¶ 2 After this case was filed but before the trial court ruled on the declaratory judgment, the interest arbitrator issued an award providing that covered employees were required to live within the state of Illinois. However, the award further provided that, in light of this litigation, if the court ultimately held that Illinois law permitted covered employees to reside outside of Illinois, the provision of the award requiring such employees to livе within the state would be null and void. The trial court ultimately granted the declaratory judgment sought by the plaintiffs and ruled that section 10-2.1-6.3(c) of the Municipal Code prohibited residency requirements from being imposed on covered employees who were hired prior to the issuance of the interest arbitrator's award. The trial court thus reversed the interest arbitrator's award requiring in-state residency for covered employees. This appeal followed.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The plaintiffs in this case are the Union and three of its members. The three individual plaintiffs are residents of Indiana, and each of them has been employed by the Village in its fire service for over 20 years. The defendants in this case are the Village, its board of trustees, and various of its officers. For ease of reference, the defendants collectively will be referred to as "the Village."
¶ 5 Since 1981, the Union and the Village have been parties to a series of collective bargaining agreements. None of those collective bargaining agreements has ever included residency requirements for firefighters. As the Union and the Village were negotiating the terms of their 2015-2017 collective bargaining agreement, the Village presented various proposals seeking to add a residency requirement for firefighters. The Union rejected all the Village's proposals. Instead, the Union insisted upon the continuation of the status quo, which was that the сollective bargaining agreement remain silent on the issue and therefore contain no residency requirements.
¶ 6 As the parties were not able to reach an agreement on this and other issues, they proceeded to compulsory interest arbitration as provided by section 14 of the Labor Relations Act. 5 ILCS 315/14 (West 2016). At the outset of those proceedings, the Union disputed that residency requirements were an issue about which it had a duty to bargain. Its position was that the issue of whether residency requirements could be imposed on current employees who were not previously subject to them was a matter specifically provided for by section 10-2.1-6.3(c) of the Municipal Code. 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-6.3(c) (West 2016). The рertinent provision of that statute states, "Residency requirements in effect at the time an individual enters the fire service of a municipality cannot be made more restrictive for that individual during his or her period of service for that municipality, or be made a condition of promotion * * *." Id.
¶ 7 The Village's position was that its residency proposal was an issue about which the Union had a duty to bargain. Its position was that the issue was controlled by section 14(i) of the Labor Relations Act, which provides in pertinent part that, with respect to firefighters, "the arbitration decision shall be limited to wages, hours, and conditions of employment (* * * including residency requirements in municipalities with a population under 1,000,000, but
¶ 8 According to the rules and regulations of the Illinois Labor Relations Board, an interest arbitrator's award is not to consider an issue if one of the parties objects in good faith to the presence of that issue before the arbitrator on the ground that the issue does not involve a subject over which the parties are required to bargain. 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1230.90(k) (2003). However, an exception to that rule exists, whereby the arbitrator has the option to consider an issue to which one party objects if the general counsel of the Illinois Labor Relations Board issues a declaratory ruling that the issue is a subject over which the parties are required to bargain. Id. Thus, after the Union objected that the Village's proposed residency requirement was not a subject over which the parties were required to bargain, the Village filed a unilateral petition to obtain a declaratory ruling from the general counsel of the Illinois Labor Relations Board about whether the Labor Relations Act required the parties to bargain over this issue. 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1200.143(b) (2016).
¶ 9 The general counsel issued a declaratory ruling determining that the Village's proposed residency requirement was a mandatory subject of bargaining. The general counsel concluded the Village's proposed residency requirement would not contravene section 10-2.1-6.3(c) of the Municipal Code. The general counsel interpreted that statute as only prohibiting a municipality from establishing residency requirements that are more restrictive than residency requirements "in effect" at the time an individual enters the fire service. It reasoned that the absence of any residency requirement "cannot reasonably be construed as an affirmative 'requirement' that is 'in effect' under the terms of the Municipal Code." Thus, it concluded that the Village's proposed residency requirement could not be considered more restrictive than any prior residency requirement in effect, as no such requirement had ever existed within the Village. For these reasons, the general counsel determined that the Village's proposed residency requirement did not seek the Union's waiver of statutory rights its members had under the Municipal Code.
