*1 O’DONNELL, ADMINISTRATRIX, v. ELGIN,
JOLIET & EASTERN CO. RAILWAY Argued No. 56. October 1949. Decided December 1949. *2 a brief for Ryan cause and filed Joseph argued D. the petitioner. a and filed brief argued the cause
Harlan L. Hackbert respondent. opinion the the delivered Mr. Justice Jackson Court. Employers’ Federal brought was under the
This action complaint 51-60. The Liability Act, §§ S. C. charges action cause of single in a count or mingled defendant specific charge and a that general negligently” and violated the “carelessly with operating equipped car by U. C. Act, plaintiff against found coupler. prescribed Court of affirmed for defendant was judgment must if the This result stand F. 2d 973. Appeals. to Court of as which the properly instructed, jury was divided. Appeals here and petitioner
O’Donnell, whose administratrix is while unwitnessed death met an plaintiff below, was its switch- yards as a member of defendant’s working adjust seen, was to going last he ing When crew. previously had failed on cars which couplers certain Shortly departure, his by impact. after couple broke loose breaking coupler, two cars result switching in a moved being cars that was from a cut of operation. free, they with Running collided other stand- ing against couplers cars and drove them those whose had said going adjust. decedent he was Some time body later was mangled lying decedent’s found across one rail had of the track on which the cars he intended to prepare for coupling gone had stood. That he had be- adjust couplers suggested tween them to is they fact coupled impact colliding that with the cars, though they previously had failed so to do. Peti- tioner’s all contention, proved, the circumstances proximately O’Donnell’s death caused by the breaking coupler, permitted the two cars run free, strike the standing cars, and unexpected cause movement the cars between which O’Donnell was engaged. Respondent they contends that indicate in- *3 stead that death independent resulted a later and on movement the track when runaway the cars were hauled place out —an which took event before discovery of body decedent’s but after the of collision the two sets of cars. We need not resolve the between conflict these competing theories of causation, for that decision was jury. Co., the Ellis v. Union R. 329 U. S. Pacific 649, 653.
Our concern is with the effect accorded the trial court’s instructions to the breaking coupler. The issue was defined Appeals: the Court of “The record is devoid of any request by plaintiff the jury that be instructed that they might infer negligence from the the breaking coupler, of but in the plaintiff District Court contended for and tendered instructions the theory that breaking coupler a the itself was negli- gence per se. The court refused to so 171 F. instruct.” 2d at 976. The Appeals, Court of with one dissent, sus- tained refusal charge, so to saying, “We do not believe required the Act defendant furnish couplers that would think the break. We true that rule where cou-
387 think reasonable pier jury may, they does the if break, coupler circumstances, under all infer that the used in defective and was furnished and violation no than hold that from go Act. cases further jury may negligence.” breaking coupler infer to con- appears As this view the we jurisdictions,1 flict with rule laid down other 337 S. 929. granted certiorari. Safety Appliance reading
A
and literal
close
only
that
functions
Act,
2,2 suggests
45
C.
two
U. S.
automatically
required
couplers:
they couple
are
they uncouple
requiring men
by impact and that
without
ends of the cars. This construction
go
between the
g., St. Louis
support
See,
finds
decisions.
e.
some
Conarty,
243, 250;
R. Co. v.
238 U. S.
& San Francisco
Q.
States,
559,
R.
220 U. S.
Chicago, B. &
Co. v. United
243 U.
Layton,
R. Co. v.
571; Louisville & Nashville
Co.,
1,
v. Southern
196 U. S.
18.
617; Johnson
Pacific
Co.,
122,
F.
also
States v. Southern R.
135
See
United
R. Co.
(S.
1905); Chesapeake
127
& Ohio
v.
Ill.,
D.
Charlton,
M.,
(C.
Chicago,
34,
Cir., 1917);
F.
40
A. 4th
(C.
Cir.,
Eisenhart,
A. 3d
Philadelphia
R. R. Co. v.
388 Linehan, St. P. P. (C. & R. Co. v. 66 F. 2d A. 8th 373, 377 Cir., 1933); Co., 2d Chicago Penn v. & N. W. R. 163 F. 995, 1947). 997 A. (C. Cir., 7th at other held, however,
Courts
times have
that failure
couplers
coupled
to remain
until released constitutes
or evidences a violation of
failure
just
the Act
as does their
couple upon impact
uncouple
or
from the sides of cars.
As stated
Appeals,
Circuit,
the Court of
Second
the Act
“is also aimed at
will
insuring couplers that
hold to-
gether.”
Railroads,
Keenan v. Director General
285
286,
(C.
1922);
F.
A. 2d
R. R.
Cir.,
Philadelphia &
Co.
Eisenhart,
(C.
v.
Cir., 1922);
F.
