O'Kelley-Eccles Co. v. State of Cal.O'Kelley-Eccles Co. v. State of Cal.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Van Dyke
This is an appeal from a judgment denying recovery of taxes paid under protest. Appellant is a retailer within the meaning of the Sales and Use Tax Law and made retail sales in this state subject to sales taxes. It claimed that by virtue of its methods of doing business a part of its receipts which constituted charges for the delivery of items sold should be excluded from the computation of gross receipts from sales.
Appellant’s methods of doing business which are pertinent here may be stated as follows: Appellant manufactures and sells concrete building blocks at “FOB Plant” prices. If delivery is made by appellant to a place designated by the buyer a specific delivery charge is made in addition to the “FOB Plant” price. About half of the blocks sold by appellant are so delivered. Appellant’s price schedules set forth prices “FOB Plant” for various sizes and styles of blocks and separately stated set forth the charges for delivery within a radius of 30 miles. Appellant grants discounts from its published “FOB Plant” prices favoring customers such as contractors who buy large quantities, but discounts are not given on that part of the total cost to the customer which constitutes the delivery charge. In paying its sales taxes, appellant deducted from the gross amount received from sales the amounts received for delivery. Respondents reassessed and demanded payment of the tax upon the excluded amounts. Appellant paid under protest.
Conceding, as it must, that these findings support the judgment, appellant attacks the findings upon the ground that the evidence does not support them.
Section 6012 defines gross receipts and provides for certain exclusions. The term “gross receipts” means the total amount of the sale price of the retail sales of retailers without deduction for the cost of the property sold or of the materials used, labor or service cost, interest paid, losses or any other expense and without deduction for the cost of transportation of the property prior to its sale to the purchaser. The total amount of the sale includes any services that are a part of the sale and all receipts, cash, credits and property of any kind. “Gross receipts” do not include “transportation charges” separately stated if the transportation occurs after the sale of the property is made to the purchaser. It was recognized by the parties hereto that the decision in this case must turn upon the question of when title passed in those instances of sale involved in the action. Appellant contends that the evidence conclusively proved that its only receipts from sales were made up from its FOB Plant prices; that its receipts from transportation formed no part of its sales receipts and were charges for transportation made after title had passed to the buyer, and that title passed at the moment the blocks were physically placed on board its trucks at the plant.
Appellant sought by testimony of its president and of some of its employees to show that title passed when the blocks were placed on its trucks for delivery to buyers by showing its general sales procedures. Thus its office manager and expediter, a Miss Frederickson, testified as follows: “A. I take the order, and if they want a price quoted I quote them a price f.o.b. plant. Then I ask them if they want the order picked up at our plant or delivered. If they want it delivered, then I quote them a delivered price. Q. Do you break down the price, so much for your f.o.b. plant and so much for delivery and total? A. Absolutely, yes. Q. Is that a standard procedure of O ’Kelley-Eceles ? A. It always has been, yes. Our price list shows the unit price f.o.b. plant and in addition to that the delivery charge separate.” Appellant sent its price sheets to those customers wtio bought m quantity and where customers came to the plant. The price sheets displayed were explained. Said Mr. Chaffee, the president of appellant: “One thing we have
The cardinal factor, according to the Uniform Sales Act, upon which the passing of title between a seller and a buyer depends, is the intention of the parties. The parties to a contract of sale may expressly stipulate as to when title shall pass and such a provision is ordinarily given full effect as between the parties, but since the parties do not always stipulate in such respect the courts have adopted, and the Uniform Sales Act has provided, certain rules for determining the intention of the parties. (46 Am.Jur., Sales, § 413.) We think the court was fully justified, under the evidence, in concluding that the contract between the parties in fact east upon the appellant an obligation to deliver the goods at the point designated by the customer, and that, therefore, the question of the intent of the parties as to the time and place where title should pass was governed by section 1739 of the Civil Code, rule 5, reading as follows:
“If the contract to sell requires the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer, or at a particular place, . . . the property does not pass until the goods have been delivered to the buyer or reached the place agreed upon.”
Appellant contends that the court erred in granting respondent’s motions to strike certain testimony offered by appellant. Appellant does not so much attack the rulings of the court on the merits as it does upon a claim that the
Appellant contends that respondent was estopped from collecting the taxes in dispute here by reason of certain conduct of respondent’s agents responsible for the administration of the Motor Vehicle Transportation License Tax Act. Appellant’s president testified that in adopting a policy for sales it was decided to sell FOB plant and then charge a fee for delivering to those who wanted the blocks delivered;
No other points require discussion.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Peek, J., and Sehottky, J., concurred.