O'BRIEN v. EscherO'BRIEN v. Escher
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Pelander
¶ 1 In these consolidated special actions, petitioners Jeremy Sean O’Brien and April Luette Stockton ask us to decide whether the November 2002 amendment by referendum of
SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION
¶ 2 In their underlying criminal cases, petitioners were convicted of first-time drug offenses subject to Proposition 200 and were placed on probation pursuant to
¶ 3 In light of the pending jail terms, which would be served by the time any appeal could be heard, petitioners do not have an equally plain, speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal. See Ariz. R.P. Special Actions 1(a), 17B A.R.S.; see also Green v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 468, 470, 647 P.2d 166, 168 (1982) (remedy by appeal inadequate because “[n]o matter how much the appeal might be expedited, petitioner would have served at least a substantial part of ... [his] jail time before disposition”); Washington v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 91, 93, 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (App. 1994) (remedy of post-conviction proceeding inadequate because probationer would have served probationary incarceration while such proceeding was pending). In addition, our acceptance of jurisdiction of these special actions is appropriate because the cases raise questions of law that are of statewide importance, apparently of first impression, and likely to recur. See State ex rel. Romley v. Martin, 203 Ariz. 46, ¶ 4, 49 P.3d 1142, ¶ 4 (App.2002); Baker v. Superior Court, 190 Ariz. 336, 338, 947 P.2d 910, 912 (App.1997). We therefore accept jurisdiction of these special actions.
BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In October 2001, Stockton pled guilty to solicitation to possess a narcotic drug, a class six, open-ended offense that she committed in January 2001. She was placed on probation for three years in November 2001 pursuant to
¶ 5 O’Brien was convicted pursuant to a plea agreement of solicitation to possess a narcotic drug and possession of drug paraphernalia based on offenses he committed in June 2001. He was placed on probation in July. On January 15, 2003, after finding O’Brien had violated his probation conditions by committing new drug-related offenses, the respondent judge extended O’Brien’s probationary period and ordered him to serve a ninety-day jail term.
DISCUSSION
I. Retroactive Application of Amended § 13-901.0KE)
¶ 6 Both petitioners’ convictions were subject to Arizona’s “Drug Mediealization, Prevention, and Control Act of 1996,” commonly known as Proposition 200, a ballot initiative passed by the electorate in 1996 and codified as
A person who has béen placed on probation under the provisions of this section and who is determined by the court to be in violation of probation shall have new conditions of probation established by the court. The court shall select the additional conditions it deems necessary, including intensified drug treatment, community service, intensive probation, home arrest, or any other such sanctions short of incarceration.
1999 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 261, § 11. As Division One of this court has noted, that subsection “require[d] that Proposition 200 probation violators be reinstated on probation with additional conditions,” and “incarceration [wa]s not an available option.” Tousignant, 202 Ariz. 270, ¶¶ 6, 8, 43 P.3d 218, ¶¶ 6, 8.
¶ 7 By a referendum election held on November 5, 2002, the voters approved H.C.R. 2013 (2002), commonly known as Proposition 302, which amended
A person who has been placed on probation pursuant to this section and who is determined by the court to be in violation of probation shall have new conditions of probation established by the court. The court shall select the additional conditions it deems necessary, including intensified drug treatment, community service, intensive probation, home arrest or any other sanctions except that the court shall not impose a term of incarceration unless the court determines that the person violated probation by committing an offense listed in chapter 34 or 34.1 of this title or an act in violation of an order of the court relating to drug treatment.
Thus, the amended statute currently permits sentencing judges to incarcerate a person convicted of a first-time, Proposition 200 offense who later commits certain “violations of the terms of his or her probation.
¶ 8 Both O’Brien and Stockton objected to the imposition of jail terms as probationary conditions, arguing that the amended version of
¶ 9 Section § 1-244, A.R.S., states that “[n]o statute is retroactive unless expressly declared therein.” Neither Proposition 302 nor its resulting amendment to
When the penalty for an offense is prescribed by one law and altered by a subsequent law, the penalty of such second law shall not be inflicted for a breach of the law committed before the second took effect, but the offender shall be punished under the law in force when the offense was committed.