A. 3d
R. Co.
Erie
Caldwell,
v.
(C.
Cir., 1920);
F. 947
A. 6th
Southern
Thomas,
Co. v.
389 even hazards greater while disengagement ignoring a coupling per- from which can result the failure until stay coupled main function, form its is to released. requires cou- hold that
We plers effected, a will remain which, coupling after secure coupled purposeful until some act of control. free set jury then a be instructed is conse-
What should perform? quence couplers that so provide failure it must lia- Should the be instructed that find injuries bility liability find merely resulting the failure? proximately case, as well arguments and instructions opinions many and texts others, language and the widespread confusion as the effect to be ac reflect 3 appliance safety federal statute. corded a violation diversity of this confusion is traceable to the Part judicial opinion concerning consequences attributed actions to violation of statute.4 Wagner, 476; g., & A. P. R. Co. v. 241 U.
3 E.
San Antonio
S.
Gotschall,
66;
244
Minneapolis
S.
Southern
& St. Louis
Co.
361,
270;
Thomas,
355,
268,
21
P.
Western &
Pac.
Ariz.
188
Co.
Gentle,
282,
257; Vigor v.
App.
198 E.
R. Co. v.
Ga.
Atlantic
58
Roberts,
2
865,
2d
also
Chesapeake & R.
F.
869. See
O.
101
789,
(2d
620,
seq.,
et
790
ed.
Carriers,
655
Liabilities of
Federal
§§
(rev.
1941);
Negligence,
ed.
183
1929); 2
Redfield on
Shearman
§
&
Acts,
Safety Appliance
Employers’ Liability and
Thornton, Federal
Liability,
Richey’s
Employers’
302,
(3d
1916);
Federal
289,
ed.
§§
(2d
Acts,
217,
Safety Appliance,
Hours of Service
and
§§
1916).
ed.
cases, see
general problem and illustrative
For discussions
Bohlen,
Torts,
78;
on
Cases
39; Harper, Law
Torts,
on
Prosser
§
Negli
on
(3d
1930); 1
& Redfield
ed.
Shearman
Torts, pp. 187-204
Torts,
Law
1941); (rev.
ed.
Restatement
gence, §§
Action,
L.
27 Harv.
Wrong
Private
Thayer, Public
§§ 286-288;
Legislation,
Liability
Criminal
317; Lowndes, Civil
Created
Rev.
L. Rev. 361.
Minn.
*6
will be
jurisdictions
in various
Breach of certain statutes
weighed
to be
negligence,
as some evidence of
regarded
Michigan
Hayes v.
by
with the facts.
along
Co.,
R. Co.
228, 240;
S.
Union
Central
U.
Pacific
McDonald,
262,
v.
283. At other times
U. S.
“prima
a
be
places,
statutes,
or under other
violation
which
“presumptive”
negligence
facie” or
evidence of
Hunt,
g.,E. Voiles v.
defendant must meet or overcome.
talk of
1234,
Iowa
But
Court
all issues of
early
this
Safety Appliance
out
cases under the
Act. For rea-
length
books,
sons set forth at
in our
the Court held
equipment
perform
required by
that a failure of
as
Safety Appliance
wrong,
is in itself an
actionable
way dependent upon
proxi-
negligence
no
and for the
liability
mate
liability
results of which there is
—a
escaped
proof
cannot be
diligence.
of care or
St.
Louis,
Taylor,
I. M. & S. R. Co.
281, 294;
210 U. S.
Q.
Chicago,
States,
B.
supra,
& R.
v. United
575-577;
Co.
v. St.
& F. R.
