MEMORANDUM OPINION
NYKCool has been struggling to collect a judgment previously entered against defendants-in-interest Pacific Fruit Inc. and Kelso Enterprises Ltd. — companies owned by defendant Alvaro Fernando Noboa Ponton (“Noboa”) — for years. These attempts have been frustrated at every turn. Each time a judgment has been awarded against a new company in Noboa’s organization, that company has transferred assets elsewhere, rendering itself judgment proof.
After several years of this, NYKCool moved for a default judgment in the amount of $6,956,036.17 agaiiist Noboa himself. Noboa moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and alleged insufficiency of service of process
Background
I. Sufficiency of Service of Process
A. Facts
NYKCool filed a complaint against No-boa and several companies that he is alleged to own on July 26, 2012, seeking to pierce the corporate veil and collect from them the judgment that this Court previously had entered against Pacific and Kel-so.
On October 12, 2012, NYKCool sent copies of the summons and complaint by e
NYKCool subsequently amended the complaint to add Truisfruit, S.A., another Noboa company, as a defendant. Judge Peck ordered that service be made on Truisfruit at El Oro 101 Intersección. Vive-ro — 5 Junio, Guayaquil, Ecuador.
B. The R & R
The R & R recommends finding that service by e-mail was permissible and adequate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3), which allows the court to order service on a foreign individual “by other means not prohibited by international agreement.” The R & R reasons that “under the circumstances presented here — i.e., years of litigation resulting form NYKCool’s efforts to enforce a judgment that Noboa and his companies have made every effort to avoid and where NYKCool had no residence address for Noboa — service on the e-mail address to which users are directed from Noboa’s website, pursuant to this Court’s October 2, 2012 Order, was sufficient service under Rule 4(f)(3) and was reasonably calculated to apprise Noboa of the lawsuit and give him an opportunity to respond.”
The R & R recommends finding that service of the amended complaint was insufficient, however. Although Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii) allows service on an individual in a foreign country “using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed receipt,”
C. Noboa’s Objections
Noboa objects to the R & R’s recommendation that the Court find that service
II. Personal Jurisdiction
A.Allegations
The complaint and amended complaint both allege that Noboa “controls the defendant and defendants in interest corporations and others as ‘sham’ and ‘alter ego’ companies in the business of the growing, transportation and sale of fresh fruit. He has stated in a web site in his name that he has, through the acquisition of the control of his father’s businesses, taken ‘control over the world’s fourth largest banana business.’ ”
Pacific Fruit and several of Noboa’s other companies are alleged to be “organized and existing pursuant to the láws of the State of New York” and they have not contested the exercise of general jurisdiction.
B. The R & R
The R & R recommends finding that there is jurisdiction over Noboa because he is alleged adequately to be an alter ego of his companies, which are subject to general jurisdiction in New York. It notes that NYKCool alleges that “Noboa owns and controls the defendant companies, [and] that money was, and is, routinely funneled throughout all pf the defendant companies at Noboa’s whim.”
C. Noboa’s Objections
Noboa objects to the R & R’s recommendation that the Court find that it has personal jurisdiction over him. He argues that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to support a finding of general jurisdiction based on an alter ego theory and that such jurisdiction may not be constitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Daimler AG v. Bau-man.,
Finally, Noboa makes an entirely con-clusory argument that the Court does not
Discussion
I. Sufficiency of Service of Process
The Court is not insensitive to the considerable inconvenience and expense that NYKCool undoubtedly has incurred in attempting to enforce the judgment against the defendants. But it is not persuaded that NYKCool’s attempt to serve Noboa by e-mail was sufficient under Rule 4(f) and the Due Process Clause.
Rule 4(f), which governs service of an individual in a foreign country, provides that service is proper in the following circumstances:
“(1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;
“(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably calculated to give notice:
“(A) as prescribed by the foreign country’s law for service in that country in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction;
“(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or
“(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country’s law, by:
“(i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; or
“(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed receipt; or
“(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders.”23
As an initial matter, it is not necessary to exhaust or demonstrate the impossibility of service under Rules 4(f)(l)-(2) before resorting to service under Rule 4(f)(3).