That statute “is a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent that an offender’s punishment is to be determined when he commits his offense.” Baker, 190 Ariz. at 339, 947 P.2d at 913 (Proposition 200 not applicable to defendants who committed specified offenses before Act’s effective date but were convicted thereafter); see also State v. Jensen, 193 Ariz. 105, ¶ 16, 970 P.2d 937, ¶ 16 (App.1998).
¶ 10 We must first determine whether the respondent judge actually gave retroactive effect to
¶ 11 Preliminarily, we agree with Stockton, and the state does not disagree,’ that “a statute authorizing the incarceration of ... individual[s and] depriving them of their liberty deals with substantive rights.”
See id.
at ¶ 18. By ordering petitioners to serve jail terms based on the amended statute, the respondent judge disturbed a vested, substantive right of petitioners by altering the legal consequences of their convictions as those consequences existed at the time Stockton and O’Brien committed their offenses, January 11 and June 20, 2001, respectively. At the time petitioners committed the offenses that resulted in their convictions and placement on probation,
¶ 12 Similarly,
¶ 13 That a jail term constitutes a sanction is clear, albeit that it may be imposed as a condition of probation. See State v. Fuentes, 26 Ariz.App. 444, 449, 549 P.2d 224, 229 (1976) (“[B]oth the imposition of probation and the subsequent imprisonment after revocation constitute punishment flowing from the same offense.”); see generally Calik; cf. State v. Gandara, 174 Ariz. 105, 107, 847 P.2d 606, 608 (App.1992) (mandatory period of incarceration as condition of probation for persons convicted of aggravated driving while under influence of intoxicant was penalty commensurate with seriousness of offense that served legislature’s stated purpose of deterring persons from committing such offenses). Absent express statutory authority, “a trial court cannot legally combine a prison or jail sentence with probation.” State v. Sanchez, 191 Ariz. 418, 419, 956 P.2d 1240, 1241 (App.1997).
¶ 14 Our conclusion that a jail term as a condition of probation is a penalty for purposes of
¶ 15 Moreover, to the extent the respondent judge imposed the jail terms as punishment for the violations of probation rather than for the underlying offenses, she lacked the authority to do so.
2
Although a court may impose a new condition of probation, or revoke probation and impose an authorized sentence on the underlying conviction, courts are not authorized to newly punish a defendant for the subsequent violation of the conditions of probation.
State v. Herrera,
121 Ariz. 12, 15, 588 P.2d 305, 308 (1978) (punishment imposed after revocation of probation is not for violating probation conditions but for original charge);
State v. Baum,
182 Ariz. 138, 140, 893 P.2d 1301, 1303 (App.1995) (trial court erroneously punished defendant for violating probation conditions rather than for offense resulting in conviction and probation). The jail terms the respondent judge imposed constituted punishment for petitioners’ underlying offenses. Because incarceration was not statutorily authorized under
¶ 16 As noted above, O’Brien also contends application of the amended version of
II. Application of Estrada to Prior Paraphernalia Convictions
¶ 17 In November 2001, our supreme court held in Estrada that the sentencing provisions of Proposition 200 apply to persons convicted a first and second time of possessing drug paraphernalia for personal use. Acknowledging that the relevant statutes do not specifically include possession of paraphernalia among the offenses for which Proposition 200 expressly mandates probation and prohibits incarceration, the court nevertheless included it. The court reasoned that, “[f]rom time to time, ... we encounter circumstances in which the plain text of a statute, because of ambiguity or outright silence, fails to give effect to the legislature’s obvious intent. As importantly, we interpret and apply statutory language in a way that will avoid an untenable or irrational result.” 201 Ariz. 247, ¶ 16, 34 P.3d 356, ¶ 16. The court added:
Proposition 200’s intent provisions, which explicitly call for treatment rather than incarceration of first time drug offenders in order to reduce drug use and preserve prison space for more dangerous criminals, make it clear that the electorate, acting in the role of the legislature, did not intend to incarcerate for the lesser offense and yet mandate probation for the more serious.
Id. at ¶ 20.
¶ 18 The’ court in Estrada did not state whether its decision applied to defendants who had committed paraphernalia offenses before that decision was filed. “A court is neither required nor prohibited from applying a decision retrospectively,” and “a state court may make the choice for itself between prospective or retrospective application of its decisions.” State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 360, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359, 1360 (1978). Because O’Brien was convicted not only of solicitation to possess a narcotic drug but also of possession of drug paraphernalia for personal use, and because he committed those offenses several months before Estrada was decided, we must determine whether Estrada applies to his case to preclude the imposition of a jail term for the paraphernalia offense.
