—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward H. Lehner, J.), entered January 30, 1992, which, inter alia, denied plaintiff’s motion seeking to disqualify the law firm of Rossner & Goodman ("the R & G firm”) and third-party defendant Andrew Goodman ("Goodman”) as counsel for defendants International Micro Optics, Ltd., Hickstech Corporation and Peter Sahagen ("defendants”), and order of the same court and Justice, entered September 3, 1992, which, inter alia, granted the motion by third-party defendants Goodman and the R & G firm to dismiss the third-party complaint as against the third-party defendants, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
Plaintiff, a New York law firm, commenced the underlying action against the defendants seeking to recover unpaid legal fees for services rendered by the plaintiff in connection with a contemplated, but ultimately unsuccessful, merger between defendants International Micro Optics, Ltd. and R-2000 Corporation.
The record reveals that the IAS Court properly dismissed, without an evidentiary hearing, the third-party complaint. It is well settled that bare legal conclusions and factual claims, which are either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence, as in the case at bar, are not presumed to be true on a motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency (Mark Hampton, Inc. v Bergreen,
The IAS Court also properly denied, without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff’s motion seeking to disqualify third-party defendants Goodman and the R & G firm from representing
Finally, the IAS Court properly rejected plaintiff’s contention, in seeking to disqualify third-party defendant Goodman as defendants’ counsel, that Goodman’s testimony will be required at trial, since it is well settled that a determination as to whether an attorney "ought to be called as a witness” (Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-102 [A] [22 NYCRR 1200.21 (a)]), and therefore should be disqualified, is based upon whether the attorney’s testimony is "necessary” (supra, at 445). The mere possibility that the attorney may be called to testify, as alleged by the plaintiff, is an inadequate excuse to justify disqualification (NYK Line v Mitsubishi Bank, supra), particularly where, as here, the testimony of third-party defendant Goodman would be merely cumulative to that of Jay Fox of the plaintiff’s own law firm, who is available to testify as to those matters related to him by Goodman concerning the failed corporate merger (H.H.B.K. 45th St. Corp. v Stern,
We have reviewed the plaintiff’s remaining claims and find them to be without merit. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Carro, Ellerin and Nardelli, JJ.
