for the construction of a new, state-of-the-art stadium in Inglewood in Southern California. In March 1995, the parties reached an agreement that required the Raiders to secure from the NFL a contribution of $20 million and a commitment that at least two Super Bowl games would be played in the new stadium at Hollywood Park between 2000 and 2004. The NFL, however, offered only to schedule one Super Bowl at Hollywood Park during the period in question. The NFL proposed to invest some money in the project, but less than the Raiders had requested. It offered to provide additional assistance on the condition that a second NFL team be permitted to play at the stadium for several years.
In May 1995, the NFL adopted “Resolution FC-7,” which, among other things, awarded two Super Bowls to the planned Hollywood Park stadium conditioned on two NFL teams playing there, and created a committee to negotiate with both the Raiders and Hollywood Park concerning a second NFL team. The new committee developed terms to permit a second NFL team to play in the Los Angeles region, but those terms were inconsistent with the Raiders’ goals, and the Raiders perceived them as favoring the second team. As a result, the Raiders entered into an agreement with the City of Oakland in June 1995 to move to the renovated Oakland Coliseum. The agreement included an “up-front” $64 million payment to the Raiders and immediately enhanced revenue streams. Al Davis, the Raiders’ owner, testified that Oakland officials assured him that personal seat licenses and game tickets would sell out.
In March 1999, the Raiders brought an action for damages against the NFL and other defendants.1 On March 13, 2001, jury trial commenced on five of the six causes of action that had survived motions for summary adjudication. The first through third causes of action involved the Raiders’ claim that, by moving to Oakland, they left the NFL with an “opportunity” to put another team in Los Angeles and that the NFL‘s constitution and bylaws implicitly required that the Raiders be compensated for providing the NFL with that opportunity. The fifth and sixth causes of action addressed the NFL‘s failure to offer the Raiders more support for the development of the Hollywood Park stadium. (The fourth cause of action, for declaratory relief, was tried later without a jury.)
The jury deliberated for 15 days. (It began deliberations anew on the fifth day after one juror was excused because of a scheduling conflict.) It returned a nine-to-three verdict in favor of the NFL. Later, after a bench trial, the court entered its statement of decision on the remaining cause of action, denying the Raiders’ request for declaratory relief.
C. Posttrial Motions
On July 26, 2002, the trial court entered judgment on all matters tried before the jury and the court. That same day, the Raiders moved for a new trial on the ground, among others, of juror misconduct. The motion asserted that Juror Joseph A. was biased against the Raiders and concealed that bias during voir dire. It further asserted that another juror, Attorney Linda H., dominated jury deliberations, infected the deliberations with her own view of the law, and engaged in private deliberations with another juror. Finally, the Raiders suggested that a third juror, Lagrimas P., had difficulty understanding English. On appeal, however, the Raiders abandoned their claim that Lagrimas P.‘s language difficulty was an independent ground for granting a new trial.
To demonstrate the misconduct of Jurors Joseph A. and Linda H., the Raiders submitted declarations from five jurors. According to those declarations, Juror Joseph A. stated several times during deliberations that he hated the Raiders and their owner, Al Davis, and that he would never find for the Raiders or award them any money. Juror Alice I. declared: “Joseph [A.] stated to the group that he hated the Raiders and Raiders’ owner Al Davis. He also said to us that the Raiders were always starting lawsuits with the NFL,
Jurors William S. and Alfredo B. submitted declarations that supported Juror Alice I.‘s declaration in all particulars. Jurors Angelo C. and Richard L. also mentioned Joseph A.‘s hostility to the Raiders and Al Davis. Richard L. said: “[Joseph A.] did not hide the fact that he was biased against the Raiders. The deliberations were held with these statements hanging over everyone.”
The Raiders also charged jury misconduct by Juror Linda H. The declaration by Juror William S. stated that Linda H. “told the other jurors that the Raiders’ lawyer did not want her on the jury, and that she would make them pay.” The declaration of Juror Angelo C. stated that Juror Linda H., a lawyer, “exercised an unofficial leadership position,” dominated the deliberations, and instructed the jurors on the law. She “told the jury that if they voted one way on one of the claims, they had to vote the same way on another claim, because ‘that was the law.‘” She also wrote out statements of the law and taped them to the jury room walls; her statements were not quotations from the jury instructions “but were her own words of what she claimed the law was.” She also told the other jurors that Resolution FC-7 could not be a contract and that there could be no fiduciary relationship between the NFL and the Raiders as a matter of law.