Delk
Louis
In a later the contention this of the evi- ipsa loquitur, rule of res maxim law of the trial in some cases. The applicable dence coupler charged breaking had that from the the court the which was instruction jury might negligence, the infer by plaintiff. The railroad requested had been opinion This in an an- Court, this opposed instruction. Liability Act, C. Employers’ 1 of the Federal Section by . . shall “Every railroad . 51, provides common carrier injury resulting in whole damages or death in for such be liable ... its any insufficiency, due to part or in ... reason defect Horton, Air Line R. Co. v. Seaboard negligence ....’’ And see 492, 501-502. 233 U. S. upheld charge against this
ticipatory one, verdict, plaintiff had objection. Since the recovered this in found no occasion to consider Court, affirming, a more entitled to plaintiff whether the would have been rail- negativing the charge. opinion favorable But the liability objection as with the absolute road’s inconsistent a holding in imposed by appears the Act the headnote “that, Safety Appliance Act, negligence view of the might opening couplers.” be inferred the mere Gotschall, Minneapolis supra. & St. Louis R. Co. Thus vocabulary negligence, appropriated non-negli- to gence uses, thought. comes dominate the no rules longer pleading, We insist technical will in a jury segregate but it ever be difficult trial separate issues do pleading, which counsel not their preparation or think thinking. unfortunately We part is in prolonged litigation course no small due to the to heed failure the admonition well stated Appeals the Court of in a Seventh Circuit similar course, proper plead case: “Of it is not different the- paragraph, ories the same but it is necessarily especially adversary objection.” fatal when the no makes Vigor Chesapeake & Ohio R. 101 F. 2d (1939). Pleadings will serve purpose sharpening *8 and if limiting only the issues claims based on negligence are separately set forth from those based on violation of appliance the acts.6
6This, all, (b), after the is command of Rule 10 Federal Rules of Procedure, provides: Civil “All averments of claim or defense paragraphs, shall be made in numbered the contents of of each which practicable single shall be limited as far as to a statement of a of set circumstances . . .” . Moore, discussing Professor in this Rule with reference to claims grounds, statutory “Sepa- based both common law and states: by way required; separate paragraph- rate of is not statement counts setting grounds ing in in is out the the above actions desirable and (2d 1948). required.” Practice, 2 Moore’s Federal 2006-2007 ed. stand, matter how are allowed to pleadings But no the intelligible to an indispensable we is think almost of two kinds separation to the that clear the charge impressed. and trial court actions be observed The aas indiscriminately in whole this case submitted the regarded be as revers- hardly case. This negligence for and the case error, pleaded ible both counsel tried in requests were stated terms entirely such and their negligence. scrambling law of But the of the claims the admit- much evidence be this case illustrates how that, and ted, considered on issues submitted in case repeated holdings, under our would be immaterial Acts. Safety violation the lia- add the plaintiff, example, nothing The can from a by producing incurred violation the Act bility and, negligence. there was affirmative evidence Here there find, testimony far can uncontradicted that so as we in- coupler,” inside of “a fracture on the partial coupler by an old defect. was weakened dicating that might have been important this evidence However nothing it added determining negligence, common law made Appliance Act under the direct case breaking coupler. showing switching that defendant stressed evidence an concurrently with emer- coupler operation the broke on the be material might evidence gency stop. Such certainly requires But question negligence. all and strain that will withstand stress equipment starts, and loadings, stops grades, ordinary operation, escape A stops. defendant cannot including emergency that too coupler’s by showing inadequacy liability for while the by showing nor that it, demanded of much was dili- properly manufactured, it had coupler been broke These no visible defects. gently inspected showed but, of negligence; go question do to the circumstances away its negligence, a railroad should explain if even *9 not enough explain liability to if it vio- its has away lated Act.7
Criticism is petitioner’s requests charge that made sufficiently specific. were not they That were somewhat in general negli- statement and were cast of a terms gence case is true. But of Appeals the Court found these requests sufficiently specific pertinent and to the issues present question which it And in decided. decid- ing question this way did, it it fallen we believe has into error. charge We no examination of make inso- far as it general related to the issue of negligence. As to the claim Safety Appliance Act, based on the we hold plaintiff that the was a peremptory entitled to instruction equip that a coupler car with which broke switching operation a violation Act, rendered for injuries defendant liable proximately result- ing therefrom, and that neither evidence of nor of diligence and care was to be considered on the question liability.
Reversed. Douglas Frankfurter, Me. Justice Mr. Justice and Mr. Justice Minton part took no the consideration or decision of this case. Burton, Justice with whom Mr. Justice Reed
Mr. concurs, dissenting. agree
We do not the Safety Appliance Acts con- tain a mandatory requirement that cars used in moving say We do not effectively that a railroad never defend under by showing adequate coupler that an failed to hold because through intervening was broken or released independent causes inadequacy defectiveness; other such, than its example, as the work of necessary a saboteur. And we do find it to consider adequate coupler a situation where an failed to hold because it was improperly set, since such facts are not before us.
395 couplers with equipped must be traffic interstate purposeful free some until set coupled “will remain legislated, so Congress might have act of control.” equipped to be required which cars it did in the section Myers . . See brakes; hand . .”2 with “efficient do it did not Co., However, U. S. 477. Reading of this phase on this judge, trial Accordingly, so. omitting any instruction to justified in case, was with equipped if railroad used car that, jury thereby switching operation, in the coupler that broke Appliance Acts. violated at the broken separating of the cars view, In our evidence treated as material coupler properly was had violated infer that the railroad jury which the could “not against using cars of the Acts prohibition impact, automatically by couplers coupling with equipped men uncoupled necessity without the can be 3 Vigor cars.” v. Chesa- ends of the between the going Co., Cf. 101 F. 865. Johnson Southern & O. R. 2d peake in- adequately 1. The 196 U. S. Pacific effect. structed to that p. 389. Supra, 298, 45 11. S. C. Stat. § 2. C. 45 U. Stat.