O'Dowd v. NewnhamO'Dowd v. Newnham
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Bussell
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
Since we are convinced, after a painstaking investigation of the ■record, considered in the light of decisions of courts of last resort in many of our sister States, that the verdict was supported by the evidence and that there was no material error in any of the instructions of the court to which exception is taken, nor in the refusal of the court to give the instructions which were requested, we might dispose of the case by a simple affirmance of the judgment refusing a new trial. However, the points insisted upon by learned counsel for the plaintiff in error are so ingeniously and earnestly urged that they deserve more than a passing notice. Furthermore, the largely increasing use of automobiles, and the fact that the relative duties of automobilists and pedestrians, under a *225state of facts similar to those here presented, has not been the subject of direct adjudication in this State, makes imperative, even more than ordinarily, the duty imposed upon us by law of deciding each question involved in the case before us. Civil Code, § 6197.
*227’ Instances are almost a matter of daily occurrence where apparently the drivers of automobiles operate their machines as if they have been granted a right of way over the public highways and as if it is nothing more than the duty of the pedestrian to yield precedence to the automobile, and to stop and wait until the automobile has passed before attempting to proceed in crossing a street or otherwise using the highway. If there is anything in the argument of priority, man was created before the automobile, and, to paraphrase a quotation from Holy Writ, man was not created for the automobile, but the automobile was created for man. Generally the natural instinct of self-preservation will inspire in the pedestrian a due degree of caution for his own safety, when he is aware of the approach of an automobile; and this the law will require him to exercise. Sometimes the circumstances surrounding the approach of one of these vehicles of ponderous proportions inspires a terror which paralyzes the power of locomotion on the part of the traveler on foot, especially if he be a child of tender years. In such a ease the dangerous character of the instrumentality which the driver of an automobile is operating forbids the assertion that he has exercised even ordinary diligence, unless he has used every possible means to avoid injury to the pedestrian. On account of the ease with which injury can result from the slightest negligence or inattention in the operation of his machine, ordinary diligence requires that the driver of an automobile be constantly on the lookout, and that he have his machine in such condition as that it shall be under his perfect control. -The pedestrian also is required to be on the lookout, but he has the right to assume that the drivers of all automobiles are on the lookout for him too; and if he is properly upon the public highway, which he is entitled to use equally with them, he has the right to assume that they are both willing and able to regard his rights. While, therefore, the law requires that a pedestrian and the driver of an automobile shall each anticipate the presence of the other upon the public highways, and that neither shall do any act likely to jeopardize the safety of the other, still, on account of the great disparity in their respective capacities to inflict injury, the exercise of ordinary diligence on the part of the pedestrian to look out for automobiles does not necessarily require as continuous caution as is. requisite to enable an automobilist to fulfil the definition of “ordinary diligence,” as *228applied to one having in his charge a dangerous and death-dealing instrumentality. “The degree of care one must use always bears a direct ratio to the degree of injury which would probably be caused by negligence.” Weil v. Kreutzer, supra. For this reason the courts have uniformly held that one who is operating an automobile upon the streets of a city must keep a constant lookout in anticipation of pedestrians, but that a pedestrian is not bound to be continually looking and listening to ascertain if auto-cars are approaching, under penalty that if he fails to do this and is injured, it must be presumed from this fact alone that he was negligent. Weil v. Kreutzer, supra; Thies v. Thomas, 77 N. Y. Supp. 276; Bradley v. Jaeckel, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1071; Gregory v. Slaughter, 124 Ky. 345 (99 S. W. 247, 124 Am. St. R. 402); Irwin v. Judge, 81 Conn. 492 (71 Atl. 572); Towle v. Morse, 103 Me. 250 (68 Atl. 1044); Simeone v. Lindsay (Del.), 65 Atl. 778; Hannigan v. Wright, 5 Pennew. (Del.), 63 Atl. 236; McFern v. Gardner, 121 Mo. App. 1, 19; Hennesey v. Taylor, 189 Mass. 583 (76 N. E. 224, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 345); Tiffany v. Drummond, 168 Fed. 47; 14 Am. Dig., Decennial Edition, 1787 et seq.; Huddy on Automobiles, §§ 47, 95, et seq.; Babbitt on Motor Vehicles, §§ 244, 268, et seq.
It may be conceded that the case might be different if O’Dowd and Newnham had both been pedestrians, or if both had been operating automobiles. In such a ease the consideration as to whether each of them exercised diligence, or whether one of them was negligent, or whether both were negligent, would have been governed by the same principles. But considering the facts of the present record in the light of the principles to which we have heretofore referred, there can be no question that Newnham was not negligent, and the jury were authorized to say that the driver of O’Dowd’s automobile was negligent. This took away from O’Dowd the possibility of defending upon the first kind of contributory negligence, and submitted to the jury only the issue as to whether O’Dowd’s ear was operated in such a manner as that the fatality which overtook Newnham could be properly adjudged to have been an unavoidable accident. Newnham was a pedestrian; he had a perfect right to cross the street at right angles, or diagonally. It *231is true that he was running to catch a street-ear, but a pedestrian has as much right to run upon the public street as to walk, provided that in running he uses due care for the safety of others. He was required also to use ordinary care for his own safety, but there is no evidence that his safety was endangered by any other vehicle of any description while running to catch the street-car. It must be presumed that he saw O’Dowd’s automobile, because there was no obstruction to prevent his seeing it. If he saw it, he had the right to assume that the driver of the automobile, in the exercise of due caution and keeping a lookout, saw him; and he had the right to assume, since he saw the. automobile traveling upon the north driveway, that it would not be suddenly turned before reaching the crossing, so as to cut off his progress or so as to come into collision with him. There is no theory that can be drawn from the evidence under which negligence can be attributed to Newnham, unless we concede that the rights of an automobilist upon public highways are superior to those of pedestrians, and that, on account of the greater weight and power of the automobile, the automobilist can force a pedestrian, whom he sees lawfully using the streets, to turn from his course and stop, or flee, at his (the automobilist’s) pleasure. The judge would not have erred if, under the facts of this case, he had wholly omitted any reference to contributory negligence. Generally, where these defenses are relied upon, and always where there is evidence in support of both defenses, a trial judge should give the jury proper instructions both as to contributory negligence and the duty of the plaintiff (or the party alleged to have been injured) to use ordinary care to avoid injury; because the terms “contributory negligence” and “the failure to use ordinary care to avoid injury” are not synonymous. •But proof that a party used ordinary care to avoid injury, or that the party inflicting the injury was guilty of such gross negligence as that the injury to the other party could not have been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, may entirely negative the existence of ‘contributory negligence.