The NFL submitted seven juror declarations in opposition to the Raiders’ motion for a new trial. Juror Joseph A. stated: “At no time did I have or conceal any hostility, bias, or ill will toward the Raiders or Mr. Davis. . . . After we had been deliberating for many days, at a moment when everyone seemed to be tense, I said jokingly that I hated the Raiders ‘because I had lost my bet.’ I mentioned that years earlier, I had gone to Las Vegas and placed a small, legal bet on the Raiders in a playoff game, which they lost. The part about ‘hating the Raiders’ was an obvious joke, no one confronted me about
According to Jurors William S. and Alice I., Wayman J., the first jury foreman, was among the jurors who confronted Joseph A. But Wayman J.‘s declaration in support of the NFL stated: “I did not . . . hear any words by any juror that reflected a preexisting bias or prejudice for or against any party.” He did not recall any incident in which he confronted Joseph A. Other jurors stated that Joseph A. did not give them any reason to believe that he harbored a preexisting bias against the Raiders.
Juror Linda H. denied any bias against the Raiders, denied dominating the deliberations, stated that she told her fellow jurors to follow the court‘s instructions and did not tell the jury what the law was, and explained that she wrote out the jury instructions verbatim, except for an inadvertent error when she wrote “fiduciary duty” instead of “fiduciary relationship.”
In response to two jurors’ assertions that Juror Linda H. stated what evidence could and could not be considered, Linda H. declared that she neither used her “position as an attorney to make pronouncements about the evidence” nor “opine[d] whether certain facts were or were not in evidence ‘as a matter of law.‘” She also denied the assertion of three jurors that she told the jury that Resolution FC-7 could not be a contract and that there could be no fiduciary relationship between the NFL and the Raiders as a matter of law. Other jurors recalled that Linda H. said the jury should get written clarification from the trial court concerning this issue and that, as a result, the jury sent a written question to the court.
The Raiders filed their reply, together with six reply declarations, on September 5, 2002. The NFL moved to strike the declarations on the ground they were untimely filed. The trial court did not rule on the NFL‘s motion to strike.
On September 11, 2002, the trial court heard argument on the Raiders’ motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and it took the matters under submission. On September 23, it issued a minute order granting the motion for a new trial and denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In ruling on the motion for a new trial, the trial court stated only: “The motion for new trial is granted. The Court finds that the objectively ascertainable acts of juror misconduct were prejudicial to the Oakland Raiders’ right to a fair trial.” The court did not specify any reasons for its conclusion. With respect to the other grounds raised by the motion, the court stated: “While some of the objections in the motion for new trial premised on erroneous and/or prejudicial jury instructions raise serious
The NFL appealed from the order granting a new trial, and the Raiders appealed from the judgment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court‘s orders granting the NFL‘s motion for summary judgment on the issue of Hollywood Park‘s fiduciary duty and denying the Raiders’ request for declaratory relief. It held, however, that the trial court‘s order granting the Raiders a new trial failed to comply with
We granted the Raiders’ petition for review, which raised only the issue of the appropriate standard of review on appeal when an order granting a new trial on the ground of jury misconduct lacks the statutorily required statement of reasons for granting a new trial on that ground.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Section 657
The authority of a trial court in this state to grant a new trial is established and circumscribed by statute. (See Diamond v. Superior Court (1922) 189 Cal. 732, 736 [210 P. 36].)
