OAKLAND POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF OAKLAND, Defendant and Appellant.
A158662 (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG19002328)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
Filed 4/26/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
Before the CPRA’s formal interrogation of the officers, counsel for the officers demanded copies of all “reports and complaints” prepared or compiled by investigators pursuant to
The officers and their police union filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging that the City of Oakland (City) violated their procedural rights by refusing to disclose reports and complaints prior to holding the supplemental interrogations. The Fourth District Court of Appeal previously considered the same issue in Santa Ana Police Officers’ Association v. City of Santa Ana (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 317, 328 (City of Santa Ana), holding that POBRA requires the disclosure of such materials after an initial interrogation and “ ‘prior to any further interrogation.’ ” Feeling constrained by City of Santa Ana, the trial court below granted the petition and ordered the City to disregard the interrogation testimony in any current or future disciplinary proceedings against the officers.
We conclude that mandatory disclosure of complaints and reports prior to any subsequent interrogation of an officer suspected of misconduct is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and undermines a core objective under POBRA—maintaining the public’s confidence in the effectiveness and integrity of law enforcement agencies by ensuring that internal investigations into officer misconduct are conducted promptly, thoroughly, and fairly. Under our reading of
A. The Investigation
A welfare check conducted by officers in December 2017 resulted in a citizen complaint alleging an unlawful search and seizure, excessive use of force, harassment, discrimination, and property damage. On the date in question, Officer Doe 1 and Officer Doe 2 responded to the citizen’s residence after a report was made that the citizen had been drinking, was suicidal, and was armed with a firearm. Smelling alcohol on the citizen, the officers handcuffed and conducted a body search, confiscating a weapon. Officer Doe 2 then asked the citizen for permission to check if anyone was in the residence. The citizen consented, and Doe Officer 2 did a quick protective sweep, finding no one inside. While Officer Doe 1 placed the citizen in a patrol vehicle, Officer Doe 2 re-entered the residence. Officer Doe 2 then exited the residence and asked the citizen about the presence of a weapon. After the citizen refused to disclose the location of a weapon, Officer Doe 2 entered the residence for a third time, locating and confiscating a weapon.
Officer Doe 3, Officer Doe 4, and a fifth officer arrived after the citizen had been placed in the patrol vehicle. A mobile crisis team also arrived and placed the citizen on a psychiatric hold pursuant to
As part of the Department’s investigation, internal affairs took the citizen’s statement and reviewed existing body worn camera footage and relevant documents. The Doe Officers were separately interrogated by the Department in April and May of 2018. The Doe Officers were cleared of any wrongdoing by the Department in June 2018. However, investigators noted two areas of concern. First, Doe Officer 2 should have waited for a third officer to arrive before conducting a protective sweep of the house. Second, a search warrant should have been obtained prior to searching the citizen’s residence and seizing a weapon. The Department recommended training for certain of the officers involved.
In September 2018, the CPRA notified each of the Doe Officers that they would be re-interviewed concerning the same December 2017 incident. Prior to these supplemental interrogations, counsel for the Doe Officers sought
All four Doe Officers submitted to further interrogations in November 2018. Based in part on those interrogations, the CPRA found that the Doe Officers had violated the citizen’s civil rights and recommended discipline. Specifically, the CPRA concluded that the Doe Officers knowingly violated the citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights by re-entering the citizen’s residence without a warrant or the existence of exigent circumstances. The CPRA also found that the Doe Officers gave misleading statements to investigators, omitted material details, and worked together in an attempt to conceal their misconduct. The agency sustained multiple findings of misconduct against certain Doe Officers and recommended that the Department implement a number of changes to its policies regarding searches and seizures.