¶ 10 The general counsel's declaratory ruling went on to address the Union's proposal to maintain the status quo of silence in the collective bargaining agreement on the issue of residency. It reasoned that contractual silence on the issue would amount to no restriction on residency at аll. It ruled that if the interest arbitrator were to grant the Union's proposal, the arbitration award would effectively be allowing residency outside of Illinois and would therefore contravene section 14(i) of the Labor Relations Act. 5 ILCS 315/14(i) (West 2016).
¶ 11 Pursuant to the general counsel's declaratory ruling that the Village's residency requirement was a subject over which the parties were required to bargain, the issue became one that the interest arbitrator could consider despite the Union's objection. 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1230.90(k) (2003). The parties thus proceeded with the interest arbitration. After the general counsel issued its declaratory ruling and the hearings in the interest arbitration were completed, but before the interest аrbitration award was issued, the
¶ 12 After this case was filed, the interest arbitrator issued his award. It provided that the following language would be incorporated into the parties' collective bargaining agreement:
"1. All Bargaining Unit members are required to live within the State of Illinois.
2. Any Bargaining Unit employee living outside the State of Illinois at the time of the issuance of this Award will have until the end of the contract, December 31, 2017, or any agreed upon extension thereto, to notify the Village of his/her intent to move to the State of Illinois and to provide the time frame for said move to the State of Illinois.
3. This matter is currently being litigated by the parties. In the event that a court of competent jurisdiction issues a final order indicating that the Union's proposal, that is, the status quo, is legal under State of Illinois law, this provision shall be null and void and the status quo shall be immediately reinstated."
In analyzing this issue in his written decision, the interest arbitrator noted that the declaratory ruling of the general counsel of the Illinois Labor Relations Board had specifically provided that granting the Union's proposal would еffectively contravene the prohibition in section 14(i) of the Labor Relations Act that an arbitration decision "may include residency requirements * * * but those residency requirements shall not allow residency outside of Illinois." 5 ILCS 315/14(i) (West 2016). The arbitrator found that the general counsel's declaratory ruling constituted "a definitive statement on the interpretation of the [Labor Relations] Act," which was the statute from which he derived his authority to issue his arbitration award. He further stated that whether the Municipal Code superseded the Labor Relations Act on the issue of residency requirements was "a question for the courts, where litigation is currently pending," and not an issue for him to determine as an interest arbitrator. He stated that he found he had "no choice but to impose an Illinois residency requirement," due to the language of section 14(i) of the Labor Relations Act and the general counsel's declaratory ruling.
¶ 13 Following the issuance of the arbitration award, the plaintiffs amended their complaint in the trial court to add a second count for review of the arbitrator's order under section 14(k) of the Labor Relations Act. Id. § 14(k). In summary, the plaintiffs alleged in that second count that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by issuing the portion of the arbitration award that imposed a residency requirement on them because they had a statutory right under section 10-2.1-6.3(c) of the Municipal Code to be free from residenсy requirements that were more restrictive than those that had been in effect when they were hired by the Village.
¶ 14 Both parties had filed dispositive motions on the original complaint, which they agreed would stand as to the amended complaint. The Village had filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016). The plaintiffs had filed a motion for summary judgment. Id. § 2-1005(a). Both parties also filed supplemental briefs arguing for ruling in their favor concerning the trial court's review of the arbitrator's award. 5 ILCS 315/14(k) (West 2016).
¶ 16 ANALYSIS
¶ 17 This appeal arises from a trial court's entry of summary judgment. Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgmеnt as a matter of law.