Service by e-mail is appropriate under Rule 4(f)(3) in some circumstances. In evaluating whether a particular method of service is sufficient, “the court must determine whether the alternative method is reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”
NYKCool has failed to show that service by e-mail to direccion@cruzadanue vahumanidad.org was reasonably calculated to reach Noboa. “Although courts have upheld service via e-mail, those cases involved e-mail addresses undisputedly connected to the defendants and that the defendants used for business purposes.”
The Court therefore holds that NYKCool’s attempt to serve Noboa via email was not sufficient because it was not reasonably calculated to provide him with notice of the claims against him. In addition, the Court adopts the R & R’s recommendation that it hold that service of the amended complaint by Federal Express to an incorrect address was not sufficient.
In view of the foregoing, and bearing in' mind that Noboa has actual knowledge of this lawsuit, the Court hereby orders, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3), that the plaintiff may serve the summons and amended complaint on No-boa by serving copies of those papers by email on the attorneys who have appeared
II. Personal Jurisdiction
The showing that a plaintiff must make to defeat a defendant’s claim that the court lacks jurisdiction over it depends on the posture of the litigation. “Prior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may defeat the motion by pleading in good faith legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction.... After discovery, the plaintiffs prima facie showing, necessary to defeat a jurisdiction testing motion, must include an averment of facts that, if credited by the trier, would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant.”
NYKCool argues that the Court has jurisdiction over Noboa because it has general jurisdiction over several of his companies, including several that are New York corporations, all of which are Noboa’s alter egos. “[I]n general, ‘alter egos are treated as' one entity’ for jurisdictional purposes.”
Noboa urges the Court to conclude that jurisdiction based on an alter ego theory is impermissible in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Daimler.
The Second Circuit in Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding AS'.,
Noboa objects also on the basis that NYKCool has not alleged adequate facts to make out a prima facie case that Noboa and his companies are alter, egos. The Court disagrees and overrules Noboa’s objections in this point. It adopts the R & R’s recommended finding that “[i]n the context of a default, NYKCool’s allegations, including that Noboa owns and controls the defendant companies, that money was, and is, routinely funneled throughout all of the defendant companies at Noboa’s whim, and that the defendant companies are not entitled to be treated as legal entities separate from Noboa, are sufficient to establish that Noboa and the defendant companies are alter egos.”
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Noboa’s objections to the R & R are sustained to the extent that the Court concludes that service of process on Noboa was insufficient and overruled in all other respects. The motion for a default judgment [DI 157] is denied without prejudice to a new motion in the event NYKCool serves Noboa and Noboa defaults.
SO ORDERED.
. DI 171, 174, at 8-12.
. DI 178.
. 'DI 179.
. 10 Civ. 3867, DI 47.
. Oct. 2, 2012 Tr. [DI 29] at 2:13-14.
. Compl. ¶ 3 ("The underlying contract of af-freightment was negotiated solely by Noboa with the President of NYKCool over the course of several days at Noboa’s residence in Ecuador.”).
. DI 29 at 2:32-3:5.
. Id. at 3:20-4:6.
. DI 116.
. DI 210, Ex. A. Dr. Jenny Arteaga, the Foundation’s director, submitted a declaration in which she affirmed that Exhibit A is a letter that she sent to the Court in December 2012. The letter itself, in which she denies that the Foundation received the summons and complaint, is not a sworn statement.
. DI 114 at 5.
. DI 121.
. R&R[DI 199] at 17.
. Id. at 14-15.
. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(C)(ii).
. Compl. ¶ 22.