B. Trial Court Proceedings
Oakland Police Officers’ Association and the Doe Officers (collectively, petitioners) filed the instant action in January 2019, claiming that the City violated the officers’ procedural rights by refusing to disclose all relevant “reports and complaints” prior to subsequent interrogations by the CPRA. Petitioners sought a writ of mandate ordering the City to comply with
While these proceedings were pending in the trial court, the parties agreed to the following stipulated facts:
(1) “The interviews of Officer Doe 1, on or about November 14, 2018, Officer Doe 2, on or about November 13, 2018, Officer Doe 3, on or about November 9, 2018, and Officer Doe 4, on or about November 13, 2018, were ‘further interrogation[s]’ under the meaning of
(2) “Prior to these further interrogations, counsel for Officer Does 1 through 4, Justin Buffington, requested that [City] turn over reports and
(3) “Before those further interrogations, and at the time of Justin Buffington’s requests for reports and complaints, the City was in possession of reports and/or complaints as discussed within
(4) “On November 5, 2018, Anthony Finnell sent an email to Justin Buffington and Joan Saupe, which stated, ‘Upon the advice of counsel, the CPRA denies your requests for “reports and complaints” and will not produce said material. (See Pasadena Police Officers Association v. City of Pasadena, 797 P.2d 608 (1990).)’ Mr. Finnell’s email also set a schedule for three officers to be interviewed and stated, ‘Refusal to submit to the interviews may subject your clients to punitive action. (
(5) “On November 6, 2018, Mr. Buffington sent an email to Mr. Finnell, which stated, ‘The Pasadena case only applies to pre-interrogation discovery, not post-interrogation discovery. In fact, the Santa Ana case harmonizes and relies on the Pasadena case in determining that officers are entitled to reports and complaints. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of the Santa Ana case, making it settled law. Unfortunately, I will be forced to litigate this matter in Alameda County Superior Court. Please be advised that reliance on the advice of counsel is not a valid defense.’ ”
After hearing, the trial court granted the writ petition, reasoning as follows: “The Court is bound by Santa Ana, which plainly holds that ‘reports and complaints also must be produced “prior to any further interrogation.” ’ [Citation.] This holding is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Pasadena Police Officers’ Association v. City of Pasadena [hereafter ‘Pasadena POA’] (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, which addressed only whether notes and reports must be produced before the initial interrogation. The Court is bound by the holding in Santa Ana, notwithstanding the conflict between that case’s holding and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Pasadena POA that ‘granting discovery before interrogation could frustrate the effectiveness of any investigation, whether criminal or administrative’ (id. at p. 578) and would be ‘contrary to sound investigative practices’ (id. at p. 579) [citation].” (Italics added.) In the resulting judgment and writ of mandate, the trial court ordered the City to comply with
This appeal followed. After briefing was completed, we granted a request by the League of California Cities and the Los Angeles County Police Chiefs’ Association to file an amicus brief supporting the City’s position.4
Following oral argument in this matter, we requested supplemental briefing concerning the applicability of the confidentiality provision in
DISCUSSION
This appeal concerns the interpretation of disclosure requirements described in
I. Relevant Law
A. Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act
Initially enacted in 1976 (Stats. 1976, ch. 465, § 1, p. 1202), POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers [citation] by the public entities which employ them. It is a catalogue of the minimum rights [citation] the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations.” (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135; White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 681 [POBRA “is concerned primarily with affording individual police officers certain procedural rights during the course of proceedings which might lead to the imposition of penalties against them”].) “These procedural protections . . .