Village of Bartonville v. Lopez
,
¶ 18 When presented with issues of statutory interpretation, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.
Better Government Ass'n v. Illinois High School Ass'n
,
¶ 19 On appeal, the Village argues that the provisions of the Labor Relations Act control the outcome of this case because the case arises out of interest arbitration proceedings that are exclusively governed by the Labor Relations Act. The Village relies principally on section 14(i) of the Labor Relations Act, which addresses the topics to which an interest arbitration decision "shall be limited," includes residency requirements among that list of topics, and specifically prohibits an arbitration decision that allows residency outside of Illinois. The text of the pertinent portion of section 14(i) upon which the Village relies states:
"In the case of fire fighter, and fire department or fire district paramedic matters, the arbitration decision shall be limited to wages, hours, and conditions of employment (including manning and also including residency requirements in municipalities with a population under 1,000,000, but those residency requirements shall not allow residency outsideof Illinois) * * *." 5 ILCS 315/14(i) (West 2016).
The Village argues that the plain language of section 14(i) prohibits the arbitrator from issuing a decision accepting the Union's status quo proposal that the collective bargaining agreement would be silent on the issue of residency requirements because in effect this would be an arbitration decision allowing residency outside Illinois for covered employees. The Village argues that the interest arbitrator correctly recognized this fact and properly issued an arbitration award that disallowed residency outside Illinois.
¶ 20 The Village argues that section 10-2.1-6.3(c) of the Municipal Code ( 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-6.3(c) (West 2016) ) should not be part of the appropriate analysis. It points out that section 15 of the Labor Relations Act provides in part, "In case of any conflict between the provisiоns of this Act and any other law * * * relating to wages, hours and conditions of employment and employment relations, the provisions of this Act or any collective bargaining agreement negotiated thereunder shall prevail and control." 5 ILCS 315/15(a) (West 2016). It further cites a provision of section 7 of the Labor Relations Act, which provides, "If any other law pertains, in part, to a matter affecting the wages, hours and other conditions of employment, such other law shall not be construed as limiting the duty 'to bargain collectively' and to enter into collective bargaining agreements containing clauses which either supplement, implement, or relate to the effect of such provisions in other laws."
¶ 21 For their part, the plaintiffs also rely on section 7 of the Labor Relations Act ( 5 ILCS 315/7 (West 2016) ), although they argue that a different provision of that section should be the starting point for the analysis in this case. They argue that the analysis starts not with the topics that an interest arbitration decision could include but with what duty they had to bargain collectively about the topic in the first instance. Section 7 addresses the duty that a public employer and the labor organization representing its emрloyees have to bargain collectively.
¶ 22 We agree with the position taken by the plaintiffs. It is evident that section 7 of the Labor Relations Act contemplates that there will be "matter[s] with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment" that are "specifically provided for in * * * other law[s]," and the duty to bargain collectively does not include the
¶ 23 The Village argues on appeal that section 10-2.1-6.3(с) of the Municipal Code should not come into play in this instance because it had no residency requirement "in effect" as required by that statute and because, regardless of the statute, it has the authority as a home rule unit to impose a residency requirement on current employees. We will address the Village's argument concerning its home rule authority first.
¶ 24 Except as limited by the provisions of section 6 of article VII of the Illinois Constitution, home rule units such as the Village "may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; tо tax; and to incur debt." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6 (a). Our supreme court has described this provision as giving home rule units "the broadest powers possible."
Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass'n
,
¶ 25 It is undisputed in this case that section 10-2.1-6.3 of the Municipal Code contains an express and specific statement limiting the authority of home rule units, at least to some extent. The parties dispute the extent to which the legislature sought to displace home rule authority with respect to imposing more restrictive residency requirements on current employees of a municipality's fire service than those in place when the employee was hired. The Village argues that the placement of the home rule restriction in subsection (a) of the statute, as opposed to in subsection (c) or at the end of the statute, indicates a legislative intent to displace home rule authority only with regard to the firefighter hiring process and not with regard to a home rule unit's power to establish the terms and conditions of employment (including residency) for its current employees. The plaintiffs, by contrast,
¶ 26 Subsection (a) of section 10-2.1-6.3 of the Municipal Code contains five paragraphs of provisions concerning the applicability of the statute. 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-6.3(a) (West 2016). Among the provisions that we find most pertinent to our analysis of this issue are the following:
"Unless a commission elects to follow the provisions of Section 10-2.1-6.4, this Section shall apply to all original appointments to an affected full-time fire department. * * *
Notwithstanding any statute, ordinance, rule, or other law to the contrary, all original appointments to an affected department to which this Section applies shall be administered in the manner provided for in this Section. * * *
A home rule or non-home rule municipality may not administer its fire department process for original appointments in a manner that is less stringent than this Section. This Section is a limitation under subsection (i) of Section 6 of Article VII of thе Illinois Constitution on the concurrent exercise by home rule units of the powers and functions exercised by the State.
* * *
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection (a), this Section does not apply to a municipality with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants."Id.
Other provisions of subsection (a) beyond those set forth above include provisions addressing how the statute applies in relation to other laws addressing the initial hiring of firefighters, and how it applies to municipalities operating under court orders or consent decrees concerning original appointments to a full-time fire department.
¶ 27 Considering the entire statute in context, we conclude that the legislature intended in section 10-2.1-6.3 to deny home rule units the authоrity to impose residency restrictions on current employees of its fire service that are more restrictive than those in effect at the time the employee began his or her service with the municipality. We disagree with the Village that the legislature's placement of the language limiting home rule in subsection (a) indicates a legislative intent that it not extend to the authority of a home rule unit to impose more restrictive residency restrictions on current employees. Subsection (a) contains numerous provisions addressing the scope and applicability of the statute as a whole, and thus it would seem to be the logical place within the statute at which to include language limiting homе rule powers. Significantly, the plain language used by the legislature is that "[t]his Section" is a limitation on the exercise by home rule units of the powers and functions exercised by the State. This indicates to us that the legislature did not intend to limit its displacement of home rule authority to some parts of the statute but not others. Where the legislature has intended in the Municipal Code to limit the displacement of home rule authority to only part of a statute, it is evident that it knows how to do so. See, e.g. , 65 ILCS 5/11-13-26(b), 11-124-1(d) (West 2016).
¶ 28 We do not discern any legislative intent to displace home rule authority only with regard to the firefighter hiring process, such that it would not extend to the provision at issue. Rather, viewing the statute as a whole and considering all of its рrovisions in context, we conclude that the legislature intended that the provision at
¶ 29 The Village cites the sentence immediately preceding the one limiting home rule authority to argue that the legislature only intended to preempt a home rule unit from administering its fire department process for original appointments in a manner that is "less stringent" than section 10-2.1-6.3.
¶ 30 As stated above, the Village also argues that section 10-2.1-6.3(c) of the Municipal Code should not come into play in this situation because it had never had any residency requirement "in effect." It notes that the statute only prohibits "[r]esidency requirements in effect at the time an individual enters the fire service of a municipality" from being made more restrictive for that individual during his or her time of service for that municipality.
¶ 31 Viewing the statute as a whole and construing this phrase in context with the statute's other provisions, we observe that the paragraph preceding the one relied upon by the Village contains a provision that provides context for what is meant by the phrase "[r]esidency requirements in effect at the time an individual enters the fire service of a municipality." That provision in the preceding paragraph states:
"[A]ll applicants for original appointment to an affected fire department shall be subject to examination and testing which shall be public, cоmpetitive, and open to all applicants unless the municipality shall by ordinance limit applicants to residents of the municipality, county or counties in which the municipality is located, State, or nation."Id.
