delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this original proceeding, Thomas Lee Nye, hereinafter called the petitioner, requests that this Court issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the Adams County District Court, hereinafter called the respondent, from proceеding to determine the paternity of an illegitimate child in an action brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, C.R.S. 1963, 43-2-1 et. seq.
On Octobеr 9, 1968, Josephine Allen initiated proceedings under the Reciprocal Support Act in Indiana, alleging that the petitioner is the father of her minor child, and requesting an order of support. After appropriate рroceedings, the cause was transferred to the respondent cоurt, which issued a summons to the petitioner, who resides in Colorado. The reсord clearly reflects that Josephine and the petitioner have never been married, and that the child is illegitimate. In his answer to the petitiоn for support, the petitioner denied the paternity of the .child, and. requested the respondent court to dis *274 miss the action. Among other defensеs, he alleged that the respondent court has no jurisdiction to determinе the paternity of the child in a proceeding brought under the Reciprоcal Support Act. The affidavit accompanying his answer states thаt the paternity of the child has never been adjudicated. The motion tо dismiss having been denied, petitioner applied for, and we issued a rule to the respondent court and the judge thereof to show cause why the rеquested relief should not be granted.
Before a duty to support an illegitimate child can be imposed, it must be established that the person upon whоm the obligation to support is imposed is, in truth, the father of the child. To support his contention that the respondent court has no jurisdiction to determine paternity in a proceeding brought under the Reciprocal Suрport Act, petitioner relies solely on
Aguilar v. Holcomb,
In an effort to distinguish Aguilar from the present case, the respondent contends that when Aguilar was promulgated, one was barred from bringing a paternity action after one year from the birth of the child, whеreas the Children’s Code now permits such an action to be brought within 5 years аfter the birth of the child. See 1967 Perm. Supp. C.R.S. 1963, 22-6-1. He points out that since the child invоlved here was born on April 13, 1966, a paternity action under the Children’s Code would not be barred even now, insofar as the time limitation is concerned, and that therefore the rule of Aguilar should not apply.
Nevertheless, we have before us only the narrow
*275
question whether the respondent court has the jurisdiction to determine the paternity of the child in proceedings brоught under the Reciprocal Support Act, and not under the Children’s Code. We said in
Aguilar
that there was no power under the Reciprocal Support Act to determine paternity. Because the legislature has met several times since
Aguilar
without amending the statute, we deem the construction which wе have placed on the statute to have the approval оf the people and to have become a part of the law of this state. See,
e.g., Lyons v. Egan,
We have examined the cases cited by the respondent court and find nothing in them which would permit us to overrule Aguilar v. Holcomb, supra. It is for the legislature, and not for this Court, to amend the statute.
The rule is made absolute.