Balanced against the need to afford peace officers a fair process, these procedural safeguards also reflect the institutional and public importance of ensuring prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations of police misconduct claims. (City of Pasadena, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 572; see also Daugherty, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 947 [“ ‘The various procedural protections provided by POBRA “balance the public interest in maintaining the efficiency and integrity of the police force with the police officer’s interest in receiving fair treatment.” ’ ”].) As the Supreme Court explained more than forty years ago when it interpreted the same POBRA provision at issue in this appeal: “To keep the peace and enforce the law, a police department needs the confidence and cooperation of the community it serves. Even if not criminal in nature, acts of a police officer that tend to impair the public’s trust in its police department can be harmful to the department’s efficiency and morale. Thus, when allegations of officer misconduct are raised, it is essential that the department conduct a prompt, thorough, and fair investigation. Nothing can
The Supreme Court has thus recognized that “[l]imitations on the rights of those employed in law enforcement have long been considered ‘a necessary adjunct to the [employing] department’s substantial interest in maintaining discipline, morale and uniformity[,]’ ” especially when “preservation of public confidence in the trustworthiness and integrity of its police force is at stake.” (City of Pasadena, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 577.) For example, POBRA requires officers to comply with administrative interrogations, and the refusal to sit for an interrogation or to answer questions may be grounds for punitive action. (Id. at p. 574; see
B. Judicial Construction of Section 3303, Subdivision (g)
In City of Pasadena, the Supreme Court considered the “narrow issue” of whether subdivision (g) (then subdivision (f)) grants “preinterrogation discovery rights to a peace officer who is the subject of an internal affairs investigation.” (City of Pasadena, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 568-569.) An investigator had interviewed Officer Ford during an internal affairs investigation into possible insubordination by Officer Diaz. When Officer Diaz appeared for a scheduled administrative interrogation, he argued that he was not required to
The Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that “in allowing an officer under administrative investigation access to reports and complaints, the Legislature intended the right to such access to arise after, rather than before, the officer’s interrogation.” (City of Pasadena, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 569.) Looking first to the statutory language, the Court noted that subdivision (f) (now subdivision (g)) does not specify when an officer’s entitlement to “reports and complaints” arises. (Id. at 575.) It observed, however, that the provision also grants an officer access to any recording of the officer’s interrogation, as well as to transcribed stenographer’s notes memorializing the interrogation, both of which logically could only be provided after an interrogation. (Id. at pp. 575-576.) Moreover, since “the Legislature placed the provision regarding disclosure of reports and complaints and the provision specifying entitlement to transcribed notes in the same sentence in subdivision [(g)],” the Court determined “that the Legislature must have intended the discovery rights in each instance to be coextensive, entitling the officer to copies of reports and complaints and transcribed stenographer’s notes after the interrogation.” (Id. at p. 576.)
The Supreme Court further reasoned that when the Legislature has required that certain acts described in
Buttressing the Supreme Court’s textual analysis was its discussion of the legislative purpose underlying POBRA. The Supreme Court emphasized the Legislature’s intent to strike a balance between safeguarding a peace
In sum, “entitlement to preinterrogation discovery is neither apparent from the language of subdivision [(g)] nor fundamental to the fairness of an internal affairs investigation.” (City of Pasadena, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 579.) Further, mandating such discovery “might jeopardize public confidence in the efficiency and integrity of its police force.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court thus held that “the Legislature intended subdivision [(g)] to require law enforcement agencies to disclose reports and complaints to an officer under an internal affairs investigation only after the officer’s interrogation.”5 (Ibid.)
Following the City of Pasadena opinion, several appellate courts have addressed the scope of the “reports and complaints” disclosure requirement under
or complaints concerning the misconduct that is the
The Sixth District Court of Appeal disagreed with this view in Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 1264. According to the Gilbert court, both “report” and “complaint” as used in the statute “suggest a more formal presentation than the raw or original source materials from which a report may be drawn.” (Id. at p. 1286section 3303, subdivision (g), are the ‘notes made by a stenographer,’ who was implicitly present at the officer’s interrogation. Fair treatment of such officer does not require that all the material amassed in the course of the investigation, such as raw notes, written communications, records obtained, and interviews conducted, be provided to the officer following the officer’s interrogation.” (Id. at pp. 1286-1287; see also Davis v. County of Fresno (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1122, 1135-1138, (Davis) [noting but declining to address split of authority on scope of “reports” and “complaints” under section 3303, subdivision (g)].)
