NYACK HOSPITAL, as Assignee of ALLEN ZADWYDAS, et al., Appellants, v GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION et al., Respondents.
Second Department
December 27, 2005
808 N.Y.S.2d 399
Joseph Henig, P.C., Bellmore, for appellants.
Freiberg & Peck, LLP, New York City (Craig J. Freiberg and Matthew E. Schaefer of counsel), for respondents.
OPINION OF THE COURT
COZIER, J.
The issue before us is whether an insurer violates
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Nyack Hospital (hereinafter the plaintiff) treated Allen Zadwydas (hereinafter Allen) from July 15, 2003, through August 6, 2003, for injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, Allen was a covered person under an automobile insurance policy issued by the insurer defendants General Motors Acceptance Corporation and GMAC Insurance Company Online, Inc. (hereinafter the defendants). The subject policy, which included a New York State no-fault endorsement, provided, inter alia, coverage for basic economic loss up to $50,000 per person/per accident, with additional Optional Basic Economic Loss (hereinafter OBEL) coverage of $25,000 per person.
The plaintiff, as assignee of Allen, submitted to the defendants, by certified mail, return receipt requested, a hospital fa
The defendants cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action the plaintiff asserted against them. The defendants argued that the policy limits had been exhausted through payment of no-fault claims submitted by other health care providers, as well as a final partial payment to the plaintiff in the sum of $19,325.67, and that there was no coverage available for the remaining hospital bill balance of $55,163.61.
The defendants also argued that the 30-day time frame in which to either pay or deny the claim was tolled by the verification request they forwarded to the plaintiff on September 12, 2003. The defendants requested Allen‘s complete inpatient hospital records as additional verification to determine whether to pay or deny the claim, and to assess the medical necessity of the services rendered. According to the defendants, the 30-day period commenced on October 20, 2003, when they received Allen‘s complete inpatient hospital records, which constituted complete proof of the plaintiff‘s claim.
The defendants submitted a payment log establishing that following receipt of the NF-5 form and the UB-92 form, and prior to October 20, 2003, they paid $29,811.12 in satisfaction of bills submitted by other health care providers for medical services provided to Allen following the plaintiff‘s medical treatment, as well as payment requests by Allen for his lost wages. The defendants’ payment log indicated, inter alia, that from July 30, 2003, through August 19, 2003, prior to the defendants’
The defendants also proffered evidence that upon their receipt of the plaintiff‘s completed claim in the sum of $74,489.28 on October 20, 2003, they were required by
Moreover, the documentary evidence confirmed that on December 8, 2003, the defendants forwarded to the plaintiff the sum of $19,325.67 for health care provider expenses, and on December 9, 2003, denied payment of the remaining balance of $55,163.61 on the ground that the policy limits had been exhausted. Accordingly, the defendants argued that the evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment for the remaining balance of the policy since the policy limits had been exhausted by the defendants’ payment of bills submitted by other health care providers, as well as the defendants’ final partial payment to the plaintiff in the sum of $19,325.67.
The Supreme Court denied that branch of the plaintiff‘s motion which was for summary judgment in its favor on the cause of action to recover no-fault medical benefits allegedly due for Allen‘s hospital bill, and granted that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action.
DISCUSSION
However, the 30-day period in which to either pay or deny a claim may be extended where the insurer submits within 15 business days of its receipt of the claim, a request for additional verification (see
Contrary to the plaintiff‘s contention, the fact that the defendants mailed the request for additional verification two days beyond the 15-day period did not render the request invalid. Rather,
However, the defendants’ 28-day period was further tolled by the defendants’ October 20, 2003, receipt of claims aggregating in excess of $30,000 for basic economic loss. Once the defendants received the plaintiff‘s completed claim in the sum of $74,489.28 on October 20, 2003, they were required to forward to Allen within 15 days of receiving such claim, an OBEL form for him to elect the manner in which OBEL coverage would be applied (see
As the defendants correctly contend, they were required to defer payment of OBEL benefits for claims submitted by or on Allen‘s behalf until he elected the manner in which OBEL coverage would be applied (see
Prior to the defendants’ receipt of the plaintiff‘s completed claim on October 20, 2003, the defendants paid other claims totaling $29,811.12. Once the defendants paid OBEL benefits to Allen for lost earnings, the remaining balance under the policy was $19,325.67. Although the defendants forwarded to the plaintiff the sum of $19,325.67 for health care provider expenses, they were not required to pay the remaining hospital bill balance of $55,163.61, as the policy limits had been exhausted by the defendants’ partial payment to the plaintiff (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 533 [2004]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., supra at 570). “[W]here as here, an insurer has paid the full monetary limits set forth in the policy, its duties under the contract of insurance cease” (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 216 AD2d 448, 448 [1995]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra).
The plaintiff maintains that the defendants violated
“[w]hen claims aggregate to more than $50,000, payments for basic economic loss shall be made to the applicant and/or an assignee in the order in which each service was rendered or each expense was incurred, provided claims therefor were made to the insurer prior to the exhaustion of the $50,000. If the insurer pays the $50,000 before receiving claims for services rendered prior in time to those which were paid, the insurer will not be liable to pay such late claims. If the insurer receives claims of a number of providers of services, at the same time, the payments shall be made in the order of rendition of services.” (Emphasis added.)
However, it is well settled that “[n]o-fault benefits are overdue if not paid within 30 calendar days after the insurer receives proof of claim, which shall include verification of all of the relevant information requested” (
Here, the plaintiff‘s initial claim for payment was premature, and was not complete until the defendants received additional verification of the claim on October 20, 2003 (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., supra at 570; St. Vincent‘s Hosp. of Richmond v American Tr. Ins. Co., supra at 340; Nyack Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., supra at 483). The defendants were not required to either pay or deny the plaintiff‘s claim until they received the requested verification (see New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., supra at 570; New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Country-Wide Ins. Co., supra at 584; Westchester County Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., supra at 554).
However, once the defendants received the requested verification, they were precluded from submitting any payment until
Accordingly, the defendants’ payment of no-fault claims to other health care providers for services rendered following the plaintiff‘s initial treatment, where such claims were submitted after the plaintiff‘s initial claim and while verification of the plaintiff‘s initial claim was pending, did not violate
Thus, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from by the plaintiff Nyack Hospital, as assignee of Allen Zadwydas, and the appeal by St. Vincent‘s Hospital of Richmond, as assignee of Dequan Fields, is dismissed, as that entity is not aggrieved by the order appealed from (see
S. MILLER, RIVERA and FISHER, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the appeal by St. Vincent‘s Hospital of Richmond, as assignee of Dequan Fields, is dismissed, as that entity is not aggrieved by the order appealed from (see
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from by the plaintiff Nyack Hospital, as assignee of Allen Zadwydas; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants.