. Id. ¶ 23 ("Pacific Fruit’s witness testified: ‘Q: What did Mr. Noboa want the $2.3 million credit to be applied? A. He just wanted — he actually just wanted a check for 2.3 million. Q. To his — to him? A. To him. I mean, I’m sure he would have worked out something where it was a credit to have something, but he’s — you know, I want my check.' ”).
. Id.
. Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 28, (Pacific International, Inc., Pan American Trading Company, Inc., and Pacific Fruit all are alleged to be organized under New York law).
. DI 199 at 19.
. - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (20T4).
. Actual notice of the lawsuit is not sufficient. Martin v. New York State Dept. of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 373 (2d Cir.1978).
. Judge Peck’s statement that it was his "inclination [] to allow service via Mr. Noboa’s Web site” was not a court order for the purposes of Rule 4(f)(3).
. Ehrenfeld v. Salim a Bin Mahfouz, 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2005 WL 696769, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005) (" 'Service of process under Rule 4(f)(3) is neither a last resort nor extraordinary relief. It is merely one means among several which enables service of process on an international defendant.' ” (quoting Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir.2002))).
.See, e.g., Philip Monis USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., 06 Civ. 2988(GBD), 2007 WL 725412, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007) ("Plaintiff, when requesting permission to serve by fax and email, demonstrated both the inadequacy of service on defendants by methods under Rule 4(0(1 )-(2), and the likelihood that the proposed alternative methods would succeed.”); Ehrenfeld, 2005 WL 696769, at *2 (noting that "[pllaintiff has reasonably asserted that the Court’s intervention is needed here” and describing the proffered reasons that service by conventional means would not be possible); see also Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 02 Civ. 0133(JTE), 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002) ("Accordingly, although a party need not exhaust all possible
. Philip Morris, 2007 WL 725412, at *2.
. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).
. Ehrenfeld, 2005 WL 696769, at *3.
. Id. (finding that service by e-mail was not sufficient where there was no evidence that "[d]efendant maintains the website, monitors the e-mail address, or would be likely to receive information transmitted to the e-mail address.”). In Ehrenfeld, as here, the plaintiff had identified a website that it believed the defendant ran and an associated e-mail address.
. Id.
. See, e.g., KPN B.V. v. Corcyra D.O.O., 08 Civ. 1549(JGK), 2009 WL 690119, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009).
. Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.1990) (citations omitted).
. SEC v. Aimsi Techs., Inc., 650 F.Supp.2d 296, 301 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
. Noboa submitted two affidavits with his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The first is of the president of Truisfruit and the second is of an expert on comparative law. Neither is particularly relevant to the question of personal jurisdiction, which allegedly is based on Noboa's alter ego status with all of his companies — not just Truisfruit.
. Transfield ER Cape Ltd. v. Indus. Carriers, Inc., 571 F.3d 221, 224 (2d Cir.2009).
. Int'l Equity Investments, Inc. v. Opportunity Equity Partners, Ltd., 475 F.Supp.2d 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (quoting Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir.1981)).
.Daimler AG v. Bauman, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014).
Noboa asserts in a footnote that the R & R "fails to analyze alter ego jurisdiction under Ecuadorian law, as required.” DI 209 at 8, n. 10. As an initial matter, at least one of the companies as to which Noboa is alleged to be an alter ego (Pacific Fruit Inc.) is incorporated in New York. Moreover, the cases he cites do not support the proposition that a court must do any such thing. In United States v. Funds Held ex rel. Wetterer, 210 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.2000), the court merely noted that Guatemalan corporate law — which the record addressed- — was relevant to the question whether the company at issue in fact had failed to adhere to corporate formalities. It did not require that district courts consider foreign corporate law, particularly where neither party*393 offers any indication of what that law would be and they have not complied with Rule 44.1. See Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 440-41 (3d Cir.1999).
. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 759.
. Id.
.Id.
. 750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir.2014).
.. Id. at 225.
. DI 199 at 19.
. The fact that service of process is quashed eliminates any default by Noboa to date. Assuming he is served, he may litigate the personal jurisdiction motion on its merits.