Most recently, in City of Santa Ana, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th 317, the Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the same question of statutory interpretation presented by this appeal. Two police officers were investigated for alleged misconduct which occurred during the execution of a search warrant at a marijuana dispensary. (Id. at pp. 321-322.) Unbeknownst to the officers, hidden cameras had recorded them during the search. (Id. at p. 322.) After certain portions of the recordings were released to the media by the dispensary owners, an investigation was initiated and both officers were interrogated. (Id. at pp. 322-323Id. at p. 323.) The officers’ request for discovery materials prior to the second interrogations was rejected. (Ibid.) The officers then filed suit in superior court, alleging in part that the refusal to produce discovery under
As for the disclosure of reports and complaints, the appellate court acknowledged that
noted that the Supreme Court had found that copies of tape recordings and transcribed notes of the first interrogation must necessarily be provided after the interrogation, the disclosure requirement for reports and complaints was located in the same sentence as the disclosure requirement for stenographer’s notes, and the Court had remarked that the discovery rights to “ ‘copies of reports and complaints and transcribed stenographer’s notes after the interrogation’ ” were “ ‘coextensive’.” (Id. at p. 328.) The appellate court thus concluded: “Because discovery rights to reports and complaints are coextensive with discovery rights to tape recordings of interrogations, and tapes recordings must be produced ‘prior to any further interrogation,’ then it follows that reports and complaints also must be produced ‘prior to any further interrogation.’ ” (Id. at p. 328.) We respectfully disagree with this analysis for the reasons set forth below.
II. Timing of Disclosures Mandated by Section 3303, Subdivision (g)
“ ‘The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ ” (Upland Police Officers Assn. v. City of Upland (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1303 (City of Upland).) “Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, we first examine the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and construing them in context.” (Esberg v. Union Oil Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 262, 268, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Bernard v. City of Oakland (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1553, 1561 at fn. 5.) We are required to read a statute’s provisions “as a whole” and to “harmoniz[e] ‘statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject . . . both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.’ ” (City of Pasadena, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 575.)
“ ‘[S]tatutes must be construed so as to give a reasonable and common-sense construction consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the
A. Disclosure of Reports and Complaints Before a Subsequent Interrogation is Not Required by Plain Meaning of Subdivision (g)
There is only one express timing directive in this statutory language—namely, a police officer whose interrogation has been recorded must be granted access to that recording “if any further proceedings are contemplated or prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time.” (
The discovery obligation for the other three types of material—stenographer’s notes, reports, and complaints—is contained in the next sentence and does not provide a time frame for disclosure. As the Supreme Court observed, the phrase “prior to” is absent from this sentence, a
City of Santa Ana concluded that because certain discovery materials (tape recordings and stenographer notes) can only be produced following an initial interrogation, all four types of materials should be treated in like manner and disclosed at the same time after the initial interrogation. (City of Santa Ana, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 328.) The appellate court relied in particular on the Supreme Court’s conclusion that discovery rights for these materials were “ ‘coextensive’.” (Ibid.) In our view, however, the Supreme Court’s characterization of these discovery obligations as “coextensive” pertained to the narrow issue before the Court—whether certain discovery materials must be disclosed prior to an initial interrogation when other materials logically cannot be. City of Pasadena should not be overread to mean that
The plain language of
The question remains, when should such materials be discovered? One appellate court concluded that, since
is implied.” (Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293.) Another court
As we explain next, we conclude the statutory language and legislative history of subdivision (g) offer a different answer, one based on the investigating agency’s statutory right to withhold certain materials it deems confidential from disclosure.7
B. Confidentiality as the Touchstone for Disclosure of Subdivision (g) Discovery Materials
Under the statute, an agency’s disclosure obligations extend only to nonconfidential stenographer’s notes, reports, and complaints. (
Under this construction of subdivision (g), and consistent with City of Pasadena, no materials identified in subdivision (g) may be disclosed prior to an initial interrogation of a peace officer. Thereafter, any tape recording made of the interrogation must be disclosed “if any further proceedings are contemplated or prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time.” (
For example, there appears to be no reason why stenographer’s notes related to a taped interrogation that was disclosed to the public safety officer would need to remain confidential from that officer. Here, the City disclosed the tapes and transcribed notes of the initial interrogations to each of the Doe Officers in this case upon request but cautioned that the materials could not be shared among the officers. It is thus conceivable that an investigating agency might deem it necessary to withhold the recordings and stenographer’s notes of other officer interrogations or witness interviews from an officer under investigation during an active investigation to preserve the confidentiality of those discussions. Reports and complaints might also be withheld if disclosure would reveal confidential sources or other sensitive information. If, however, punitive action is contemplated at the conclusion of an investigation, the agency must decide whether to de-designate and disclose any confidential materials to the officer or decline to bring misconduct charges on the basis of those materials. (See Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1280, 1290.)