¶ 19 For his paraphernalia offense, O’Brien’s plea agreement provided that “as a condition of probation the defendant may be incarcerated 12 months in the Pima County Jail.” 3 The agreement further provided that, if O’Brien was later determined to have violated his conditions of probation, the court could impose additional conditions, one of which was “any other such sanctions within the jurisdiction of the court.”
¶ 20 The respondent judge noted at O’Brien’s disposition hearing that his plea agreement expressly permitted her to impose any sanction within her jurisdiction in the event O’Brien violated his probation conditions; she concluded that a jail term was within her jurisdiction, particularly because O’Brien had committed the paraphernalia offense before the supreme court’s decision in Estrada. But if Estrada applies to O’Brien’s disposition, then, as the state suggested in its response and implicitly conceded at oral argument, the foregoing provisions of the plea agreement are void, and the respondent judge exceeded her authority by imposing the jail term on that offense after O’Brien violated his conditions of probation. O’Brien argues that, “[bjeeause the court’s holding in Estrada concerned the meaning of §’ 13-901.01, the holding applie[s] to those who had committed drug offenses before Estrada was decided.” We agree.
¶ 21 Estrada was riot a change in the law, procedural or substantive, for purposes of retroactivity analysis. Consequently, we are not required to apply the federal retroactivity analysis in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), to determine whether Estrada applies to O’Brien. Cf. State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, ¶ 5, 64 P.3d 828, ¶ 5 (2003); State v. Slem mer, 170 Ariz. 174, 828 P.2d 41 (1991). Rather, as the state acknowledged at oral argument, our supreme court’s determination that possession of drug paraphernalia falls within the scope of Proposition 200 was based on the court’s interpretation of what the law was always intended to include. Cf. Nation v. Colla, 173 Ariz. 245, 256, 841 P.2d 1370, 1381 (App.1991) (in determining applicability and scope of immunity of state official in federal civil rights action, court stated that interpretation of a statute does not change prior law; rather, it clarifies what law meant all along). Nor was Estrada otherwise a sharp break with the past that created new law. Therefore, it applies to O’Brien, even assuming arguendo that application may be regarded as retroactive. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2586-87, 73 L.Ed.2d 202, 213 (1982).
¶22 We find this situation analogous to that faced by the court in
State v. Arizona Department of Corrections,
187 Ariz. 211, 928 P.2d 635 (1996), in which our supreme court clarified the applicability of its decision in
State v. Tarango,
185 Ariz. 208, 914 P.2d 1300 (1996). In
Tarango,
the court held that, when the state seeks enhanced penalties for dangerous or repetitive crimes pursuant to
We did not change the meaning of§ 13-604 in Tarango, we simply construed its meaning and its application to those who were sentenced under it. To hold that§ 13-604 meant something different for inmates sentenced prior to Tarango would be a logical impossibility. Simply put, there is no retroactivity issue here.
187 Ariz. at 213, 928 P.2d at 637.
¶23 Similarly, “there is no retroactivity issue” raised by the question of whether Estrada applies to O’Brien. Id. Having concluded that the electorate could not have intended to exclude from the scope of Proposition 200 a charge of possession of drug paraphernalia for personal use, the court in Estrada merely declared what the law had always been intended to include. Consequently, the provisions of O’Brien’s plea agreement that provide otherwise and permit imposition of a jail term either initially or upon the violation of conditions of probation are void. Cf. Coy (because plea agreement provided illegally long term of probation, trial court was required to impose shorter term in accordance with statutes and state could not withdraw from agreement). And because the state has confessed error and, at least implicitly, has conceded that the proper remedy here is to disallow the imposition of a period of incarceration, we strike the void portions of the plea agreement.
CONCLUSION
¶ 24 We conclude that the amended version of
Notes
. Only O’Brien provided this court the transcript of the disposition hearing.
. As she had at O’Brien‘s disposition hearing, the respondent judge stated in her minute entry for that hearing that she had imposed jail time “as a sanction for violating the conditions of probation.”
. That provision apparently was based on State v. Holm, 195 Ariz. 42, 985 P.2d 527 (App.1998), which was expressly disapproved in Estrada. 201 Ariz. 247, ¶ 26, 34 P.3d 356, ¶ 26.