delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1959 thе appellant had been committed to Patuxent Institution as a defective delinquent, but in 1962 he had been рlaced on a “work out — live in” status. While on this schedule, and while employed at Cypro, Inc. in Baltimore City as a machinist’s helper, he was apparently discharged. He returned next day and forcibly took money from two co-employees, an elderly man and a young woman, after he had threatened them with а screwdriver in the back and a letter opener in the throat. He left them bound and gagged and went to Nеw Jersey, where he subsequently surrendered to the New Jersey police. On December 5, 1962, he was taken bеfore a judge in New Jersey, where he refused an offer of counsel and waived extradition. He returnеd to Patuxent in an automobile with Captain Ingram of that institution and Lieutenant Carter.
The appellant was presented by the Grand Jury in Baltimore City on December 20, 1962, and indicted on January 10, 1963, on charges of robbery with a deadly weapon. On January 25, 1963, he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the offense, and insane at the time of trial. He was represented by court-appointed counsel, and elected a jury trial. Both employees testified and the State also introduced an оral confession made by the accused and reduced to writing. The jury found him guilty, sane then and sane now. He wаs sentenced to fifteen years on each indictment, to run concurrently, and remanded to Patuxent.
On this appeal the appellant contends (1) that the trial court *461 erred in charging the jury that the burden was uрon the appellant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) that the court committed reversible error in admitting evidence of the oral confession by the acсused, and (3) that there was reversible error in the proceedings prior to indictment, amounting to a deniаl of due process.
1. The State contends that the instruction was correct, but argues that even if it was nоt there was no reversible error because the defense produced no evidence of insanity sufficient to overcome the presumption of sanity.
Thomas v. State, 206
Md. 575,
Lipscomb v. State,
2. It is perfectly clear that no force or threats were used against the accused when he made thе oral confession. This occurred on the ride back to Maryland from New Jersey. The appellаnt was not even questioned in the matter. He volunteered the information as to how he had happеned to take the money, and why he had gone to New Jersey. He admitted he *462 had been glad to see thе Maryland officers, and complained of the treatment he had received from the New Jersey рolice. He questioned the Maryland officers as to what charges had been placed against him, and seemed relieved when told that, so far as they knew, the charges were escape and robbery. He admitted that what he told the officers was voluntary. Any connection between the alleged mistreatment by the New Jersey police and his statements to the Maryland police was effectively broken, as the trial court found.
3. The appellant’s last contention is based on the claim that he should hаve been taken before a magistrate upon his return to Maryland, and upon the undue delay betweеn his arrest and indictment. Actually, he was returned to Patuxent, to which he had been previously committed. He would not have been entitled to bail. The fact that he was not taken into court until after his indictment seems immаterial, under the circumstances. A preliminary hearing is not essential, or a necessary preliminary to a valid indictment.
Shorey v. State, 227
Md. 385;
Hardesty v. State,
Judgment affirmed.