Even if punitive action is not pursued at the end of an investigation, the designation of material as confidential carries other consequences. Under subdivision (g), “No notes or reports that are deemed to be confidential may be entered in the officer’s personnel file.” This provision suggests that “the employing department may not make adverse personnel decisions concerning the officer based on reports, or the portions thereof, deemed confidential and not made available to the officer.” (Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) Other POBRA provisions support this view.
We are aware that prior cases have found a police officer’s right to view adverse comments under section 3305 broadly applicable, even in the face of an assertion of confidentiality by the investigating agency. (See County of Riverside v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 793; Sacramento Police Officers Assn. v. Venegas (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 916; Seligsohn v. Day (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 518.) These cases are distinguishable because they arose in the context of police officers requesting access to investigative records and complaints under sections 3305 and 3306 after the investigations had ended and no further action was taken. Animating these court decisions was the unfairness in allowing law enforcement agencies to maintain undisclosed allegations in a separate confidential file with potential consequence for future personnel decisionmaking. (See Riverside, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 796-797, 799.)
That is not the situation here. For the confidentiality clause in subsection (g) of section 3303 to apply, an officer must be “under investigation and subjected to interrogation” (
C. Section 3303’s Legislative History Supports This Construction
An examination of section 3303, subdivision (g)’s legislative history further confirms that the Legislature intended for the confidentiality provision to serve as a counterpoint to an agency’s disclosure obligations. Balanced against the public safety officer’s disclosure rights under subdivision (g) is the broad latitude given to an investigating agency to declare otherwise discoverable materials confidential so as to ensure the efficacy and integrity of police misconduct investigations.
As originally introduced on December 19, 1974, then-subdivision (f) of section 3303 provided in relevant part: “The complete interrogation of a public safety officer shall be recorded and there shall be no unrecorded
Opposition to A.B. 301 focused on the bill’s negative impact on internal affairs investigations. (See Rodney J. Blonien, Cal. Peace Officers’ Assn. & Cal. District Attorneys’ Assn. & Cal. State Sheriff’s Assn., letter to Assemblyman Keysor, Apr. 18, 1975 [A.B. 301 “in its present form would significantly hinder law enforcement agencies in conducting internal affairs investigations and citizen complaints against law enforcement officers. The constraints this bill imposes would be detrimental to the protection of society and to the law enforcement profession as a whole.”]; Sen. Democratic Caucus, 3d. Reading File of Assem. Bill 301 (1975-1976 Reg. Session) as amended on June 4, 1975 [noting as arguments in opposition that the bill “inhibits law enforcement agency in ascertaining criminal violations of peace officers” and “may inhibit confidential sources reporting against police [by] allowing rights to any reports made by investigators”].) As the Assembly’s Third Reading Report summarized: “This bill is opposed by most major law enforcement organizations largely because it imposes what many feel are excessive or unrealistic restrictions on law enforcements’ ability to supervise and, when necessary, discipline its members.” (A.B. 301, Assem. 3d Reading Report of bill as amended June 4, 1975.)