It appears to us that this is what the legislature was referring back to when, in the subsequent paragraph, it used the phrase "[r]esidency requirements in effect at the time an individual enters the fire service of a municipality." In this provision of section 10-2.1-6.3(c) of the Municipal Code, the legislature established a default rule whereby a municipality's examination and testing for original appointment to a fire department would be "open to all applicants" regardless of their residency. It then provided that a municipality could elect not to have this default rule apply, if the municipality enacted an ordinance limiting applicants to those who were residents
¶ 32 Given our conclusion that section 10-2.1-6.3(c) of the Municipal Code applies and the Union had no duty under section 7 of the Labor Relations Act to collectively bargain over this issue in the first instance, we disagree with the Village's argument that this case is controlled by the provision of section 14(i) of the Labor Relations Act prohibiting an arbitration decision allowing residency outside of Illinois. 5 ILCS 315/14(i) (West 2016). Because this was not an issue over which the parties were required to bargain in the first instance, it was not an issue that should have been considered by the interest arbitrator. 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1230.90(k) (2003). In other words, section 14(i) of the Labor Relations Act cannot control this case because there never should have been an arbitration decision addressing the proposed residency requirements in the first place. As residency requirements were not an issue that should have been included in the decision at all, the decision would not be one "including residency requirements * * * [that] allow residency outside of Illinois." 5 ILCS 315/14(i) (West 2016).
¶ 33 The only reason the interest arbitrator was able to address residency requirements was because the general cоunsel of the Illinois Labor Relations Board issued a declaratory ruling concluding that the Village's proposed residency requirement would not contravene section 10-2.1-6.3(c) of the Municipal Code as the Village had no residency requirement "in effect" at the time any of its firefighters were hired. 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1200.143(b) (2016); 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1230.90(k) (2003). While the general counsel's declaratory ruling is not at issue in this appeal, nevertheless it is obviously inconsistent with our conclusion above. The fact that the interest arbitrator was able to consider the issue based on an interpretation of the Municipal Code that we have found to be incorrect is not a basis for concluding that section 14(i) of the Labor Relations Act therefore controls the outcome of this case.
¶ 34 The Village next argues that the trial court erred in reversing the decision of the interest arbitrator under section 14(k) of the Labor Relations Act. 5 ILCS 315/14(k) (West 2016). That section provides that an arbitrator's order is reviewable by the circuit court but only for reasons that (1) the arbitrator was without or exceeded his or her statutory authority, (2) the order is arbitrary or capricious, or (3) the order was procured by fraud, collusion, or other similar and unlawful means.
¶ 35 The Village's arguments on this issue largely mirror what it argued in opposition to the declaratory judgment sought by the plaintiffs. In summary, the Village argues that the arbitrator acted within his authority in considering this issue under section 14(i) of the Labor Relаtions Act, based on the general counsel's declaratory ruling. Consistent with its arguments discussed above, the Village argues that the arbitrator's award was proper and appropriate
¶ 36 In
City of Markham
,
¶ 37 The same result is warranted in this case. As discussed above, the Union did not have a duty under section 7 of the Labor Relations Act to collectively bargain over the issue of residency requirements for current employees of the Village's fire service because it involved a matter specifically provided for in the Municipal Code. Thus, as in City of Markham , we hold that the interest arbitrator lacked the authority to issue an interest award that ignored the limitations imposed by section 7 of the Labor Relations Act and forced a waiver of the plaintiffs' statutory rights to be free from residency restrictions during their period of service with the Village. For this reason we further hold that the provision of the interest arbitration award providing for this is invalid as a matter of law. We find no error in the trial court's ruling reversing the arbitrator's award imposing residency restrictions on current employees.
¶ 38 CONCLUSION
¶ 39 In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the Village and its issuance of the declaratory judgment. We further affirm the trial court's order reversing the arbitrator's award concerning residency.
¶ 40 Affirmed.
Presiding Justice Cobbs and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment and opinion.