O’CONNOR v. FULTON COUNTY et al.
S17A0880
Supreme Court of Georgia
September 13, 2017
302 Ga. 70
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
FINAL COPY
Aрpellant Patrick J. O’Connor appeals the grant of summary judgment to Appellees Fulton County and its County Manager, Richard Anderson, on his claims for breach of contract, mandamus relief, and attorney fees. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
As found by the trial court, the undisputed facts establish as follows. O’Connor was hired in 1996 as the CFO/Finance Director for Fulton County. At all relеvant times, O’Connor was an unclassified, at-will employee, and, though the Finance Director position was originally an “on-range position” — i.e., one that is on a pay scale — it was later changed to a set-rate position, which has a salary specifically approved by either the County Manager or the Fulton County Board of Commissioners (“the Board”). In October 2014, the Board appointed O’Connor as Interim County Manager. Just a few months later, however, O’Connor was removed from that position and given the option
In September 2015, O’Connor filed a three-count complaint against the County and its new County Manager seeking damages for breach of contract from the County, a writ of mandamus compelling Anderson to reinstate O’Connor to the position of Finance Director, and attorney fees from both parties. In his complaint, O’Connor asserted that the Fulton County Personnel Regulations constituted an employment contract and that, pursuant to Fulton County Personnel Regulation 300-4 (7), he was entitlеd to be returned to his former position as Finance Director after he was removed as Interim County Manager; O’Connor also asserted that, once reinstated to the former pоsition, his employment could only be terminated by the County Manager, not the Board, and, thus, sought a writ of mandamus compelling Anderson to return him to his former position.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees, concluding that the personnel regulations did not create an employment contract and that, even if they had, Personnel Regulation 300-4 (7) did not apply to O’Connor. The trial court also concluded that, because O’Connor could not prevail on his
1. As O’Connor recognizes in his brief, this appeal turns on whether the Fulton County Personnel Regulations amount to an employment contract and, if they do, whether they apply to him. The issues before this Court are purely legal, see City of Buchanan v. Pope, 222 Ga. App. 716, 717 (476 SE2d 53) (1996), and “[o]ur review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo.” See Southern States-Bartow County v. Riverwood Farm Homeowners Assn., 300 Ga. 609, 611 (797 SE2d 468) (2017).
Genеrally speaking, the policies and information in personnel or employee manuals1 neither create a contract, see, e.g., Ellison v. DeKalb County, 236 Ga. App. 185 (1) (511 SE2d 284) (1999), nor support a claim for breach of contract, see Jones v. Chatham County, 223 Ga. App. 455 (5) (477 SE2d 889) (1996). Nevertheless, “an at-will employment relationship can give rise to certain contrаctual rights.” See Shelnut v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of
When interpreting this regulаtion, we must give effect to its plain and unambiguous provisions. See City of Buchanan, 222 Ga. App. at 717. Fulton County Personnel Regulation 300-4 (7) states as follows:
Any permanent Classified or permanent Unclassified on-range employee, who is required by the Appointing Authority,
or designee, to work in an acting or interim capacity whereby he/she performs the duties of a vacant existing higher classification and position outside of his/her regular classification/position for twenty (20) or more consecutive workdays in one (1) calendar year, shall receive the salary of the acting or interim position effective on the twenty-first (21st) workday. Such appointment shall not exceed one (1) year. An Appointing Authority shall not appoint an employee unless such employee meets the eligibility requirements for the higher class. Once the employee is no longer performing the duties in the higher classification and position, he/she shall be returned to his/her former classification and position and to the salary at which he/she would have been entitled had he/she remained in the position. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.) By its plain language, Regulation 300-4 (7) does not guarantee future compensation; instead, it speaks to the administration of certain temporary appointments. The mentions of salary are in the context of a temрorary appointment (or a return therefrom) and the referenced salary is plainly contingent upon continued employment. Indeed, the nature of O’Connor’s argument supports our reading of the regulation; namely, O’Connor asserts that Regulation 300-4 (7) gave him a contractual right to return to his former position at the conclusion of his temporary appointment; any concern regarding future compensation is dependent upon and collateral to his central
Simply put, Regulation 300-4 (7) controls the administration of certain temporary appointments and does not amount to a promise of future compensation; accordingly, the рrovision does not form the basis of an employment contract. Compare Shelnut, 333 Ga. App. at 451-452 (2) (contract created by policy that explicitly addressed salary and provided “for an automatic increase at a definite percentage upon promotion to a supervisory position”), and Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Metzger, 203 Ga. App. 595 (2) (417 SE2d 163) (1992) (provision controlling disability pay for on-the-job injury constituted enforсeable contract).
Moreover, even if this Court were to construe O’Connor’s argument as a true claim for breach of contract premised on future compensation and tо conclude that Regulation 300-4 (7) is a provision that could give rise to such a
2. O’Connor also argues that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling Anderson, the new County Manager, to reinstate him as Finance Director. Again relying оn Regulation 300-4 (7), O’Connor asserts that he was automatically returned to his former position as Finance Director when he was removed as Interim County Manager and that he has never beеn lawfully removed from that position. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, as explained above, Regulation 300-4 (7) is inapplicable to
3. Finally, because O’Connor has not prevailed on his claim for damages, the trial court correctly concluded that he was not еntitled to attorney fees under
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Mandamus. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Campbell.
Parks, Chesin & Walbert, J. Matthew Maguire, Jr., for appellant.
Jerolyn W. Ferrari, Kristen B. Williams, Paula R. Miller, Kaye W. Burwell, Dominique A. Martinez, for appellees.