Before 1965,
As this court explained in Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104 [65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315] (Mercer), the first case to construe the amended statute, “it is apparent that in the context of this statute the words ‘ground’ and ‘reason’ have different meanings.” (Id. at p. 112.) The word “ground” refers to any of the seven grounds listed in
Finally,
California courts have consistently required strict compliance with
The courts’ strict interpretation of
B. Judicial Review of Orders Granting a New Trial
Although many issues were raised in the Court of Appeal, the Raiders’ petition for review in this court raises only one: whether the trial court‘s order granting the Raiders’ motion for a new trial should be sustained on the ground of jury misconduct. The parties here do not contest (1) that the only possibly viable ground for a new trial was jury misconduct; (2) that the trial court adequately specified that ground as a basis for granting the motion; and (3) that the trial court did not state its reasons for granting a new trial on that ground. Thus, we address a single, narrow issue: the standard of review—whether abuse of discretion or independent review—when, as here, a trial
When the trial court provides a statement of reasons as required by
In Mercer, supra, 68 Cal.2d 104, we described those purposes as twofold. One is “to promote judicial deliberation before judicial action.” (Id. at p. 113.) The statute serves that purpose by requiring a statement of reasons drafted by the court, not by the prevailing party. (Id. at pp. 113, 115.) The other purpose is “to make the right to appeal from the order more meaningful.” (Id. at p. 113; see Stewart v. Truck Ins. Exchange, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 484; Bigboy v. County of San Diego (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 397, 404 [201 Cal.Rptr. 226].) We explained in Mercer that before the Legislature‘s 1965 amendments to
Our decisions have frequently overturned orders granting a new trial based on a conclusion that to do otherwise would frustrate the purposes of
In Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d 359, for example, we held that a statement of reasons in the form of a finding of ultimate facts rather than evidentiary facts “frustrates rather than promotes the legislative purpose of facilitating meaningful appellate review of the order granting a new trial, and hence is inadequate to comply with the mandate of
In La Manna v. Stewart, supra, 13 Cal.3d 413, the trial court stated its reasons for granting a new trial orally, specifying the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. (Id. at p. 417, fn. 1.) It later filed a written statement of reasons after the statutory 10-day period had run. (Id. at p. 417.) Rejecting the argument that the trial court had substantially complied with
Miller v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. (1973) 8 Cal.3d 689 [106 Cal.Rptr. 1, 505 P.2d 193] was a wrongful death and personal injury suit in which the plaintiffs alleged that the flood control district had negligently maintained a dam-like flood control basin, thereby creating a dangerous condition of public property. (Id. at p. 693.) During a rainstorm, water and debris flowed over the basin and demolished the plaintiffs’ house, causing the death of one resident and injuries to another. (Ibid.) After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, the trial court granted the flood control district‘s motion for a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. (Id. at p. 696.) The court‘s statement of reasons stated only that the defendant completely and adequately discharged its obligations, without any further explanation. (Ibid.) We reversed the order granting a new trial, holding that the trial court‘s statement of reasons was inadequate because we could not determine whether the trial court found that a hazardous condition never existed or that it had been remedied before the date of the plaintiffs’ injuries.
In Sanchez-Corea, supra, 38 Cal.3d 892, the trial court‘s order specifying insufficiency of the evidence as the ground for granting a new trial was not filed until after the trial court had lost jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 898, 903.) Consequently, under the terms of
The moving party in Sanchez-Corea argued that the order granting a new trial should be affirmed on the ground that the verdict was “against law” (
Finally, we note the decision of the Court of Appeal in Thompson, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 544. There, the plaintiff sued for breach of an employment contract. (Id. at p. 547.) The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial court granted the defendant‘s motion for a new trial on the ground of excessive damages. (Id. at pp. 547-548section 657, which requires the court itself to prepare the statement of reasons. (Thompson, supra, at pp. 548-549.) Thompson concluded that in the absence of a statement of reasons prepared by the trial court, the appellate court should “independently review all the grounds advanced for the new trial motion” to determine if a new trial was required on any stated ground. (Id. at p. 550.) Applying an independent standard of review, and finding no stated ground that required a new trial, the Court of Appeal in Thompson reversed the new trial order. (Id. at pp. 550-552.)
The Raiders urge us not to apply a standard of independent review, contending that doing so would be inconsistent with two older decisions of this court, Malkasian, supra, 61 Cal.2d 738, and Treber, supra, 68 Cal.2d 128. As we will explain, those decisions suggest that an appellate court should defer to the trial court in determining whether an act of misconduct was prejudicial. But before a court can consider whether an act of misconduct
At the time of the Malkasian trial,
In Malkasian, the analysis proceeded in two steps. We first determined that the defendant‘s attorney had engaged in misconduct during argument to the jury, and then that the attorney‘s misconduct was sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial. The first step, determining whether misconduct had occurred, did not require the resolution of conflicting evidence because the undisputed record showed that the attorney‘s argument to the jury had relied on purported facts that were unsupported by the evidence presented during the trial. (Malkasian, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 746-747
Treber, supra, 68 Cal.2d 128, the other case cited by the Raiders, was a companion case to Mercer, supra, 68 Cal.2d 104. Treber involved a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate an order granting a new trial that lacked an adequate specification of reasons. (Treber, supra, at p. 130.) We held mandate unavailable because the petitioner had an adequate appellate remedy. (id. at p. 136.) We also explained that in reviewing an order granting a new trial, the appellate court will independently review an issue of
The Court of Appeal here concluded that the absence of a statement of reasons calls for independent review of the trial court‘s order granting a motion for a new trial. We agree.4 The reviewing court should not, in a situation such as that presented here, defer to the trial court‘s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, or draw all inferences favorably to the trial court‘s decision, because in the absence of a statement of reasons, the record does not show whether the trial court resolved those conflicts or drew those inferences.