The proposed subdivision was then amended in August 1975 to mandate recording of interrogations only “where practical” and to limit disclosures to public safety officers as follows: “The public safety officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports made by investigators, except those which are deemed by the agency to be confidential. No notes or reports which are deemed to be confidential may be entered in the officer’s personnel file.” (A.B. 301, as amended Aug. 25, 1975 at p. 18.) A final amendment in August 1976 made recording of interrogations discretionary and expanded the materials subject to disclosure. As adopted, the subdivision read in relevant part: “The complete interrogation of a public safety officer may be recorded. . . . The public safety officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons, except those which are deemed by the investigating agency to be confidential. No
As the legislative history demonstrates, by granting investigating agencies the authority to withhold confidential materials, the Legislature intended to strike a balance between a police officer’s entitlement to relevant discovery and the agency’s ability to supervise its employees effectively and to safeguard the integrity of its internal investigations. Indeed, even as the Legislature amended A.B. 301 to include the confidentiality provision, it added a further protection for peace officers by forbidding confidential materials to be entered into a personnel file. Thus, under our reading of subdivision (g), the timing of post-interrogation disclosure of notes, complaints, and reports against a peace officer is guided by an investigating agency’s exercise of its discretion to designate certain materials as confidential in furtherance of its investigative objectives and to release nonconfidential materials upon request of the officer under investigation.9
D. Consistency With POBRA
As stated above, we must construe a statute “ ‘with a view to promoting rather than defeating its general purpose and the policy behind it.’ ” (City of Upland, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1303.) We reject a construction of section 3303, subdivision (g), which would automatically require disclosure of reports and complaints “prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time.” (
Indeed, mandating such discovery prior to the subsequent interrogation of an officer could severely hamper the agency’s investigation, and therefore undermine the public’s confidence in the integrity of the law enforcement agency. “Underlying every administrative inquiry into suspected officer misconduct is the obligation of the law enforcement agency to assure public confidence in the integrity of its officers. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether there is any truth to the allegations of misconduct made against an officer and, if so, whether to commence disciplinary proceedings.” (City of Pasadena, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 578.) Granting premature discovery during an investigation could “frustrate the effectiveness” of the investigation, thereby impairing “the reliability of such a determination and the effectiveness of the agency’s efforts to police itself.” (Id. at pp. 578-579.)
For example, disclosures made before a subsequent interrogation “might color the recollection of the person to be questioned or lead that person to conform his or her version of an event to that given by witnesses already questioned.” (Id. at p. 579; see Davis, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1134 [noting preinterrogation disclosure “might hamper the investigation by allowing the officer being investigated to craft answers that fit or explained the evidence”].) In addition, “[d]uring an interrogation, investigators might want to use some of the information they have amassed to aid in eliciting truthful statements from the person they are questioning. Mandatory preinterrogation discovery would deprive investigators of this potentially effective tool.” (City of Pasadena, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 579.) Simply put, disclosing “crucial information about an ongoing investigation” prior to interrogation “would be contrary to sound investigative practices.” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court’s observations in City of Pasadena apply with equal force under the circumstances of this appeal. The CPRA is a civilian
Such concerns are magnified in situations, such as here, where the CPRA disagreed with the Department’s internal investigation and found significant discrepancies in the testimony of the various Doe officers.10 These alleged discrepancies may not have materialized, and other avenues of investigation left undeveloped, had the CPRA been required to disclose the requested materials under the rule announced by the City of Santa Ana court. The Supreme Court’s admonition in City of Pasadena bears repeating: “Nothing can more swiftly destroy the community’s confidence in its police force than its perception that concerns raised about an officer’s honesty or integrity will go unheeded or will lead only to a superficial investigation.” (City of Pasadena, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 568.)
In sum, we conclude that requiring reports and complaints to be provided to a police officer under subdivision (g) of section 3303 “prior to any further interrogation” is inconsistent with the plain language of
Constrained by the City of Santa Ana decision, the trial court below determined that the City was required to provide relevant reports and complaints to the Doe Officers “prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time” (
DISPOSITION
The judgment and writ of mandate are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to fashion new relief consistent with this opinion. City is entitled to its costs on appeal.
SANCHEZ, J.
We concur.
HUMES, P.J.
MARGULIES, J.
(A158662)
Alameda County Superior Court
The Honorable Frank Roesch
Counsel:
Barbara J. Parker, City Attorney, Ryan Richardson, Special Counsel, Jennifer Logue, Supervising City Attorney, Hanson Bridgett, Adam Hofmann for Defendant and Appellant.
Rains, Lucia Stern St Phalle & Silver, Zachery A. Lopes and Timothy Talbot for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, J. Scott Tiedemann, Alex Y. Wong for League of California Cities and Los Angeles County Police Chief’s Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.