Our decision is a narrow one. We address only the situation in which there is conflicting evidence on the issue of juror misconduct, not the question whether misconduct, shown by the record, is prejudicial. We do not address the situation in which apparently conflicting declarations can be reconciled, so that on close examination it is determined that the crucial allegations of misconduct are not in dispute. (See, e.g., McDonald v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 256, 263-265 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 734]; Young v. Brunicardi (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1344, 1351 [232 Cal.Rptr. 588]; Clemens v. Regents of University of California (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 356, 365 [97 Cal.Rptr. 589].)
C. Independent Review of the Juror Declarations
Because ordinarily “a party who seeks a court‘s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
The Raiders have not met this burden. We have described in detail (see ante, at pp. 630-632) the juror declarations filed in support of and in opposition to the Raiders’ new trial motion. In summary, the Raiders alleged that Juror Joseph A. was biased and that Juror Linda H. committed misconduct. Because the trial court did not file a statement of reasons underlying its conclusion of jury misconduct, we do not know whether the trial court‘s ruling was based on the bias of Joseph A., the misconduct of Linda H., or both.
Juror Joseph A., in his declaration submitted by the NFL in opposition to the Raiders’ motion for a new trial, acknowledged telling the other jurors that he hated the Raiders, but he claimed that he said so in jest. Some jurors who filed declarations in favor of the NFL agreed that Joseph A. was only joking; but those filing declarations in favor of the Raiders said they took Joseph A.‘s comments seriously. Other jurors did not hear or remember Joseph A.‘s comments. Juror Alice I. said that she and two other jurors (Wayman J. and William S.) confronted Juror Joseph A. and warned him that by concealing his bias he could cause a mistrial. Juror William S. supported Alice I.‘s statement, but both Joseph A. and Wayman J. denied that any confrontation occurred.
Juror Linda H. acknowledged in her declaration submitted by the NFL in opposition to the Raiders’ motions for a new trial that she wrote statements of law and taped them to the walls of the jury room. Linda H. and three other jurors said the statements merely copied the trial court‘s instructions; three other jurors said the statements departed from the court‘s instructions. The
According to the declarations of three jurors, Linda H. told them Resolution FC-7 (see ante, at p. 629) could not be a contract, but the declarations of two other jurors said Linda H. only suggested that the jurors should get clarification from the trial court on that issue, which they did.
In sum, the testimonial evidence submitted by the parties in the form of juror declarations is sharply conflicting on every material issue, and the Raiders submitted no other evidence to support their motion for a new trial. Consequently, upon independent review of the record, we conclude that the Raiders have failed to discharge their burden to persuade us of jury misconduct warranting the grant of a new trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
George, C. J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.
BAXTER, J., Concurring.—I join in the judgment affirming the Court of Appeal and concur generally in the majority‘s analysis under the particular circumstances of this case. Had the trial court supported its order granting a new trial with an adequate statement of reasons, we would have been bound to defer to the trial court‘s resolution of the factual conflicts in the affidavits concerning the existence of juror misconduct. (Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 108-109 [95 Cal.Rptr. 516, 485 P.2d 1132].) In that event, it appears that the Oakland Raiders would have been entitled to the benefit of the new trial order, inasmuch as the National Football League has not contended here that the new trial order was invalid under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The Raiders snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in this proceeding only because the trial court failed to comply with its “mandatory” duty to specify the reasons for its order granting a new trial (Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 896 [215 Cal.Rptr. 679, 701 P.2d 826]) and because the Raiders, on this record, failed to discharge their burden of persuading the reviewing court that a new trial should have been granted.
As the majority emphasizes, however, our decision to review this new trial order under a nondeferential standard is “a narrow one” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 640) in that the trial court‘s failure to file a statement of reasons made it
George, C. J., and Moreno, J., concurred.